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When I painted Joko Widodo 
The portrait I painted of Joko Widodo in August 2014 was to open the story of resistance toward a 
general involved in the 1998 student shootings. I painted two portraitures of Wiji Thukul the previous 
month. 1998’s history and the massive sexual attack on Indonesian Chinese women have been 
denounced from official records and documents. History is written by the victors, and (her)story is 
written on muted walls. The politics of memory, Gesichtspolitik, has never occupied a central place in our 
self-understanding of national history. Poetry is a measure, an attempt, an attest, that goes beyond a 
genocide memorial—a national monument to victims of past conflict, mass-rape, land-grab and massive 
angst under the repressive Authoritarian New Order regime. Hopes for Joko Widodo are dim at present 
with the weakening-function of KPK under his patronage. Colors in the portrait are intended to exhibit a 
poetic voicelessness. Gesichtspolitik is meant to give voice to those who are being disremembered. 
Painting addresses the role of politics in shaping collective memory. They connect the construction of 
identity and monuments to justice (Surakarta, 24 February 2015).  
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 From the Editor:              
To Whom It May Concern 
I am a daughter of Indonesian history and I believe in 1965 
(A poem by Yacinta Kurniasih, September 2014) 
The International Journal of Indonesian Studies [IJIS] is proud to present its Autumn Issue, 2015. It 
has been a long-learning process for all of us in the IJIS Coordinating Editorial Board, since we 
launched our inaugural edition in November 2013. We are grateful for everyone’s patience as our 
“baby” overcomes the first and admittedly faltering steps in its development.There are of course 
many people to thank. We thank firstly our contributors who are mostly early career researchers, 
Phd students, and even ‘first timers’ to publish their work in English. We also thank our reviewers, 
without whom we could not begin to consolidate the academic credentials and integrity of IJIS. 
The Autumn Issue again presents a variety of subjects in the field of contemporary Indonesian 
Studies: political history, linguistics, Islam and democracy, gay issues, the environment, education, 
intellectual property securitization, consumerism and literary and translation studies. We are 
particularly proud to present the study of the ‘gay Indonesian migrant’, as we feel it is an important, 
rare and encouraging contribution to a fairly marginalized discourse. And, congratulations to all 
contributors for whom English may well be their second, third and sometimes even fourth language. 
We are again very appreciative of the artistic contribution made by Dewi Candraningrum. 
The basic philosophy of IJIS remains its commitment to promoting and helping disseminate new 
Indonesian scholarship especially from early career researchers and/or Indonesian scholars seeking 
opportunities to publish in English in a peer-reviewed journal. Again, we sincerely welcome your 
submissions and ask potential contributors to closely adhere to the IJIS formatting guidelines. We 
have had to ‘indulge’ some variations in formatting, citation and referencing techniques for this 
second issue and we trust our readership will be patient with us and our contributors as this element 
of IJIS is more stringently addressed in forthcoming issues. 
We are very pleased to welcome Dr Howard Manns (Monash University) and Dr Elisabet Titik 
Murtisari (Satya Wacana University) as members of the IJIS Coordinating Editorial Board. Finally, we 
ask for your support firstly in disseminating news of IJIS’s Autumn Issue through your networks; 
second, in constructive critique of this collaborative project; third, and most importantly, 
contributing your work for publication in future issues. 
Ms Yacinta Kurniasih, Dr Matthew Piscioneri, Dr. Roby Marlina and Dr. Baiq Wardhani 
 
Again, we especially thank the reviewers of the papers included in the Autumn issue of IJIS. You 
know who you are and we invite expressions of interest from others in reviewing for IJIS.  
Yacinta.Kurniasih@monash.edu 
 
Special Acknowledgements:  
Elisabet Murtisari 
Howard Manns 
Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia 
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Indonesia’s Foreign Politics 1955-1965: Between Decolonisation and Beacon 
Politics 
Haryo Kunto Wibisono,S.AP,M.AP 
 
 
Biodata: Haryo Kunto Wibisono, S.A,M.AP is an independent scholar. His research interests are 
Indonesian studies and Asia-Africa studies. His email is wibisono_kunto@rocketmail.com 
 
Abstract 
In Indonesian historiography, the period 1955-1965 was marked by the leadership of Ir. 
Soekarno facing the “end of parliamentary democracy chaos”. The prevailing spirit of the 
period was to build a new Indonesia after acknowledgement of its sovereignty, especially to 
organise Asian-African-Latin Americans nations to balance the Western-Eastern Bloc. A 
foreign political experiment was designed by Ir. Soekarno and nationalist/Communist groups 
through their important posts in Indonesia’s Government. It was a main factor in how 
Indonesia’s foreign politics sought/were able to gain international acknowledgement. The 
aim of this paper is to explain why Indonesia was chosen as a new power between the 
Eastern and Western Bloc in 1955-1965. It also examines the internal conditions of Indonesia 
when holding this line in foreign politics. Finally, the paper assesses what were the risks of 
these choices. 
 
Keywords: Ir.Soekarno’s Leadership, Indonesian Foreign Policy, Decolonisation, Cold War 
 
Introduction  
In his book titled, A short history of Indonesia: the unlikely nation? Brown (2003) explained 
that in January 1950, while Indonesia was politically independent, questions posed at the 
outset of the revolution concerning its aims and its methods remained largely unresolved in 
the eyes of many Indonesians. For some national leaders, the revolution had meant a 
change of regime, a change from Dutch rule to Indonesian rule, but little else. These leaders 
considered that the revolution was over, and the task now facing the government and the 
state was one of rebuilding Indonesia’s political, economic and social bases.  
 
After Independence Day, August 17th, 1945, Indonesia had not been directly 
acknowledged by other countries, especially the former colonial Dutch. Moreover, European 
powers had even formed the Allies/NICA (Netherland Indies Civil Administration) to occupy 
their former colonies and to regain the Netherland Indies with Dutch Polisionale Actie 
Campaigne (also known as Operation Kraai ["Operation Crow"]) resulting in Indonesia’s 
focus at that early stage of independence on defensive warfare vis a vis the Dutch/Allies. 
Thus, during 1945-1949, the Indonesian Government focused on diplomatic strategies for 
many agreements, such as Linggarjati, Roem-Royen, Renville, until the Round Table 
Conference/KMB (Konferensi Meja Bundar) that took place in Den Hague on December 27th 
1949. As the result, Indonesia gained much international sympathy and de facto 
acknowledgement from Great Britain, the United States of America, Australia, China, India, 
Iran, although Syria and Egypt were first to acknowledge Indonesian independence de jure 
(Snit, 1986, 23-25). 
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The period of 1949-1955 was a period after the Round Table Conference in which 
Indonesia’s governance structure was arranged and the geographic spatial structure of the 
Republic of Indonesia defined. At the same time, between April 18-24th 1955 under the 
leadership of Ir.Soekarno, Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo supervised the inaugural Asian-
African Conference/Bandung Conference and changed Indonesia’s foreign politics in the 
direction of developing its status as a new leading power in the anti-colonialism-racialism 
movement based around newly independent Asian-African nations. It brought Indonesia 
closer to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China/PRC obtaining these 
superpowers’ support to press the United Nations on Indonesia’s West Irian problems and 
the campaign to reduce the influence in the region of the economic-political power of the 
Western Bloc. 
 
However, a contradictory situation occurred after the PRC-Soviet Union was involved 
in conflict, leading to the Sino-Soviet split in 1962-1964. It caused turbulence in Indonesia’s 
diplomacy and then pressed Ir.Soekarno’s power along with the Indonesian Communist 
Party/PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) as his support base. At the same time, opposition 
groups and the army were backed by the Western Bloc to organize themselves to overthrow 
Ir.Soekarno’s leadership. 
 
This paper’s aims are to establish the reason for Indonesia’s declaration as a new 
power between the Eastern and Western Bloc in 1955-1965, what was the internal 
condition of Indonesia when holding this line in the international political sphere and, what 
was the risk of these choices? Finally, the paper looks to understand what was the main 
factor which shaped the direction of Indonesia’s foreign politics at this time? 
 
Dynamic of Indonesia in the period of 1949-1955 
 
1949-1955 was the period that positioned the Indonesian Government in a transitional 
phase. The international political situation had clearly changed since the Cold War. 
Indonesia itself stood between those polarities, namely the Western and Eastern Blocs. 
There were challenges which in the post World War II period had not yet been resolved in 
the region, such as West Irian. For this reason, Indonesia needed extensive international 
support in United Nations’ forums to repulse the Dutch. Similar to its action in relation to 
Egypt and the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Soviet Union through its leader Nikita Kruschev 
showed its support to Indonesia’s movement to decolonise and in relation to West Irian. 
This support included promotion of ‘zones of peace’, announced by Khrushchev at the 
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, coupled with his strong endorsement of the Bandung 
Conference the year before. These displays of solidarity were intended to “steer the 
emerging anti-Western Afro-Asian political identity along lines favorable to the socialist 
bloc” (Allison,1988; Crockatt,1995, 172). 
 
From the political perspective and from the perspective of governance, at the 
beginning of 1955, Indonesia’s cabinet was marked by many changes of leadership. The 
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Prime Minister implemented a large number of policies that ran ineffectively in the handling 
of educational issues, public services and economic development, for example. 
Consequently, processes of national consolidation in the period of post-acknowledgement 
of sovereignty in 1949-1955 faced many serious challenges in practicing parliamentary 
democracy largely caused by the great number of political parties. Additionally, Indonesia 
had been facing several separatist rebellions and the transition of the nation’s format from 
RIS/Republik Indonesia Serikat to NKRI/Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. 
 
The representation of the national leadership, the Dwi-Tunggal of Ir-Soekarno-
Mohammad Hatta, only stood when forming the Komite National Indonesia Pusat/KNIP until 
1956, after Hatta resigned as vice president. However, the governance of the Republic of 
Indonesia was still under the control of political groups based on religion, as well as 
nationalist, socialist, Communist, regionalist and military interests. Domestic political affairs, 
such as the National Election/Pemilu 1955, Presidential Decree 1959, and the overthrow of 
President Ir. Soekarno, were directed by members of the Indonesian elite whose groups in 
the Indonesian Government had a role to determine the direction of the policy of the state, 
domestic or foreign. 
 
The international situation also pressed the position of Indonesia in the constellation 
of global politics, especially when several Asian-African nations began to struggle for their 
sovereignty. The USA and the SU started conditioning “new satellites” in the Cold War as 
they struggled for political, economic, ideological, cultural, knowledge, and technological 
influence. 1  
 
One issue that emerged from the competing claims to the title of “World War II 
winner” was the clash of interests in South-East Asia and Indonesia as analysed by Gouda 
and Thijs Zaalberg (2002) in their book American Visions of the Netherlands East 
Indies/Indonesia, US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949. The book’s 
argument is that Soviet involvement in Vietnam could be clearly identified and Indonesia 
provided American officials with a confirmation of their worst fears. On May 22nd 1948, the 
Soviet Union announced its intention to establish consular relations with the Indonesian 
Republic, despite the fact that the Netherlands had not yet conceded its independence.  
 
Beacon politics: a world experiment in 1955 
1955 was the time when Ali Sastroamidjojo from the Indonesia National Party/PNI (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia) was installed as Prime Minister and introduced state policies that 
characterised the nationalist group. For instance, the Bandung Conference which was held 
                                                          
1
 The Cold War in its Third World manifestation was a proxy conflict between the West and the Soviet Bloc (or 
between the USA and the USSR) for influence and strategic position in the regions outside Europe and North 
America. The principal instruments deployed in this struggle were diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, 
and, more importantly, arms transfers and various forms of direct and indirect intervention. I argued that 
German division after World War II, NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry, partition of Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe were the roots of Cold War in Europe (Fawcett et.al.,1999,16). 
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on the 18-24th April 1955 was part of a diplomatic strategy that expressed Indonesia’s 
position that the decolonisation processes were not yet finished. After the declaration of 
Independence on August 17th 1945, the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 left the West Irian 
problems behind. 
 
 Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in a Policy Statement to the Parliament on 25 
August 1953 stated that cooperation between Asia-Africa countries conformed to United 
Nations’ regulations concerning regional arrangements. Moreover, those countries had the 
same views with regard to some international relations issues; they had common ground for 
the establishment of special groups. Hence, Sastroamidjojo urged Indonesia to continue and 
strengthen cooperation between these countries (1955). So, the Panca Negara Conference 
took place in Bogor on December 28-29th 1954.  
 
The attendance of 29 countries at the later Bandung Conference, where racialism, 
colonialism, and self-determination issues were discussed, surely generated much curiosity 
due to the fact that neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union were invited. 
The People’s Republic of China, which at that time was still a close ally of the Soviet Union, 
was invited and represented by Prime Minister Chou En Lai. The attendance of Chou En Lai 
was based on the PRC’s foreign policy to discuss the Taiwan problem, citizenship issues of 
Tionghoa and Indonesia, interest expansion in Africa and the Southeast Asia region, 
including the PRC’s struggle for membership in the United Nations (Compton, 1992, 327-
331).2  
Sponsor countries were Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and participant 
countries from Asia were Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Japan, Philippines, Lebanon, Thailand, 
Nepal, the People’s Republic of China, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Laos, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam and Cambodia. From Africa: Ethiopia, 
Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. After the conference on 24th April 1955, the 
Final Communique as the consensus of participants was born including the Bandung Ten 
Principles, the contents of which were as follows (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955, 161-
169).3 
1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and 
small. 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another 
country. 
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in 
                                                          
2
 Compton, Boyd.1992.Kemelut Demokrasi Liberal: Surat-Surat Rahasia Boyd R. Compton. Jakarta:LP3ES p.327-
331 
3
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia. (eds). 1955. Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung. 
Djakarta.p.161-169 
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conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
6. a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the 
particular interests of any of the big powers. 
b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries. 
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country. 
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of 
the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation. 
10. Respect for justice and international obligations.  
 
Through the Bandung Conference 1955, the prestige of Indonesia had increased, 
especially in the sphere of foreign politics. The ability to embrace Asian-African nations was 
seen as sign of a coming era of liberation by nations that had not yet gained their 
independence. The idea of the unification of coloured nations challenged the Western 
press’s opinion of the Bandung conference, which it cast as a Communist or Leftist 
provocation against the West. According to Richard Wright (1956,14), an Afro-America 
writer who reported the conference, the call for the meeting had not been named in terms 
of ideology yet. The participants could not be categorised as proletarians; they comprised 
princes and paupers, Communists and Christians, Leftists and Rightists, Buddhists and 
Democrats, in short, just about anybody who lived in Asia and Africa.  
 
The impact of the Bandung Conference, according to Podeh (2004,184), was first 
discernible in Africa. The Suez Canal Nationalisation in 1956 in Egypt marked the beginning 
of Nasser’s aggressive campaign against the Baghdad Pact. His participation at the historic 
meeting at Bandung, the Czech arms deal, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, 
and the end of the Anglo-French-Israeli joint offensive, out of which Nasser emerged as a 
hero-victor, all signaled defiance of the foreigner whether it be Western Imperialism or not.  
 
On the other hand, Ghana’s independence from British colonialism on July 6th1957 
also related to Ghana/Gold Coast’s participation in the Asian-African Conference on April 
18-24th 1955. The representation of Kojo Botsio continued with the Conference of 
Independent African States in Accra on April 15th 1958 and the All African People Conference 
on December 8–13rd 1958 attended by Patrice Lumumba (Congo) and Tomb Mboya (Kenya). 
  
Those conditions led African nations to see the Bandung Conference as an 
opportunity to gain their independence. The joint statement in the Final Communique from 
the Asian-African Conference on April, 18-24th 1955 also talked about economic, political, 
and cultural processes between the two continents, emphasising a respect for national-
sovereignty, the exchange of specialists to help advance both continents, inter-continental 
commodities stabilisation, and the development of political systems based on self-
determination and human-rights. According to discussions during the Bandung Conference, 
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solidarity, unity, and the common needs of Asian-African nations to make up their position 
in the global society were prioritised. Thus, after gaining their independence, many Asian-
African nations needed to recover from colonialism in terms of their cultural, economic, and 
political identity. 
 
For Indonesia, the success of Bandung Conference and its impact in the international 
world made the Soviet Union and the United States of America pay attention to Indonesian 
diplomacy, especially the West Irian problems and Asian-African decolonisation movements. 
At the same time, Indonesia’s foreign policies after the Bandung Conference came to be 
based on: 
1. Cooperation among Asian-African countries to common ground and world-peace 
2. Peaceful co-existence among the nations 
3. Colonialism 
a. General problems 
 Colonialism in Asian-African states 
 Racialism  
b. Special problems: North Africa, Indonesia, People’s Republic of China, etc 
4. Economic cooperation between Asian-African countries 
5. Cultural relations between Asian-African countries 
6. Nuclear usage with a peaceful aim 
7. Consideration around the United Nations (Bandaro,1958) 
 
During the Bandung Conference, nationalist icons and PNI members, such as Ir. 
Soekarno, who delivered the opening speech, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo (Chairman 
of the Conference), Mr. Sunario (Foreign Minister) dominated the whole session of the 
conference that focused on the economy, politics, and culture. The meaning of the Bandung 
Conference, however, would be distorted politically by “opposition groups” who interpreted 
the values of that conference as an effort to improve the image of Ali Sastroamidjojo’s 
cabinet and Ir.Soekarno for the Election/Pemilu in 1955 and to conceal the chaotic 
economy-political condition in Indonesia at the time.4 
 
Towards guided democracy and global constellation 
 
After the diplomatic achievements of the Bandung Conference, Indonesia conducted its 
domestic election/Pemilu in 1955 with 28 parties as contestants. The People’s 
Representative Council/DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)’s election was held on September 
29th 1955 and the Constituent Assembly/Konstituante’s election on December 15th 1955. 
According to Ricklefs (2001,p.304), the results positioned PNI 22,3 % (57 seats), Masjumi 
20,9 % (57 seats), Nadhatul Utama 18,4 % (45 seats), PKI 16,4 % (39 seats), PSII 2,9 % (8 
seats), Parkindo 2,6 % (8 seats), Catholic Party 2,0 % (6 seats), PSI 2,0 % (5 seats).  
                                                          
4
 Although Ali Sastroamidjojo’s government had foreign policy achievements, domestic conditions had been 
focused around inflation, the country’s unbalanced budget, corruption inside government, rebellion in many 
provinces, pseudo warlordism threating in Sulawesi, and chaos in the Army (Compton, 1992, 321-334). 
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 A large number of PNI seats in the parliament and the addition of Ali 
Sastroamidjojo’s achievement at the Bandung Conference had made the PNI dominant and 
in a position to execute its economic-political policies. Moreover, because of the Bandung 
Conference, Indonesia’s bargaining position had increased and it could more effectively 
negotiate the problems in West Irian and press the Dutch. Campaigns by Ir.Soekarno and 
PNI in relation to national economic policies were aimed at transforming what remained of 
the economic structures of the Dutch colonial system. Ricklefs (2001) argued that the 
cabinet also pressed for Indonesianisation of the economy, with encouragement for 
indigenous businessmen. In practice, however, many new firms were bogus fronts for 
arrangements between government supporters and the Chinese: the so-called ‘Ali-Baba’ 
firms, in which an Indonesian (‘Ali’) was a front man for a Chinese (‘Baba’) entrepreneur.5 
 
The resignation of Muhammad Hatta in 1956 and the unfinished constitution’s 
formulation by the Konstituante, which had lasted from November 10th 1956 until 1958, led 
to the creation of the Guided Democracy which placed total power in Ir. Soekarno’s hands. 
In late 1956, President Sukarno became openly critical of the parliamentary system. In 
February 1957, Sukarno offered an extremely vague alternative with his Konsepsi speech, 
which proposed a gotong-royong cabinet (gotong royong meaning mutual help) comprised 
of all the political parties, plus a national council composed of representatives of functional 
groups (such as workers’ groups, women’s groups) that would advise the cabinet (Feith, 
1962; Redfen, 2010, 34). 
 
The break up of Dwi Tunggal and chaos in the parliament was the beginning of the 
transition to Guided Democracy through the Presidential Decree on July 5th 1959 which 
contained the dismissal of the Konsituante and the formation of the Advisory Board (Dewan 
Perwakilan Agung Sementara/DPAS-Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/MPRS), 
and a return to the Undang-Undang Dasar-UUD 1945 as Indonesia’s basic constitution. The 
parliamentary condition that saw a polarisation of Nationalist/Secular groups and Islamic 
parties was taken advantage of by Communist groups/PKI as the 4th position holder in the 
DPR. The international situation and the Bandung Conference, in particular the PRC’s/Chou 
En Lai’s attendance at that event, had increased the prestige of the PKI. In addition, the 
peaceful-coexistence policy which was being promoted internationally by the 
CPSU/Communist Party of Soviet Union or Soviet Union, indirectly, offered a form of 
support to the Afro-Asian movement and encouraged closer ties between a number of 
emerging states, some newly independent, with the Eastern Bloc.6 
                                                          
5
 See Dick et.al. (2002, 78) The Emergence of a National Economy. An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800–
2000, Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai’i Press 
Honolulu.The program was extended to nationalisation of 70% of the import trade. Nominally, this goal was 
achieved, but in early 1955 the head of the Central Office of Imports estimated that there were only 50 bona 
fide importers (Sutter, 1959, 1025–1026). 
6
 Khrushchev noted the development of a new force for peace in world politics: the neutral and non-aligned 
movement of newly independent countries which had recently thrown off the shackles of colonialism in Asia 
and Africa. Nevertheless, PRC viewed de-Stalinisation and rejected Stalin’s foreign policies and his cult of 
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Meanwhile, on June 29th 1954, relationships between Indonesia and the Dutch 
became worse after the Dutch officially refused to talk about West Irian problems. This 
Dutch intransigence led to the boycotting of several Dutch companies, the expulsion of 
50,000 Dutch citizens in Indonesia, and the takeover of BPM (Batafsche Petroleum 
Maatschapij) in 1958 (Snit, 1986, 52-53). Indonesia’s negotiation over the West Irian 
problems met with deadlock and was an opportunity for Indonesia to arrange the United 
States of America (John F. Kennedy), on one side, and the Soviet Union, on the other side, to 
press the Dutch in the United Nations. Indonesia’s supporters included Asian-African 
countries from the created Non-Alignment Movement, with Yugoslavia as an addition. 
 
Indonesia’s capability in international diplomacy was supported by the Communists 
and the PKI’s growing influence in domestic affairs after the Election in 1955. Aidit 
(1959,419) wrote that Indonesia’s people along with PKI, nationalist-revolutionary, 
President Soekarno Konsepsi, the August Revolution 1945, democracy and Indonesia’s 
nationalist interest, and the shift to the Left adapted to the international situation which 
moved to the Left also. Meanwhile, Mạsjumi/PSI were banned after being reputedly 
involved in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1958; the PNI was disposed to enjoy Ir.Soekarno’s 
patronage. It can be concluded that in the early stages of the Guided Democracy, PKI’s 
pattern and Indonesia foreign policies were always related to each other, for example 
supported to and from the Afro-Asian nations, cooperation with the People’s Republic of 
China, Cuba, Soviet Union, East Germany and North Korea: all identified as part of the 
Eastern Bloc.7  
 
The shifting of Indonesia’s foreign politics towards much closer alliances with 
Communist countries resulted in Indonesia being more extensively counted as a new power, 
one of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO). Indonesia was invited, alongside Egypt (Gamal 
Abdul Nasser), Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah), India (Jawaharlal Nehru) and Yugoslavia (Josiph 
Broz Tito) to be part of the Non-Alignment Movement declared in Beograd in September 
1961. Basically, that movement was not part of the Eastern Bloc or Western Bloc, but the 
growth of the Communist Party in Indonesia, as well as Ir.Soekarno’s leadership, had 
enabled foreign policies that faciliated closer ties with the Eastern Bloc against the United 
States of America’s nuclear program which involved the Cuban Nuclear Crisis in 1961. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
personality in Nikita Kruschev’s speech in Cỏngess 20
th
  CPSU/Soviet Union, which I argued were roots of the 
Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s (Roberts,1999, 45). 
7
Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional VI. Partai Komunis Indonesia September,7-14 1959. Djakarta: Jajasan 
Pembaruan. The Congress also discussed not “choice one Bloc but operated foreign politics which advantages 
Indonesian peoples”. On page 85, its document quoted Ir.Soekarno’s speech which said that in war and peace 
problems, in imperialism and independence problems, we were not neutral but explicitly stood for peace and 
independence. These conditions advantaged the PKI as the main supporter of the whole raft of Ir.Soekarno’s 
ideas and policies, displaying enormous people power with a membership of more than 1,5 million which 
included youth, women, workers, peasants, artists and also the parliamentary DPR-GR (Bintang & Merah,1960, 
84-94) 
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Confrontation and peaceful co-existence (1960-1965) 
 
After the Presidential Decree on July 5th 1959, Indonesia’s internal condition commenced to 
stabilise with the formation of the National Front and the new format of Indonesia’s 
governance termed the DPR-GR (Gotong Royong) on June 1960 in NASAKOM (Nasionalist, 
Agama/Religion, Communist) concept, without Masjumi and the PSI party. Ir.Soekarno was 
more impelled to liberate his ideas about Rediscovery to Our Revolution, National 
Revolution, Nation-character building, Trisakti, NEFO (New Emerging Forces), and To Build 
the World Anew, all concepts reflected in Ir.Soekarno’s official speeches and legalised as the 
orientation of nation-state development or GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) in 
Tap/MPRS/No1/1960. Thus, in the domain of policy, a regulation in National Planning 
Department/Depernas, Rancangan Pembangunan Semesta and MANIPOL-USDEK (Politic 
Manifesto-UUD 45, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, Nation 
Character) became the reference point around which development in domestic affairs and 
foreign affairs would commence.  
 
The nuclear crisis in the 1960s was the first step for Indonesia to make itself a 
beacon in global conflict by bringing the issues of world peace and the finalisation of 
sovereignty in the Asian-African sphere to the forefront of international debate. In the post-
Bandung Conference period, Indonesia initiated and participated in a wide range of 
international dialogues and conferences, such as the Asian-African Students Conference in 
Bandung (1956), the First Asian-African Writers Conference in New Delhi (1956), the Asian-
African People Solidarity Conference in Cairo (1957), the First Asian-African Women 
Conference in Colombo (1958), the Asian-African Youth Conference in Cairo (1959), the 
Asian-African Law Master Conference in Conakry (1962), the Asian-African Journalist 
Conference in Jakarta (1963), the First Asian-African Workers Conference in Jakarta (1964), 
the Asian-African Pediatrics Conference in Jakarta (1964), the Asian-African Movie Festival in 
Jakarta (1964), the Seminar of Economic Asia-Africa in Aljazair (1965), as well as playing a 
role in the Non-Alignment Movement, and promoting the PRC’s membership in the United 
Nations. 
 
These ideas were supported by the Soviet Union and PRC in diplomacy, politics, 
economics and military matters which helped Indonesia to promote the Bandung Spirit to 
Asian-African countries in their struggles to break free of colonialism, in states such as the 
Congo, Algeria and Vietnam.8 As a result, after the Bandung Conference until 1964, 35 
countries in Africa declared their independence, making Indonesia’s efforts more concerted 
in its conduct of the NEFO’s conception and the Non-Alignment Movement with additional 
support from Latin American states. Those conceptions not only occurred in the domains of 
                                                          
8
 Roberts (1999, 46) writes that the ‘practical face of Soviet policy in the third world was diplomatic support for 
the Bandung movement of non-aligned state… economic and military aid to newly independent states (for 
example, India and Egypt) and political encouragement of the radical tendencies in Third World nationalism; 
the latter effort being informed by the concept that there could be a rapid transition from national liberation 
to socialism’. 
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diplomacy and politics, but also related to the blue-print of economic cooperation, cultural 
exchange and also in the domain of sports (for example, GANEFO, the Games of New 
Emerging Forces) in 1963.  
 
However, Indonesia was confronted in 1960 by the Dutch navy’s provocation in the 
Arafuru Sea and by the Malaysia Federation in May 1961, a situation supported by Britain 
and the United States of America. This situation brought Indonesia to confront Malaysia 
after Dwikora/Two Commands of People and to defend West Irian through Trikora/Three 
Commands of People as campaigned in 1961. The culmination was the proposal for the 
Malayan state as a member of the Security Council that led Indonesia to withdraw from the 
United Nations in 1964.9  
 
Turbulence, split, and the ending of confrontation  
In this period, the international position suddenly changed when the PRC-India were 
involved in border conflicts in 1962, following the Sino-Soviet split. The tensions between 
the Soviet Union and the PRC impacted on Asian-African nations’ foreign politics and within 
the Non-Alignment Movement as many of these states had formed a dependency on the 
support offered by the Soviet Union and the PRC. According to The Atlas on Regional 
Integration Report (2006, 2-3), although China and the Soviet Union had cooperated to 
“lead Africa to revolution”, their goals now diverged. The Soviet Union launched into 
“peaceful coexistence”, putting peace and disarmament at the top of its strategic foreign 
affairs agenda. China’s policy was to provide military and financial support to nationalist 
movements. However, China’s ambitions in Africa were limited by its systematic opposition 
to the USSR and Western interests (See Atlas on Regional Integration, 2006, 2).10 
 
Developments in Indonesia received aid in the form of financial capital and 
infrastructure technology from the Soviet Union and the PRC. For example, Indonesia 
received military aid in its confrontation with Malaysia and in the struggle to liberate West 
Irian. Ricklefs (2001,326) noted that in January 1960, Khrushchev had visited Jakarta and 
extended a US$250 million credit to Indonesia. In January 1961, Nasution went to Moscow 
and received a Soviet loan of US$450 million for arms. The army now began to grow in size 
for the first time since the Revolution, reaching about 300,000 men in 1961 and 330,000 by 
late 1962. 
 
Sukma (1999, 30) noted that from March into early April 1961, Chen Yi visited 
Indonesia and talked about ‘the perpetual Sino-Indonesian friendship’. He offered to supply 
                                                          
9
 Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965 Britain, the United States and the Creation of 
Malaysia. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. In late December, the PKI’s Central Committee passed a 
resolution condemning Malaysia as ‘a form of neo-colonialism’ which would ‘suppress the democratic and 
patriotic movements of the peoples in [the Borneo territories] which aim at the attainment of national 
independence and freedom from imperialism’, while with its British bases, Malaysia would be smuggled into 
SEATO (Jones, 2002, 99). 
10
 See The Atlas on Regional Integration. Africa and China (2006). ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD©2006 - December 
2006. p.2 
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economic aid for the new Indonesian development plan, and reiterated People Republic of 
China’s support for Indonesia’s claim over West Irian. In June 1961, Sukarno visited the PRC 
and was praised by Liu Shaoqi for his role in promoting “the great project of the bridge of 
friendship between People Republic of China and Indonesia”.11  
 
The impact of Indonesia’s cooperation with the Soviet Union and the PRC was to 
eliminate Western Bloc influence. Such a situation also brought with it risks that became 
more apparent after the Sino-Soviet split that was triggered by Mongolia-PRC’s conflict in 
1964 and the Soviet’s previous support of India in the border conflict with the PRC in 1962. 
Even more, the Soviet Union’s foreign policies about peaceful coexistence were ideologically 
cast as Communist deviation/revisionism by the PRC.12 I have argued that the Sino-Soviet 
split caused a hesitation to appear in Indonesia’s foreign policies which up until then had 
been strongly supported by the PKI, but the Sino-Soviet conflict affected the PKI’s internal 
policies which by that time had become dominant in Indonesia’s Government. In addition, 
many of Indonesia’s allies in Africa were experiencing turbulence, especially during the 
period 1961-1965. These countries included Algeria, Mali, Congo, and Ghana. This condition 
affected Indonesia’s foreign agenda that was based around the Bandung Spirit and Non-
Alignment.  
 
The postponing of the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference was a result of the PRC’s refusal to 
be involved in the conference that took place in Algeria. The clash of interests over the 
India-Pakistan-Soviet Union conflict also impacted Indonesia’s bargaining position. It was 
weakened because Indonesia should choose between Peking and Moscow.13 Weinstein 
(1965) argued that the most critical point came after the Asian-African Conference 1955, 
where political and ideological priorities were assumed to be important to the detriment of 
the economy and education sector. Those events assumed that economy policies inter Asia-
Africa needed a supporting system that consists of stability, foreign politics and internal 
affairs. Nevertheless, the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War climate “turbulence” 
                                                          
11
 The relations between Communist Party Indonesia and Ir.Soekarno’s foreign policy to confront Malaysia 
through connections among the leaders of Communist parties in South East Asia: in September (1964), the 
leaders of four Communist parties (Zhou Enlai from China, Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Nguyen Chi Thanh from 
Vietnam, Kaysone Phomvihane from Laos, and D. N. Aidit from Indonesia) held a meeting in Chonghua, in 
China’s Guang-dong province. In a keynote speech, Zhou Enlai pointed out that Southeast Asia had been the 
focus of a confrontation between international revolutionary and reactionary forces (Gadis & Lewis, 2001, 
208). 
12
 “The Leaders of the C.P.S.U Are Betrayers of the Declaration And the Statement. The revisionist line 
advanced by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. is the opposite of the revolutionary principles of 
the Declaration of 1957. The 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. created grave confusion in the international 
Communist movement; Together with other fraternal Parties, the Communist Party of China conducted a 
principled struggle against  Khrushchov's  revisionist line at the Moscow Meeting” (Peking Review, 1966, 9). 
13
 “The Second African-Asian Conference Should Be Postponed. If the Soviet Union can participate in the 
African-Asian Conference, then other countries in Europe, America and Australasia, too, can participate. What 
kind of an Afro-Asian conference would this be? Since a matter of principle is involved, we will never agree” 
(Peking Review, 1965, 8-11). 
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together and caused serial coup d’etats amongst 29 countries who attended in Bandung, 
even war and civil war. 
 
There was a series of coup d’etats which positioned Western Bloc allies as leaders on 
the Africa continent. For example, Patrice Lumumba was assassinated and was replaced by 
Moise Tshombe in 1961. In Indonesia, the Western Bloc’s influence reinforced opposition 
and supported anti-Communist groups/anti-Ir.Soekarno forces. The Western Bloc created 
the Malaya Federation which took over North Kalimantan territories and West Irian 
problems were postponed until 1969. The Western Bloc also supported military and 
intelligence operations to overthrow President Ir. Soekarno along with the “catastrophe” of 
the October 1st 1965 Movement. The chaos masterminded by forces internal and external to 
Indonesia led to anti-PRC and anti-Communist demonstrations and the genocide of PKI 
members during 1966. This period would also see the dismantling of nationalist/PNI groups, 
and finally President Ir. Soekarno resigned and was replaced by General Soeharto after the 
Nawaksara speech on June 22nd 1966.14 Those conditions severed Indonesia’s diplomatic 
connection with the PRC in 1967; relations with the Soviet Union were frozen and Indonesia 
again joined the United Nations in 1966. General Soeharto began to normalise relations 
with Malaysia in August 1967. Thus, suddenly, foreign relations between the PRC and the 
United States of America became closer and were formalized in 1972. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union faced a leadership crisis after Nikita Kruschev died and split with satellite states 
in Eastern Europe.  
 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that many of Indonesia’s foreign policies in the 1955-1965 period were 
under the influence of Ir. Soekarno’s leadership, as well as the growth in the influence of the 
Communists/PKI in Indonesia’s socio-political life. These influences were made possible by 
the sense of nationalism that imbued Indonesia’s population in that early post-colonial era. 
These conditions supported the parliament which was dominated by the PKI and which 
advised on Ir.Soekarno’s foreign policies. The external statement of those policies were 
supported by the PRC-Soviet Union as the main power of the Eastern bloc, promoting 
Communism with peaceful coexistence policies to help many Asia-African nations to gain 
their independence and self determination after independence. However, the rivalry 
between the PRC and the Soviet Union was the main factor that caused the Eastern Bloc, as 
well as Asian-African nations allied to one or other Communist superpower, to clash with 
each other. The 2nd Afro-Asian Conference was postponed due to their rivalry. Indeed, the 
rivalry between the PRC and the Soviet Union brought advantages to the Western Bloc to 
spread their influence to Asian-African nations, including, for example, to Indonesia.  
 
                                                          
14
The first of these, which goes at least as far back as 1952, was “to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia 
from passing into the Communist orbit” (Pentagon Papers 1971, 27). Here, in line with the domino theory, the 
emphasis is regional rather than national as the generalized enemy and, in line with the main thrust of 
American cold war foreign policy, targets Communism (Crockatt, 1995, 236-237). 
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 The condition of Indonesia was destabilised when the PKI became confused over 
which axis to support, to choose between Peking-Moscow. Disputes over the leadership at 
the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference, rifts within the Non-Aligned Movement, and confrontation 
with Malaysia, all contributed to Indonesia’s instability. These conditions worsened when 
opposition groups supported by the army took over Ir.Soekarno and PKI’s power. At this 
time, the Indonesian economic-politic landscape was marked by inflation, unstable 
monetary conditions, and social chaos. By the end of the 1960s, Indonesia foreign policies 
totally changed. With the overthrow of Ir.Soekarno, the PKI were banned and diplomacy 
with the PRC and other of the Communist states, largely broken off. By this time, the power 
of the New Order led by General Soeharto had been established. 
 
References 
Aidit, DN.(1959). Selected Works II. New Phase and Adapting Organisation with Situation.Djakarta: 
Jajasan Pembaruan, pp. 378-444. 
 
Bintang, Merah (Eds).(1960). Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional VI. Partai Komunis Indonesia 
September, 7-14 1959. Djakarta : Jajasan Pembaruan. 
 
Brown, Colin. (2003). A short history of Indonesia: the unlikely nation? New South Wales : Allen & 
Unwin. 
 
Compton, Boyd.(1992). Kemelut Demokrasi Liberal: Surat-Surat Rahasia Boyd R. Compton. Jakarta : 
LP3ES. 
 
Crockatt, Richard. (1995).The Fifty Years War: The United States and The Soviet Union in World 
Politics 1941-1991. London and New York : Routledge : Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
Dick, Howard. (2002). The Emergence of a National Economy: an economic history of Indonesia, 
1800–2000, Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin and 
University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu. 
 
Fawcett, Louise and Yezid Sayigh (Eds). (1999). The Third World beyond the Cold War Continuity and 
Change. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis. (2001). Mao’s China and The Cold War. Chapel Hill & London : The University of 
North Carolina Press.  
 
Gouda, Frances and Thijs, Brocades Zaalberg. (2002). American Visions of the Netherlands East 
Indies/Indonesia, US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949, Amsterdam : 
Amsterdam University Press. 
 
Jones, Matthew. (2002). Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United 
States and the Creation of Malaysia. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
 
Peking Review. (Jan. 1, 1966). A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views.  IX (1),Peking : Peking 
Review. 
 
--------------------- (Oct. 29, 1965), VII (44), Peking : Peking Review. 
 
Podeh, Elie and Onn Winckler., (Eds.). (2004). Rethinking Nasserism Revolution and Historical 
Memory in Modern Egypt, USA : University of Florida. 
 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e1
7
 
Redfen, William. (2010). Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of  Foreign Companies in 
Indonesia in the 1960s. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of  Doctor of Philosophy (History) at The University of Michigan. 
 
Ricklefs, M.C. (2001). A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3rd Ed), Hampshire : Palgrave 
McMillan. 
 
Roberts, Geoffrey. (1999). The Soviet Union in World Politics Coexistence: Revolution and Cold War, 
1945–1991. London and New York : Routledge : Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
Snit, C. (1986). Dekolonisasi Indonesia. Fakta dan Ulasan. Jakarta : Pustaka Azet. 
 
St. Bandaro, Kamarsyah. (1958). Asia-Afrika diantara dua pertentangan. Djakarta : Soeroengan. 
 
Sukma, Rizal. (1999). Indonesia and China.The Politics of a Troubled Relationship. London and New 
York : Routledge : Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
The Atlas on Regional Integration. Africa and China.(2006). ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD©2006 -December 
2006. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic Of Indonesia. (1955). Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung. 
Djakarta. 
 
Weinstein, Franklin. ‘The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts’. Asian Survey, 5 (7). 
(Jul., 1965),. University of California Press. 
 
Wright, Richard. (1956). The Color Curtain. A report on the Bandung Conference. University Press of 
Missisipi/Jackson : Banner Books. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e1
8
 
Homosexuality in Indonesia: Banality, Prohibition and Migration 
(The Case of Indonesian Gays) 
Wisnu Adihartono 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) Marseille 
Biodata: Wisnu Adihartono is a PhD candidate in sociology in Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences 
Sociales (EHESS - Centre Norbert Elias (CNE) UMR 8562 CNRS), Marseille, France. His research 
interests are sociology of gender, gay studies, masculinity studies, sociology of migration, sociology 
of the family, and sociology of everyday life. 
wisnuadi.reksodirdjo@gmail.com/wisnu.adihartono@ehess.fr 
Abstract 
A State and a national identity are formed on the basis of mutually unifying thoughts and 
beliefs through the processes of social imagination and social representations. Through 
these two processes, people also have rights to determine which thoughts and beliefs are 
acceptable and which ones are not. Thus, issues relating to homosexuality cannot be 
avoided. Most Indonesians consider homosexuality as a set of abnormal acts and contrary to 
their religions. In Indonesia, homosexuals are denied access to power and have almost no 
access to pursue their rights. Consequently, in order to survive, Indonesian homosexuals 
usually must hide their orientations, or in extreme cases, they move to other, more tolerant 
countries. Through face-to-face interviews with several gay Indonesians who lived in Paris, 
the study on which this paper reports sought to establish the reasons for the participants’ 
migration to Paris. It also sought to establish the motives for the choice of Paris as a city of 
destination. I particularly focus on gays (gay masculine and/or gay feminine). This research 
was entirely conducted with qualitative methods. Thus, in this paper, several short stories 
that have been collected from the participants are recounted and analysed. 
Keywords: Indonesia, Social Imagination, Social Representations, Homosexuality, Gay, 
Migration 
Introduction 
The idea that homosexuality is a disease is widely shared in Indonesia. Many LGBTIQ 
(lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender/intersexed/queer) suffer the consequences of a severely 
homophobic society. According to the report of International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission (2007), Indonesian LGBT people are often targeted for human rights abuses 
due to their sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression. 
A straightforward example of how Indonesian LGBTIQs are discriminated against was 
when the “Queer Film Festival” was held in Jakarta in 2011 in cooperation with a number of 
European Cultural Centers. A very conservative Islamic organization -- the Front Pembela 
Islam or the Front of Islamic Defenders (FPI) -- went to the French Cultural Centers and 
attempted to close the festival. According to FPI, the movies that were being screened were 
pornographic or at least contained elements of pornography. To attempt to close the 
festival, the FPI threatened to burn some of the cultural centers that were responsible for 
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the organization of the festival. The only way the festival was able to continue was by going 
“underground”15  
Another event that indicated the violent rejection of homosexuality in Indonesia 
occurred in June 2005. Members of FPI forcibly entered the “Miss Waria Indonesia 2005” 
beauty pageant and harassed contestants. In November 2005, the Jakarta Biennale was 
forced to close because of objections to the display of “Pinkswing Park”, an exhibit that 
depicted semi-clad actors and actresses in a fictional Garden of Eden.  
 Under the current circumstances, the international migration of Indonesian gays is 
understandable. Being open about their sexuality results in discrimination and violence 
being directed against Indonesian gays. Indonesian gays are particularly vulnerable to being 
discriminated against by society, religious leaders, and even by the state. Thus, in short, 
migration appears as a “natural way” to avoid being mistreated. 
 This paper examines Indonesian gays’ migration abroad, in particular to Paris, 
France. The data on which the following discussion is based is derived from a study of 
Indonesian gays in Paris based on the author’s on-going PhD research in Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – Marseille, France. Semi structured interviews with 
twenty Indonesian gays aged between twenty-four and forty-two in Paris, France, were 
used to explore why they migrate to Paris, as well as a question about why they have 
chosen Paris as a city of destination. The interviews were operationalized through 
questionnaires given to initial respondents. In general, interviews were recruited from four 
locations: fast food restaurants, university parks, public parks, and their residences. Each 
person was interviewed for an average of one to two and a half hours. The names and other 
identifying details of the research informants have been changed to protect their 
confidentiality.  
The most difficult aspect of recruiting respondents was obtaining access to the 
potential participants and then to get to know them intimately because there is no 
statistical data. I was assisted by a gate keeper who has been living in Paris for more than 
two decades. He, at least, knew roughly of the existence of Indonesian gays in Paris. 
According to him, at present, there are approximately 450 Indonesian LGBTIQ with a wide 
range of social statuses in the city and immediate surrounds. In terms of respondents, this 
research focuses only on gays (biological males exclusively in male to male relationships). 
There are approximately 100 Indonesian gays in Paris, although it should be understood that 
the figures are approximations only based on surmise of anecdotal evidence. 
          Why in this study is “gay” used rather than the term “homosexual” in general? The 
word “homosexual” has a negative meaning. The term indicates a strong relation with 
                                                          
15
 Retrieved from http://social science.nl/2013/09/25/searching-security-migration-indonesian-gay/ on 
Tuesday, 17 December 2013 
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pathology, and humiliates the person to whom it is directed. Concerning the word “gay”, 
Whitaker (2011, p. 15) said, 
 Some people believe the word “homosexual” has negative overtones even that it is  
demeaning. Most homosexual men and women prefer the words “gay” and 
“lesbian”. Either word is acceptable as an alternative to homosexual, but “gay” 
should be used only as an adjective. “Gay” as a noun – “gays gathered for a 
demonstration – is not acceptable. If you wish to use homosexual, as adjective or 
noun, do so. It is also useful, as it applies to men and women. 
On the other hand, on their website, the PFLAG Canada,16 a Canadian organization that 
supports gay communities, describes the word “gay” as follows, 
“Gay” is a term that describes same-sex attractions felt by both [men] and women; 
however, some women prefer the term lesbian. The word “gay” first crossed the 
gender/sex threshold in England during the 16th century, when it was applied to male 
actors who were cast into female character roles. During the 19th century, Europeans 
associated the term with heterosexual promiscuity; however, it did not cross into 
sexually diverse communities until much later. Under this meaning, “gay” projected 
an impression of perversity. In the early 20th century, American men and women 
experiencing same-sex attractions became the first to identify as “gay”, preferring it 
to the word “homosexual”, a term used primarily by mental health professionals.  
It is clear that “gay” is used to represent selfhood, as in the sentence “I am gay”, “It’s who I 
am”, and “It’s what I label myself” (Savin-Williams, 2005, p. 7). Thus, being gay is a source of 
pride. 
 Before I commence discussion of the respondents’ accounts of their migration 
through their short stories (short narratives), I will present the traditional history of 
homosexuality in Indonesia, including the banning of ‘homosexuals’’ existence based on the 
concepts of social representation and the hegemonic gender belief system. 
The banality of homosexuality in Indonesian ancient times 
Homosexuality in Indonesia grew from a long and complex cultural and historical 
background. Its existence has been written in history as a part of Indonesian culture and 
tradition (Johan, 2011, p. 199). According to Boellstorff, Indonesia had been aware of the 
issue of homosexuality for at least a thousand years. Yet, clearly, as he states: “It is quite 
certain that no one in the archipelago called themselves gay or lesbi in the year 900, 1400, 
1900, or probably even 1960. Yet by the early 1980s gay and lesbi existed in the archipelago 
as nationally distributed subject position” (Boellstroff, 2005, p. 36). 
As an anthropologist, he categorized traditional/historical Indonesian homosexuality 
as an Ethno localized homosexual and Transvestite professional subject Positions (ETP). This 
term bonded with the concept of ethnicity and locality. Thus, the ETP, as Boellstroff stated, 
related to indigenous homosexuality and transgenderism (Boellstroff, 2005, p. 45). The 
                                                          
16
 Retrieved from www.pflagcanada.ca/fr/ on Monday, 16 December 2013.  
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existence of Bissu in South Sulawesi, the tradition of Warok Gemblak in Ponorogo, East Java, 
and the traditional dance of Rateb Sadati in Aceh, are the cultures most related to 
homosexuality and regarded as an ETP.  
 The community of Bissu is a part of Indonesian’s pre-Islamic tradition. In the tribe of 
the Bugis, Bissu is a hermaphrodite man. He is regarded as a sacred person because of his 
power to dialogue with the goddess. Bissus are mediators between the goddess and the 
people on earth. To conduct their rituals, Bissu wear androgynous costumes (Boellstroff, 
2005, p. 38). They place Badi’ (a big knife) and flowers as symbols of masculinity and 
femininity (Graham, 2002, p. 27). As a sacred person, Bissu usually is invited to a ceremony 
to bless some activities, for example, the birth of a baby, a marriage, the rice harvest 
ceremony, and so forth. 
 Ancient history explained that because of their function as a mediator, Bissu are 
created neither man nor woman. When Graham conducted her research into Bissu, she 
interviewed Haji Bacco’ about the birth of Bissu: 
You ask how this world came to be. Well let me tell you. Up there in the heavens, the 
God decided they would bring life to this lonely planet. They therefore sent down 
one of their most inspiring deities, Batara Guru. But Batara Guru was not at 
organizing things. To do all of this, two Bissu were needed. So the Gods sent down 
two Bissu who flanked Batara Guru as he descended. And when they arrived, the 
Bissu set about making everything blossom; they created language, culture, customs 
[adat], and all of things that a world needs if it is going to blossom. That’s how the 
world began; you see. (Graham, 2002, p. 27) 
It is difficult to be a good Bissu. They have to able to memorize all mantras for several 
rituals, in addition to understanding the sacred language, studying the ancient sacred books, 
and some dances particularly for Bissu. Graham described Bissu as a Man and Woman with 
divine and mortal characteristics (Graham, 2002, p. 27).  
 The condition suddenly changed completely when during the Guided Democracy 
period (1959-65) the old ideological divisions gave way to a left-right polarization, mirroring 
the Cold War struggle within which Indonesia politics became increasingly enmeshed. The 
army and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) emerged as the two main contending 
forces, with Sukarno attempting to prevent either from threatening his position. Sukarno 
supported his concept of Nasakom (the unity of nationalism, Islam and Communism) 
(Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003, p. 5). The resistance against PKI culminated when on the night 
of 30 September 1965 six of the country’s most senior generals were kidnapped and killed. 
Since then, the political and social construction of Communism in Indonesia changed and 
turned so that people who do not have a religion have been characterized as Communist.  
It is also happened to the Bissu when they were marginalized and considered as an 
atheist group, particularly when the Operasi Tobat was launched by Kahar Muzakar in the 
1960s in South Sulawesi. As a consequence, Bissu were forced to convert to Islam, while 
those who did not obey the regulations, would have faced death (Boellstroff, 2005, p. 39). 
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Currently, the Bissu can be still recognized in the role of the person who offers the blessings 
in a number of key social and cultural ceremonies. But, mostly, they do it now only for the 
sake of tourism (Boelstroff, 2005, p. 39). 
 Besides Bissu, the banality of homosexuality in Indonesia can also be seen in the 
traditional relation between Warok and Gemblakan17 in the performance art Reog Ponorogo 
in East Java. This narrative below indicates how that relationship is related to 
homosexuality, in particular in the concept of pederasty:  
Ini bukan acara khitanan. Seorang remaja laki-laki sekitar 12 tahun, bersarung kain 
batik, tangan  kirinya berarloji, sandalnya tertutup – bukan sandal jepit murahan. Ia 
bergigi emas.  
Wajahnya bersih, jalan dan suaranya agak keperempuan-perempuanan. Di saku 
bajunya selalu ada rokok. Kadang-kadang ia berkacamata hitam pula. Satu atau 
beberapa laki-laki berotot mengawalnya. Itulah pemandangan yang hanya bisa 
dilihat kaitannya dengan khitanan, meski ada hubungannya dengan seksualitas. 
Adapun para pengawal, itulah warok. Kehadiran gemblak dan warok bermula pada 
pantangan: jangan menyentuh wanita, bila kamu ingin sakti. Maka, untuk 
meneduhkan gairah birahinya, selagi memantapkan ilmu, warok Ponorogo 
mengangkat pacar remaja laki-laki . Dari situ muncullah tradisi gemblakan, atau 
homoseksualitas…Boleh jadi di Ponorogolah, gemblakan atau homoseksualitas bukan 
saja tidak dikutuk, tapi malah jadi simbol status utama.18 
(This is not a circumcision ceremony. There was a teenage boy about 12 years old, 
wearing batik, in his left hand wearing a watch, and he wore expensive sandals. His 
face was clean and his gesture is like a woman. In his pocket is always a cigarette. 
Sometimes he wears sunglasses. One or more muscular males escort him. Those 
guards are called Warok. The existence of Warok and Gemblak began on abstinence: 
do not touch a woman, if you want to have a magic power. Thus Warok has a 
Gemblak (those teenage boys). It may be that in Ponorogo, gemblakan or 
homosexuality is not condemned, but became a symbol of social status) 
 In the history of Warok, it is possible to establish a definition of Warok. Budiman 
explained that authentic Warok was derived from the word “Wewarah” or people who are 
able to advise others about the ‘good life’ (Budiman, 2012, p. 574). Warok is a mediator 
between the superior and the inferior in terms of cosmology. Warok are stereotyped by 
wearing “kolor ijo” and black dress (Budiman, 2012, p. 574). Some mythologies have 
suggested that Warok‘s character is that of a rebel. 
                                                          
17
 The term Gemblak and Gemblakan basically have a same meaning. The term Gemblak refers to a person 
who acts as a Gemblak – a teenage boy aged between 12 to 15 years; meanwhile, the term Gemblakan refers 
to the system of the activity.   
18
 Dari Mata Turun ke Hati. Retrieved from 
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1987/10/10/PRK/mbm.19871010.PRK32396.id.html on 
Wednesday, 18 December 2013 
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 Gemblakan is a teenage boy aged between 12 to 15 years old. Gemblak is always 
having a love relationship with Warok. For the Ponorogo peoples, that relation is normal 
and acceptable (Budiman, 2012, p 574). Having a handsome boy is a source of pride for 
Warok. Warok will dress his Gemblak with beautiful clothes and powder his face to maintain 
his good looks. However, their relationship can be stopped because of the maturity of 
Gemblak. Warok has a stake to find a woman for his Gemblak. When Gemblak marries, then 
he automatically loses his charm.  
 Another relation similar to the relation of Warok and Gemblak can be found from 
the origins of the dance of Rateb Sadati in Aceh. According to Dutch Islamologist, Snouck 
Hurgronje, the word “Ratib” was first introduced in Medina in the 18th century by Sammam, 
a mystical teacher. Ratib is basically a prayer or praise to Allah sung by groups of people. 
Ratib is usually sung in the afternoon, in particular during the Friday prayer (Hurgronje, 
1906, p. 216–219). In its development, the tradition of singing Ratib has become a dance, 
called Rateb Sadati.  
 The dance of Rateb Sadati has an Arab-Malay characteristic. It was performed by 15 
to 20 male dancers accompanied by a Syekh, called Ulee Rateb, Pangkay, or Ba’.  At the 
same time, this dance is required to have two Radat who have the task of repeating what is 
sung by Syekh. A Syekh sings love poems to Allah in the local language (Hurgronje, 1906, p. 
221). Thus, the word “Sadati” itself is derived from the Arabic language and means love 
poems (Hurgronje, 1906, p. 221).  
 Among the men who danced this dance, there must be a handsome boy who dresses 
as a woman. This handsome boy is named ‘Dalem’, ‘Aduens’, or ‘Abang’ (brother). In 
principle, historically, the three examples above indicate that ancient Indonesians accepted 
homosexuality as a fact. The term ‘homosexual(ity)’ was identified as emerging in Indonesia 
in the 1970s through the publication of a book “Jalan Sempurna”, found by Ulrich Kratz in 
the National Library (Perpustakaan Nasional) in Jakarta. From the fragments that I will 
describe, we can see the indication that the “history” of homosexuality in Indonesia has 
already appeared at the beginning of the 1910s. This book tells the journey of life of Sucipto, 
a Javanese man who lived during the Dutch colonial era (Boellstroff, 2005, p. 48). Here, I 
show the feelings of Sucipto when he meets a man around twenty years old in Situbondo 
(East Java). 
I walked by the front of the Regent’s residence, intending to keep going past the 
railway station. But only a few steps after I passed the Regent’s residence, a young 
fellow suddenly stepped out of an alley. He looked to be about twenty years old, but 
was still in school, judging from the schoolbag that he, like me, was carrying. The 
second our eyes met, my heart started to pound. I felt as if the blood was hissing 
(berdesir-desir) through my body. “Hey, why is your heart thudding like that?” I 
asked myself. Never in my life had it pounded so. And, at that moment, I lowered my 
head, puzzling over the beating of my heart. (Anderson, 2006, p. 47) 
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That day, I could not pay attention in my class. All I could think of was the meeting 
that had so shaken my heart. “Where does he come from? What is his name?” It was 
only natural, after all, that I didn’t know where he came from, since we had never 
met before. And besides, when we were walking together, I never learned his name; 
since the whole time his eyes were fixed on me as if they could never be satisfied. 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 48) 
“Why is he like this?” I thought to myself. I was sure that his desire was awakened. 
But why was I, too, aroused? Unmistakably, it was because his body was really 
amazing. Wherever I laid my hand, his skin felt so smooth and soft. Even though he 
was another boy, at whatever part of his body I looked, my desire and passion grew 
stronger. Especially, if I looked at his face. If I didn’t quickly lower my head, my desire 
would surely explode. I would surely lay my head by his. I longed to nibble at his lips 
and kiss them. His body was like silk to my touch. Even this morning when I first met 
him, my heart was already pounding, as if something was beating inside my chest. 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 54) 
Eventually, he explained to me that a man can satisfy his desire with another man. 
We became lovers, until he was transferred. After he left, I did with others what he 
had done with me. I was attracted to handsome boys, and in the end found a good 
friend, whom I had to leave when I came here. … “How does one satisfy one’s 
desire?” I asked him with a smile. He answered not a word, but began kissing my 
cheeks, while his hands caressed my body. At that point I could no longer control my 
desire, so I forgot myself and responded with kisses of my own. “This is what I’ve 
been waiting for for so long,” I said to myself. Then gradually he took hold of my 
thigh, and inch by inch lifted up my sarung, till finally his hand touched my… “It 
seems you like me, isn’t it so, Little Brother?” he said with a smile, and kissed me 
again. By this time my desire had become indescribable. (Anderson, 2006, p. 54 – 55) 
From the fragments above, Sucipto did not say the word ‘homo’ or even ‘gay’. He did not 
know that the romance between two men can be considered as ‘homosexuality’. Until then, 
he began to realize that that kind of relation is unusual when he found his friend has a 
relation with a doctor who loved him. 
At one time my friend, too had not understood. Just like me. Then he learned from 
the doctor who loved him. Ah, why would a doctor, with plenty of money, not feel 
like marrying? Other men would certainly have married a beautiful girl. But he didn’t 
want to because he wasn’t used to an attachment to women. The other thing was 
that I had no idea why he didn’t go for women. Perhaps he was the kind of man 
who… And it was the same with my friend. He was accustomed to being attached to 
other boys. (Anderson, 2006, p. 59) 
The emphasizing of ‘homosexuality’ between Sucipto and his boyfriend is more indicated in 
this fragment, 
Can you really hear the bells from here? Amazing. In that case, I needn’t stir till I hear 
them ring! Right now, the two of us have received a blessing. So we must be grateful 
to Him and give Him thanks. And now that we have received this blessing, let’s not 
just run round and round from joy.… I thought it was I who had fallen in love with 
him. But now I see that his love for me is even greater than mine for him.… Listen to 
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me, Little Brother. My love for you is like nothing else in this world. If I try to hold it 
back, I feel my heart dissolve. (Anderson, 2006, p. 65) 
However, what made homosexuals so distinguished from other social classes was the major 
contribution of the colonial Dutch government. The Dutch government ‘imported’ a new 
culture of homosexuality, when around the same time, homosexuality was banned in 
Europe. The very existence of the Dutch crackdown suggests that homosexuality was visible 
enough to catch the eye of the colonial apparatus at a time when the colony’s future was 
increasingly in doubt. Sex between men seems to have become seen as threatening the 
racial19 hierarchy and as the product of global connection and a threat to social order 
(Boellstorff, 2005, p. 54). 
Social representation and gender belief system 
The creation of the “State” contributed most certainly to the interdiction of homosexuality 
in Indonesia. Every State represents itself to its society through the mechanisms of social 
representation and the gender belief system. Social representations are about processes of 
collective meaning–making resulting in a common cognition which develops social bonds 
uniting societies, organizations and groups (Höijer, 2011, p. 3).20 These social forms make it 
possible to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviors and to objectify 
them as part of a shared social setting. While representations are often to be located in the 
cognitions of men and women, they can just as often be found ‘in the world’, and as such 
examined separately (Moscovici, 1988, p. 214).  
 Moscovici added that a social representation is as a “network” of ideas, metaphors 
and images, more or less loosely tied together (Moscovici, 2000, p. 153). They are 
embedded in communicative practices, such as dialogues, debates, media discourses and 
scientific discourses (Marková, 2003). Social representations participate each time in the 
global vision a society establishes for itself (Moscovici, 2000, p. 160), and operates at 
different levels, including large communities such as the nation and small subgroups of 
people (Höijer, 2011, p. 6). Thus, as Fairclough (1992) said, social representation proceeds in 
society and everyday life.  
 The system of representation has a power to classify, to assimilate, and to compare 
the society and the environment (Giust-Desprairies, 2009, p. 45). As a consequence, if social 
representation is embodied in the structure of society, it appears then as a gender system 
termed the gender belief system. This system is closely related to norms that dominate in a 
                                                          
19
 As an “academic product”, racial theory cannot be separated from its own historical moment: it was 
developed at a particular era of British and European colonial expansion in the nineteenth century which 
ended in the Western occupation of nine tenths of the surface territory of the globe (Young, 1995, p. 91). 
20
 With the epithet « social » Moscovici wants to emphasize how representations arise through social 
interaction and communication between individuals and groups. “Social”also marks that the contents of 
representations are social. They reflect, in different ways, historical, cultural and economic contexts, 
circumstances and practices (See Höijer, 2011, p. 4). 
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society, which, in this case, is the emergence of the norm of heterosexuality. Rubin (2011, p. 
151) underlined this norm as,  
 Sexuality that is “good”, “normal”, and “natural” should ideally be heterosexual,  
marital, monogamous, reproductive, and noncommercial. It should be coupled, 
relational, within the same generation, and occur at home. It should not involve 
pornography, fetish object, sex toys of any sort, or roles other that male and female. 
Any sex that violates these rules is “bad”, “abnormal”, or “unnatural”. Bad sex may 
be homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, nonprocreative, or commercial. It may be 
masturbatory or take place at orgies, may be casual, may cross generational lines, 
and may take place in “public”, or at least in the bushes or the baths. It may involve 
the use of pornography, fetish objects, sex toys, or unusual roles. 
 
 This is what Gagnon and Simon explained as a sexual script theory where sexuality is 
produced, shared, and forced to follow a blue print and is used as guide to analyze the 
perfect gender. As a blue print, sexual scripts serve as a cultural consensus to define 
sexuality. Such a dominant sexual script affects at the level of perception as to the good and 
perfect couple, the sexual relations that should appear and sexual emotions (Waskul and 
Plante, 2010, p. 151). 
 Indonesian’s understanding of contemporary sexuality is very limited. This situation 
is probably a result of the heteronormative norms dictated and sustained by the New Order 
Era (era Orde Baru) government. The New Order government based its Nation-State on the 
heterosexual archetype of the nuclear family consisting of a husband, a wife and children, 
with the nation’s president and his wife as parents (Johan, 2011, p. 200). Marriage is 
oftentimes viewed as the basis of society. Sexual intercourse aims primarily for procreation, 
which consistently serves to build a nuclear family (Yulius, 2013). Thus, according to the 
Indonesian government, the only legal marriage is a marriage between a man and a woman 
(Johan, 2011, p. 205). This notion has prevented the emergence of a homosexual culture in 
Indonesian society as homosexuality is considered a deviance and immoral practice against 
the norms of society (Johan, 2011, p. 200). For the reason stated above, gay, lesbian, and 
waria are considered deviants and their identity is perceived as penyakit masyarakat (social 
problems or illnesses). These people have been forced to ‘linger in the closet’ and it is 
deemed taboo to talk about them publicly (Johan, 2011, p. 200). It can be said, thus, that 
the LGBT peoples in Indonesia are victims of prevailing social norms (une victime de normes 
sociales) (Chauvin and Lerch, 2013, p. 12) that arise in a society and which are legitimized by 
the State through social representation and the hegemonic gender belief system.  
 In fact, in reality, people who behave homosexually are informally welcomed by 
most of modern Indonesian society. It means that a person who displays homosexual 
behavior will be accepted as long as he or she does not trigger any trouble in the society 
(Johan, 2011, p. 203). But, actually, according to Oetomo, cited by Johan (2011, p. 204), 
there are many problems facing gay men especially in current Indonesian society. The first 
issue is that many Indonesian gays, lesbians, and warias feel insecure and self-doubting. 
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They feel guilt-ridden, not normal, awkward, and unrighteous because of their condition. 
Their greatest fear is to be rejected by their family and condemned as a sinner by their 
religion. There are many negative stereotypes, judgments, and the misinterpretation of 
homosexuals in Indonesian society. Second, most homosexuals are afraid of their family’s, 
friends’ and society’s perceptions and the risk of rejection. This circumstance forces 
Indonesian homosexuals to disguise their identities and sometimes to coalesce on the town 
outskirts and build new, exclusive communities. Some will leave their hometowns to live in 
larger cities such as Jakarta, Bali, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Bandung (Ellis, 2011, p. 204) 
and even may migrate overseas to cities deemed more tolerant such as Amsterdam, The 
Hague, Paris, London, San Francisco, Sydney, Melbourne, for example. 
The myths of Paris 
Under the social representation and gender belief system, gay people in Indonesia instead 
of playing ‘hide-and-seek’, have often decided to migrate to other countries, for example to 
Paris, the capital city of France. The Netherlands21 is also known around the world for its 
liberal position on homosexuality.  
 Freytag (2008, p. 8) states that as a travel destination Paris evokes multi-faceted and 
particularly capturing imageries that are portrayed in countless travel guides: the iconic 
landmark of the Eiffel Tower and the controversial glass pyramid of the Louvre, impressive 
Haussmannian boulevards that dress the city in cream-grey limestone, numerous cafés and 
restaurants, the Montmartre hill with tiny lanes and squares filled with street painters, the 
glamorous Champs-Elysées boulevard that stretches from the Obelisk of Place de la 
Concorde to Arc de Triomphe, magnificent views of the River Seine from Pont-Neuf, and the 
famous cathedral of Notre-Dame. According to key tourist indicators, Paris can be identified 
as the European capital of tourism and one of the most important urban tourism 
destinations in the world (Freytag, 2008, p. 9).22  
Paris as a Destination for Gays 
As a destination, the city always makes images such as beauty, sorrow, pleasure, mystery, 
and violence (Clavel, 2002, p. 51).  Paris has many places for homosexuals, so that Paris has 
become one of the capital cities of homosexuality in Europe (Leroy, 2005, p. 585). The City 
of Paris and its homosexuality reached its golden age in the 1920s, during which time 
                                                          
21
 Amsterdam, in particular, is often associated with gay emancipation, as it provided the setting for the 
world’s first legally recognized ‘gay marriage’ in 2001, and hosts the famous gay parade with festively 
decorated boats floating through the city’s picturesque canals each year. In cross-national survey research, the 
Dutch indeed indicate to accept homosexuality more than most other European peoples (See Buijs, Hekma, 
&Duyvendak, 2011, p. 633). 
22
 With a ratio of almost 60 per cent of the overnight visitors to Paris, the city is an important destination for 
international tourists. The leading resident countries of international travelers are the US and UK, followed by 
Italy, Japan, Spain, and Germany. As a result of its function as the political and economic center of France, 
Paris attracts a large number of business travelers that are estimated to be more than 44 per cent of overnight 
visitors (See Freytag, 2008, p. 9 – 10). 
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appeared many famous homosexual artists, for example Proust, Colette, Satie, Gide, and 
Diaghilev (Leroy, 2005, p. 586).  
 Paris is considered as a major gathering place for homosexuals after Berlin and 
London (Leroy, 2005, p. 585). Areas of Paris which encourage the open meeting of 
homosexuals and the gay lifestyle are central and suburban Paris locations such as the Hôtel 
de Ville and Place de la Bastille (4th area), 9th area, and 11th area (Leroy, 2005, p. 588). 
Between those areas, the 4th area is the largest area for homosexual peoples: the Le Marais. 
In earlier times, this was an area for aristocrats until the 19th century (Clavel, 2002, p. 35). Le 
Marais has been growing rapidly since the 1980s as a commercial area, reserved in 
particular for gays. It is characterized by the creation of gay bars, gay boutiques, and other 
services for gays. In addition, this area is used as a symbol of the existence of homosexuality 
which can be seen from the rainbow flag (Giraud, 2011).  
 Indonesian gays prior to their arrival in Paris did not know of Le Marais. From the 
interviews I conducted, it is clear that the only images of Paris were connected to notions of 
a romantic city, the Eiffel Tower and the Louvre, Mona Lisa, a fashionable city, and the 
French kiss. Respondents almost totally answered in the negative when asked of their 
knowledge of Paris as also the city that represents freedom for homosexuals.  
 “For those who have never been to Paris, Paris is Eiffel Tower” (D, 27) 
 “Eiffel Tower, Monalisa, and Disneyland” (W, 29) 
 “Eiffel tower, who does not dream to see that famous tower?” (W, 31) 
“For me, Paris is a romantic city. Here you can find many places where gays, lesbians, 
and transgender can express their expression. They can embrace each other, kissing 
each other” (M, 38) 
“Paris is Eiffel tower. But now I am thinking that Paris is a city of tolerance” (H, 40) 
Why Should I Move to Paris? 
The discourse of migration is inseparable from the discourse of globalization. Larsson (2001, 
p. 9) explained that globalization is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting 
shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on 
one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on other side of the 
world. In other words, globalization not only compresses time and space (Harvey, 1989, p. 8) 
but creates a process of massive migration, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism (Szeman, 
2003, p. 94).  
 The migration of gay people abroad is an example of the greatness of the effects of 
globalization. There are no organizations worldwide that have statistical data for LGBT 
migration, in particular the number of Indonesian gay peoples who move abroad. 
Concerning the condition of gay peoples in Indonesia who are discriminated against 
physically and psychologically, it is understandable that migration is not always a choice but 
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a necessity (Binnie, 2004, p. 88).  The migration of Indonesian gays outside Indonesia seems 
to indicate that that this condition is the best way to avoid discrimination.  
“I moved here because I think it’s impossible being a gay in Indonesia. Look at FPI! 
They attacked us. It’s rude! How can I live peacefully in Indonesia? That’s why I 
move. Thank God that I met a Belgian man in France. He takes care of me. Oh I 
forgot to explain to you that I move here as a student. I learned French for 3 months 
and the rest I work as a waiter” (Y, 33) 
For some men, parental divorce becomes a trigger to move abroad. The conditions of stress 
and depression have inadvertently led them to stay in France. 
“I love Indonesia but I hate it also. I am Indonesian but why do I have to live abroad 
just because I am gay? When I am in Indonesia, I have to play hide and seek. I 
confessed only with my best friends, but I didn’t confess with my family. In 2004 my 
parents divorced and I got stress. I went to some bars and I got drunk. When I took a 
pee, I met a French man. He helped me because I almost fainted. In sum, he asked 
me to move to his country. I think this is the way that I have to leave Indonesia while 
I love my country. In 2006, I move to France and living with him.” (K, 38) 
“My parents divorced 15 years ago. I hate them, especially to my father. … But 
although I hate him, I missed a father figure. I remembered when he taught me 
math. He explained very well until I understood math. … One day I went to the bar 
with my gay friends. There I met French man. Since I can speak French, he was very 
excited to chat with me. I don’t know why I didn’t hesitate to tell my problems. In 
the end, I fell in love with him, and he did. He asked me to go to France. For me, why 
not? I am a gay and I understand that I can’t live in Indonesia; in addition I am in love 
with him. After taking care of all documents, I went to Paris. He picked me up at the 
airport. And now I am happy because it seems that I found the figure like my father.” 
(J, 35) 
Some of the respondents moved abroad just to study. At first they did not want to stay in 
France, but their meeting with French men led them to decide to stay there.  
“Actually I don’t have any plan to stay in Paris. I came here as a scholarships receiver. 
I studied Master in Communication. One day when I had a coffee in one of the best 
coffee shops in Paris, I met a French man. At that time, the café was full but I didn’t 
notice it. I continued reading a roman. Suddenly he asked me whether he could sit 
next to me or not. Ok, when I saw that the café was full, I directly said “yes, of 
course”. Time goes by, we fell in love. Now I stay with him. He works in…sorry I don’t 
want to mention his office…while I work as a waiter in a junk food restaurant. I don’t 
think so that when I stay in Indonesia, I can come out of closet. It’s hard to be a 
homosexual in Indonesia.” (A, 37) 
From the respondents that I interviewed, it can be seen that at the first time they did not 
have the intention to migrate to France. They came to France with their competences as a 
student or because of they were invited by their partners. At present, what they feel is 
calmness, because they can live freely without pressure or discrimination. 
 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e3
0
 
Conclusion 
According to Romero (2012, p. 194 - 196), the United Nations noted that there are 72 to 
8623 States that still punish homosexuals. In addition, between 1979 and 1990, there have 
been 107 executions of homosexuals. Thus, the State and society became the greatest 
sources of discrimination against homosexuals. What the State does is to create and to form 
society through a hegemonic process of social representation embodied in a system that is 
trying to make a stereotype of every human. This systematic stereotyping can best be 
understood as a gender belief system. 
 The gay groups whose existence is challenged from all dimensions, they ought to be 
afraid. It is very reasonable if they accumulate a million questions; for example, how they 
can live in the homophobic society? What is the impact of society’s view of their existence? 
Where they should look for security when they are discriminated against? The 
“contemporary” question to solve this problem for many Indonesian gays is to move 
abroad. It can be said that the gay migration cannot be prevented anymore because they 
are vulnerable to discrimination not only from Indonesian society but also by the Indonesian 
State. 
 Globalization opens the eyes of this vulnerable group and, as indicated in this paper, 
many move to France, in particular to Paris as a capital city of France. Borderless 
technology, assisted by the internet, offers chances to think more deeply about staying in 
Paris. As many of the respondents’ comments suggested, they feel Paris offers a freedom 
for homosexuals, seen by Paris’ popularity as a “queer city” (Binnie, 2004, p. 122). Paris is 
not overtly a gendered city that always puts men over women, over minority groups, over 
children’s and the poor’s rights, where they do not have any access to move freely (Low, 
1996, p. 390). In addition, the contribution of their partners as the person who invited them 
to move to France is also a major trigger. The partners have contributed to allow many of 
the Indonesian gay migrants surveyed here to move immediately and to become settled in 
France. Thus, as I said before, the migration of Indonesian gays is not affected by a ‘push 
factor’ or a ‘pull factor’ but automatically; indeed, those two factors influenced them to 
move abroad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 The number is still more and more developed since the pressure of sexual minority groups is high to insist 
the local government to pass the law of the recognition of homosexuality as well as to pass the gay marriage. 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e3
1
 
References 
Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (2006). First Love: The Opening of Soetjipto‘s Djalan Sampoerna. 
Indonesia 82, October, 39 – 74 
Bastié, Jean. (1992). Paris, Ville Mondiale. La France Dans le Monde (Under the direction of Gabriel 
Wackemann). Paris: Nathan. 
Boellstroff, Tom. (2005). The Gay Archipelago. Sexuality and Nation in Indonesia. London : Sage 
Bourchier, David and Vedi R. Hadiz. (2003). Introduction. Indonesian Politics and Society. A Reader. 
London : RoutledgeCurzon. 
Binnie, Jon. (2004). The Globalization of Sexuality. London : SAGE Publications  
Budiman, Muhammad Arief. (2012). Reog: Unique Dance. Proceedings of the 4thInternational 
Conference on Indonesian Studies. Jakarta: ICSSIS UI. 
Buijs, Laurens, Hekma, Gert and Duyvendak, Jan Willem. (2011). ‘As Long As They Keep Away from 
Me’: The Paradox of Antigay Violence in a Gay-Friendly Country. Sexualities, 14 (6), 632 – 652 
Chauvin, Sébastien and Lerch, Arnaud. (2013). Sociologie de l’Homosexualité. Paris : La Découverte. 
Clavel, Maité. (2002). Sociologie de l’urbaine. Paris : Anthropos Dari Mata Turun ke Hati (1987). 
Retrieved from 
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1987/10/10/PRK/mbm.19871010.PRK32396.id.h
tml 
Ellis, Justin. (2006). Gay Life in Jakarta: Defining the Emerging Community. Retrieved from 
http://www.kyotojournal.org/gender/gay_jakarta.html 
Fairclough, Norman. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge : Polity Press 
Freytag, T. (2008). Making a Difference: Tourist Practices of Repeat Visitors in the City of Paris. Social 
Geography Discussion, 4 (1 – 25), 1 - 19 
Giust-Desprairies, Florence. (2009). L’Imaginaire Collectif. Paris: Erès 
Giraud, C. (2011). Enquête sur les lieux de residence des homosexuels masculins à Paris. Sociétés 
Contemporaines, (81), 151 – 176. 
Graham, Sharyn. (2002). Sex, Gender, and Priest in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. IIAS Newsletter (29), 
27.  
Harvey, David. (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity. In R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation 
State. London : Macmillan Press. 
Höijer, Birgitta. (2011). Social Representations Theory. A New Theory for Media Research. Nordicom 
Review, 32 (2), 3 – 16 
Hurgronje, Snouck. (1906). The Achehnese. Leyden : E. J. Brill 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission. (2007). Human Rights Abuses Againts 
Sexual Minorities in Indonesia. Report, November. 
Johan, Rizki Theodorus. (2011). Discovering the “Others”: Unearthing Homosexual Identity 
Construction in Selected Indonesia Contemporary Novels and Short Stories. The Asian 
Conference on Literature and Librarianship Official Conference Proceedings. Osaka: Japan, 199 
– 209.  
Larsso, T. (2001). The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization. U.S : Cato Institute 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e3
2
 
Leroy, Stéphane. (2005). Le Paris Gay: Elément pour une Géographie de l’Homosexualité. Ann. Geo., 
(646), 579 – 601 
Low, Setha M. (1996). The Anthropology of Cities: Imagining and Theorizing the City. Annual Review 
of Anthropology, (25), 390 
Marková, I. (2003). Dialogicality and Social Representations. The Dynamics of Mind. Cambridge, UK : 
Cambridge University Press. 
Moscovisi, S. (1988). Notes towards a Description of Social Representations. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 18, 211 – 250 
___________. (2000). Social Representations. Explorations in Social Psychology. Cambridge, UK : 
Polity Press 
Oetomo, Dede. 2001. Memberi Suara pada yang Bisu. Yogyakarta: Galang Press. Reksodirdjo, Wisnu 
Adihartono. (2013). Searching for Security: The Migration of Indonesian Gays. Retrieved from 
http://socialscience.nl/2013/09/25/searching-security-migration-indonesian-gays/ 
Romero, Jean-Luc. (2012). Homopoliticus. Paris : Edition de la Cerisaie 
Rubin, Gayle. (ND). Deviations. A Gayle Rubin Reader. Durham, London : Duke University Press. 
Savin-Williams, Ritch. (2005). The New Gay Teenager. London : Sage 
Sidanius, Jim, & Pratto, Felicia. (1999). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy 
and Oppresion. New York : Cambridge University Press 
Szeman, Imre. (2003). Culture and Globalization, or the Huma nities in Ruins. CR: The New Centennial 
Review, (3), 2, 94 
Waskul, Dennis D., & Plante, Rebecca F. Sex(ualities) and Symbolic Interactions. Symbolic 
Interactions, 33, 148 – 162 
Whitaker, Brian. (2011). Unspeakable love. Gay and lesbian life in the Middle East. London : SAQI 
Young, Roberts. 1995. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. New York : Routledge 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e3
3
 
         The Fiqh Paradigm and the Religious Justification 
for the Secular State: 
The Traditionalist Muslims and the Dutch Colonial Rulers 
Saefur Rochmat24 
Biodata: Saefur Rochmat is a lecturer at the History Department of the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Yogyakarta State University (UNY). His research interests are Islamic groups and parties, religious 
studies, and Indonesian politic. His contact email is rochmat@yahoo.com. 
Abstract 
Traditionalist Muslims understood that Islam is not identical to politics, so political Islam is 
not monolithic, in aiming at power and then at the establishment of the Islamic state. They 
believed that political Islam is to fulfil salvation in the world (rahmatan lil’alamin)25 so that 
the state is a tool, not the object, of religion, and accordingly, they were more concerned 
with the function of the state than that of the form.26 Accordingly, they justified any existing 
political system for the purpose of maintaining public order, which constitutes a pre-
requisite for religious order. In line with this, for example, they had justified the non-Islamic 
states of the Netherland East Indies.  
Key words: the Traditionalist Muslims, the Fiqh Paradigm, Religious Justification, Political 
Justification, and the Indonesian Secular State. 
Introduction 
I would like to discuss the issue of Islam and the state, with a focus on those who support 
the secular state with religious justification in Indonesia. In this regard, I follow Talal Asad’s 
advice that religious people should understand the meaning of the term secular from their 
own particular religious traditions as a way of constructing the picture of social interactions 
that involve secular and religious affairs.27 Their understandings of secular may be slightly 
different from the modern theory of secular state, and accordingly they represent a 
moderate theory of secularization which accommodates the religious aspirations of people 
through public reasoning. Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and other traditional organizations such as 
the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah28 (Perti, Union of Islamic Education), Persatuan Umat 
Islam, and Nahdlatul Wathan adopted the paradigm following the Sunni tradition29 which 
views the relationship between Islam and the state as not as an ideological paradigm, but 
                                                          
24
 The author would like to acknowledge the contribution Dr Richard Chauvel made through his comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. Dr Chauvel was the author’s PhD supervisor at Victoria University.  
25
 Munib Huda, 1998, p. 17  
26
 I will address these issues in greater depth later in the paper.  
27
 Asad, 2003. Please see also Volpi, 2010, pp. 2-3. 
28
 Please see: Latif, 2008, p. 164. Perti was founded in 1930 in West Sumatera and it successfully influenced the 
modernization of the traditionalists in Jambi, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Aceh, Kalimantan Barat, and South Sulawesi. 
Please see also Jones, 1984, p. 10. Although Perti was a small Sumatra-based party, it was ideologically akin to 
NU, but even stricter than NU in its reliance on the Shafi’i school of orthodox Islamic law. Perti had received 24 
seats in the 1971 election and this meant that Perti had a relatively strong following because it was the same 
number of seats as obtained by Parmusi, the modernist party. 
29
 Please see: Effendi, 2010, pp. 19-26.  
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according to the Fiqh paradigm, for believing that Islam and the state constitute different 
identities, so that Islam does not always require an Islamic state.30 Whereas, the Muslim 
modernists, in Indonesia often associated with Muhammadiyah and Persis, accepted the 
Sunni tradition just in specific religious matters (ibadah), not on societal life,31 because they 
advocated the ideological paradigm, namely Islamic ideology, that idealized an Islamic state, 
implying the unity of Islam and state as one identity.32 In this regard, NU and Perti were 
consistent with the background of the birth of Sunni, which is to say, out of its attempt to 
reconcile the damaging ideological conflicts following the death of Muhammad the prophet, 
especially with the killing of the Caliph Utsman. Accordingly, the traditionalists tried to 
behave moderately toward other religious paradigms as a way of reaching mutual 
understanding. 
This section tries to elaborate how the Fiqh paradigm dealt with these political 
systems. In the discussion, I compare the Fiqh paradigm with other paradigms, namely the 
Islamic ideological paradigm and the secular paradigm. The birth of the Islamic ideological 
paradigm was to challenge the Dutch colonial rule with its political system; meanwhile, the 
secular paradigm challenged the method of the Islamic ideological paradigm to deal with 
the Dutch colonial rule, as it favoured a secular political system. As a prelude to this 
discussion, I would like to elaborate how the Fiqh paradigm justified as well as challenged 
the legitimacy of the pre-colonial Sultanates and Islamic kingdoms. By so doing, I am 
explaining how religious legitimacy intermingles with political legitimacy.  
The pre-NU traditionalist Muslims and their Fiqh paradigm in relation to the Dutch 
colonial rule 
There is no agreement amongst Muslim scholars about the concept of an Islamic state and it 
is not surprising that Islam and the state are different identities. Following the Fiqh 
paradigm, the traditionalist Muslims aspired to an Islamic state which would implement 
Shari’a into the state regulations, apart from their acknowledgements of the different 
nature of Islam and the state. Accordingly, they did not dichotomize the political systems of 
the world into the ‘territory of Islam’ (dar al-Islam) and the territory of unbelievers’ (dar al-
kuffar or dar al-hard), but also recognized the third category of the ‘territory of peace’ (dar 
al-sulf).33 From this perspective, indeed, we understand that they aspired to an Islamic state 
(dar al-Islam) where the state implements Shari’a, but they did not want to force its 
establishment so that they recognized the existence of the ‘territory of peace’ (dar al-sulf). 
                                                          
30
 Please see: Arkoun, 1994, pp. 20-21. In this regard I agree with Mohammed Arkoun who distinguishes 
between “ideas” and “ideology”. This kind of distinction is similar to his distinction between “myth” and 
“mythology”.  
31
 Wahid, 1999b, pp. 153-154.  
32
 Noer, 1985, p. 281 and 284. Muslim Modernists from Persis, Permi, and Sarekat Islam did not want to 
legitimize the NEI government because the latter was not an Islamic state. More moderate Muslim modernists 
such as Muhammadiyah did cooperate with the NEI government in their efforts of developing a modern 
Islamic education which would challenge the authority of the Muslim traditionalists.  
33
 Hosen, 2005, p. 429. 
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This last category was based on a hadith that ordered the Muslims to obey the ruler of 
Ethiopia, although the ruler was not a Muslim.34  
The Indonesian Muslims had established some Islamic kingdoms before the arrival of 
European colonisers such as Portuguese, Spanish and the Dutch, in which the Sultans 
implemented Shari’a into the state law. We recognize some Islamic kingdoms in what is now 
Indonesia such as the Sultanates of Aceh, Gowa, Deli, Mataram, Banten, Ternate, and 
Tidore. However, we also should notice the fact that in the history of Islam that there was 
no common and uniform Shari’a implemented by the Islamic states. These Islamic kingdoms 
each implemented a slightly different Shari’a as a result of the influence of different socio-
cultural contexts.35 This implies that a Sultan was not able to claim the rights as the only 
true interpreter of Islam. Indeed, the Sunni tradition recognized two elements of the 
societal system that are the clerics and the ruler. The role of the clerics was to reformulate 
Shari’a (Islamic laws) and the role of the rulers was to implement them in the societal life.36 
This implies that the state and Islam are different identities and, indeed, the traditionalist 
Muslims advocated the Sunni tradition: that the validity of religious practices is not related 
to Muslims’ political affiliation, but it is based on its validity in the face of the Fiqh which is 
formulated by the clerics. However, they recognized the existing political system, namely 
the state, as a tool for supervising public order which constitutes a pre-requirement for a 
religious order.  
The secular character of an Islamic state is clearly informed by the fact that not all 
Shari’a becomes state regulation and accordingly, the traditionalist Muslims understand 
Islamic law in terms of the Fiqh. Not all products of the Fiqh became the state regulations, 
as the coverage of Fiqh is wider than political affairs. Regarding the fact that not all clerics 
were incorporated into the state bureaucracy, this implied that the Sultan did not properly 
claim to represent the interest of Islam. This is also inferring that the Sultan was not able to 
claim the rights for an absolute religious legitimacy. In this regard, it is useful to quote 
Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naim who argues ‘that framework and main principles of Shari’a were 
developed as an ideal normative system by scholars who were clearly independent of the 
state and its institutions.’37 Accordingly, there exists disparity between the implementation 
of Shari’a by the state and the product of Shari’a by the clerics. This disparity informs us that 
                                                          
34
Hadiths was narrated by HR. Abu Dawud, Tirmidzi, Ahmad that Abu Najih (Al-Irbadh) bin Sariyah radhiyallahu 
'anhu said that Muhammad the Prophet PBUH gave heart-touching advice to us so that our heart became 
shaken, beating and our tears dropped, then we asked: hey Muhammad the Prophet, it is likely the advice of 
those who will die and leave us forever, give us your will! The Prophet, then, said: “I made myself will that all 
of you should be afraid of the God, besides listening and following orders, although they came from the ruler 
of Ethiopia (Habsyah). Really, those who have lived a long time amongst you will encounter with some 
conflicts. Accordingly, you should hold fast to my tradition (hadiths). 
35
 The discussion of the pre-colonial Islamic political systems in Indonesia presents a generalised picture that 
does not explore the differences between the Hindu-Buddhist influenced states based in Java and the 
maritime states from Aceh through to Tidore and Ternate. 
36
 Effendi, 2010, p. 26.  
37
 an-Na’im, 2008, p. 325.  
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the state is not able to implement Shari’a completely and accordingly the production of 
Shari’a by the clerics might play the role of a normative critic of the ruler.   
In line with the above mentioned categorization of state in Islamic civilization, there 
existed some Islamic kingdoms in Indonesia which implemented Shari’a into the state 
regulations. Sultan, the leader of an Islamic kingdom, positioned himself as a leader of an 
Islamic state as he/she tried to find legitimacy from Islam. By doing so, the Sultan as the 
leader of the political institution also tried to assume a religious leadership based on his role 
of the protector of Islam. For winning the religious legitimacy, Sultans always tried to find 
justification either from the centre of Islam, namely Mecca, or that of the existing caliph in 
Istanbul, Ottoman Empire, who they considered, inaccurately, a spiritual leader.38 Whereas, 
the clerics considered the Sultan as a symbol for an Islamic theocratic state in terms of 
political leadership, not religious leadership. Accordingly, the Sultan’s efforts for uniting 
both political and religious leaderships were related to the secular nature of politics. It was 
quite often that we find the cases of politicization of Islam for the purpose of maintaining 
power. Indeed, it was not easy for Sultan to acquire religious leadership as he/she should 
master Islamic sciences, namely understand Islam, besides practising Islam properly. 
However, religious leadership was not monolithic such as in the case of the existence of 
some schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and accordingly, he/she should tolerate other 
understandings of Islam if he/she expected that he/she would receive a wider political 
legitimacy from other religious communities. From this elaboration, we find that there is a 
subtle relationship between political and religious legitimacies.39     
For the purpose of having a strong legitimacy from the Muslim community, the 
Sultans tried to develop cooperation with the clerics. As the leaders of Islamic states, they 
supervised both Islamic civil and criminal laws and they cooperated with some clerics for the 
purpose of governing both civil and criminal laws. For managing Islamic affairs, Sultans 
appointed a Mufti who was in charge of providing legal advice on Islamic affairs. However, it 
was very rare to have a monolithic view on certain Islamic laws as some clerics had a quite 
independent position from the state, especially in their rights of formulating Shari’a. This 
implies the existence of the plurality of Shari’a which would challenge the validity of Shari’a 
as formulated by the regime. The cooperation between the Sultans and the clerics did not 
mean that an Islamic kingdom represented the union of political and religious leaderships. It 
was due to not all clerics being subjugated into the state, as they were able to perform their 
                                                          
38
 This caliphate did not have a formal relationship with these Islamic kingdoms. Awkwardly, Sultans 
considered the caliph as a spiritual leader, besides the symbol of the unity of the Sunni Muslims. This term of 
unity is also awkward as the Shiite Muslims had their own leaders who unconvincingly claimed a political 
leadership as well as religious leadership. 
39
 In the classical history of Islamic civilization we find that Muhammad the Prophet was able to establish an 
Islamic state, although he assumed himself as a religious leader, not a political leader. Regarding Muhammad’s 
status as a Prophet, namely religious leader, he did not choose someone or provide the mechanism for 
choosing someone as his successor. In political affairs, the position of Muhammad was replaced by some 
caliphs and accordingly, this kind of political system was recognized as the caliphate. These caliphs were 
chosen by the Muslims for the purpose of implementing Shari’a (Islamic law) and they were not the 
formulators of Shari’a. Indeed, the authority of Shari’a is in the hand of the clerics who understand Islam.    
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role of Islamic leaderships outside the state apparatus, except in the case of criminal law in 
which they abided by the existing political system. 
In an Islamic kingdom, the clerics had important role in the management of the state 
in matters of both civil and criminal affairs. The Sultan delivered an authority and appointed 
a cleric to occupy the supreme office of judge (hakim). Of course, this supreme judge 
appointed some clerics to implement civil and criminal law at lower levels. In other words, 
these clerics executed criminal law in the name of the Sultan; it did not rest on their 
authority as clerics. This was because the authority of the clerics was not based on power, 
but on their Islamic knowledge, so that if they punished the offender against criminal law, it 
might raise counter-violence produced by the other social powers in the society. In this 
regard, this criminal aspect of law does not bear in itself a specific feature of Islam, as a non-
Islamic state also executes this kind of criminal law, which constitutes a tool for establishing 
public order.40 This implies that this criminal law has a secular nature because it requires 
power to execute.   
Apart from the help of the clerics to execute criminal law, the clerics were more 
concerned with the implementation of civil law which regulates the societal life as well as 
the family life of the Muslims, but not their political life. For that purpose, the Sultan 
facilitated the establishment of the Court of Religion (the Penghulu Court) which handled 
internal Muslims’ affairs such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, alms, etc. In line with this, 
the Sunni clerics did not hesitate to support the existing political power as long as regimes 
gave the Muslims freedom to practice their religion. In the case of Indonesia, it happened 
before the Muslims were able to establish independent Islamic kingdoms and they 
organized their internal affairs under the leaderships of the clerics who recognized the 
sovereignty of non-Muslim rulers.41 This implies that the traditionalist Muslims followed the 
Fiqh paradigm that Islam and the state were different entities, although both should 
develop mutual legitimacy.  
The Sultans did not always have strong support from the clerics if the former did not 
rule following the Islamic teachings. It was quite often also that the Sultans ruled 
autocratically and neglected the advice of the clerics. This was due to the fact that the 
Sultans assumed the power by following the concept of the ‘shadow of God’ and they felt 
superior to the clerics who received their authority from Muhammad the Prophet. In the 
case of Mataram kingdom, Amangkurat I (1645-1677) ordered the killing of some 5,000 
clerics who championed a non-syncretic Islam. Indeed, it was very often that the clerics 
were not able to provide checks and balances to the power of the Sultans, and, accordingly, 
the Sultans often violated the principles of Islamic law.42 
VOC - Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (then the Netherland East Indies government - 
NEI) was very successful in expanding its influence over Indonesia because it applied the 
                                                          
40
 Kamil & Bamualim, 2007, p. 97.  
41
 Wahid, 1999a, p. 54. 
42
 Noer, 1978, p. 4. 
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tactic of divide et impera (divide and conquer). Some Islamic kingdoms were able to 
maintain their independence for long time, but they, then, were subordinated into the 
Dutch colonial rule.43 In the second part of 19th century, the Dutch rulers were able to 
control most parts of Indonesia either economically or politically, apart from the fact that its 
territorial expansion took place after the occupation of Aceh in 1904. The Dutch rulers had 
tried to control the trade in Nusantara since 1602 with Batavia as its centre. For most parts 
of Indonesia, the Dutch rulers did not run the government directly, but indirectly through 
some native officers, who were under the direct command of some kings.44 The Dutch ruler 
governed the people directly when they did not find any local rulers. If so, they made use of 
Islamic law to judge civil affairs amongst Muslims for the purpose of avoiding the frontal 
reaction of the Muslims and, on the other hand, the Muslims respected the criminal law 
executed by the colonial ruler.  
This indirect rule enabled Muslims under the leadership of their kings to manage 
their internal religious affairs both in the matters of civil and criminal law, although they 
recognized the superiority of the colonial ruler.45 For the purpose of the domestication of 
Islam, the NEI government tried to control the system of leadership within the Islamic 
community so that in 1882 it created the courts of religious affairs (priesterraad)46, and, 
then, elevated the status and authority of the religious officer (penghulu) by strengthening 
their aristocrat status with symbolic and feudalistic rights. Next, the clerics with their 
pesantren were placed under the control of these religious officers. This policy was also to 
enlarge the power of local rulers,47 even though they were under the control of the NEI 
government.48 In some cases, resident, the NEI officer, had authority to appoint penghulu 
(Islamic religious officer) in areas which were not under direct control of the Sultans.49 
Following the Fiqh paradigm, the traditionalist Muslims respected the NEI 
government in matters of the implementation of the criminal law which would create public 
order. This was due to public order constituting a requirement of the religious order. They 
did not want to question the ideological philosophy of the state as the validity of pure 
religious practices was not dependent on a given political ideology.50 They differentiated 
                                                          
43
 Gibson, 2007, p. 111. 
44
 Suminto, 1985, pp. 183-184.  
45
 Please see: Ali, 1987, pp. pp. 189-190. The VOC reign did not force the implementation of Dutch Law. It can 
be observed from the Jakarta Statutes of 164, Compendium Freijar of 1760, Mogharraer legislative manual, 
Pepakem Cirebon legislative manual, and B.J.D Clootwijk’s compendium of Bone and Goa Laws.  
46
 Noer, 1978, p. 43. 
47
 Abdullah, 1987, pp. 68-69. 
48
 Kuntowijoyo, 1987, p. 110. 
49
 Lev, 1980, p. 31. 
50
 In the classical history of Islam, the Sunni tradition avoided challenging the political authority because it 
risked maintaining the religious order. Indeed, some Sunnis opposed the political authority but they did it for 
political reasons without theological justification. This stand is also adopted by the majority of Shiites affiliating 
with the Itsna Asy’ariah sect. They believe that Imamah is just a religious concept not an ideological concept so 
that they are not required to establish an Islamic state which unifies both political and religious leadership at 
once. 
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Islam from the state in which the religious authority was in the hand of the clerics and the 
rulers just had power for establishing public order. Following the Sunni tradition, they 
considered that it was justified to live under non-Muslim government as long as they had a 
degree of freedom to practice the basics of the religion and the government guaranteed the 
safety of the individual as well as his/her property; “but they are expected to manage their 
affairs in such a way that it did not contribute to the military strength.”51  
In 1888, the Clerical Party in the Netherlands won the election and governed the 
country.52 These parties assumed the moral responsibility of developing Dutch East Indies 
people, but this spirit was not neutral, but rather grounded in the belief in the superiority of 
Christianity over Islam. Accordingly, the NEI tried to marginalize Shari’a systematically by 
deploying some methods such as confronting Shari’a with the local law (adat), introducing 
Western law, and issuing some policies related to Shari’a.53 In line with this, the NEI 
government adopted the association policy which would unify the NEI with the Netherlands 
through the Cultural Association within the programs of Ethical Policy. This change in Dutch 
policy weakened the political legitimacy of the NEI government in the eyes of Muslim 
leaders as they favoured Christianity. The Muslim leaders also did not agree with the 
cultural association, in the form of an educational system, as they did not want to identify 
with Christianity. On the contrary, the Muslim leaders expected that the government would 
support, as well as develop, Islamic education in order to be compatible with 
modernization. This implies that the government did not want to transform the Islamic 
education to suit the modern changes and it signified the government’s denial of a full 
participation of Muslims in education. The government was only concerned with the 
education of the limited people of the local elite, namely priyayi and other local elite groups 
outside Java, who would play the role of associating Indonesian culture with the 
Netherlands’ culture. It introduced a secular education which would detach the local elites 
from Islamic tradition. Accordingly, this policy would eliminate the idea of Pan-Islamism as 
the government was convinced that those who have identified with the Dutch culture would 
be easy to convert by missionaries.54 In line with this, the government was more concerned 
with controlling than developing religious education. The government, later, was willing to 
subsidize the private Muslim schools which followed the government educational system. 55 
                                                          
51
 This stand point is justified by all big schools of Islamic laws, except Maliki, but it was not due to the matters 
of doctrines. Please see: Saeed, 2007, p. 21. 
52
 In the 1888 elections in Holland the largest party in the lower house was the Liberal Union with 46 seats, 
followed by the Anti-Revolutionary Party 27 seats and the Catholic Party with 25 out of a Tweede Kamar of 100 
seats. The government was formed around the Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Catholic Party. 
This alliance of Protestant and Catholic political parties dominated Dutch politics until 1918. So, the so-called 
Ethical policies and cultural association were introduced by governments dominated by these parties.   
53
 Kamil & Bamualim, 2007, pp. 89-99. 
54
 Suminto, 1985, pp. 39-40. This modern education was also to fulfil the demand for the skill labours as well as 
educated people following the introduction of modern capitalism.  
55
 However, in the 1930s the government accommodated the wish of the Muslim leaders that the government 
schools provided religious lessons to the Muslim students as an extracurricular subject. Of course, it was a 
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This association policy was partly successful in augmenting modern intellectuals who 
challenged the Islamic ideological paradigm advocated by the Muslim modernists associated 
with Sarekat Islam. These Muslim modernists were the followers of the Middle East scholars 
such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rasyid Ridha who had already 
adopted modern sciences and philosophy to make use of them for the purpose of Islam at 
the end of 19th and early 20th centuries. They tried to challenge the secular ideology of the 
West by introducing Islam as a kind of ideology which encompassed all aspects of life. The 
introduction of an Islamic ideological paradigm was a kind of a counter discourse, they 
hoped, which would prevent Muslims from adopting the secular Western ideologies.56 In 
this regard, the secular intellectuals were able to provide a counter discourse to the idea of 
Islamic ideology. Their thoughts had a strong influence amongst the Indonesian people, 
although they were not able to attract a significant membership comparable to the Muslim 
organizations such as Sarekat Islam, NU, and Muhammadiyah because of the repressive 
colonial regime.    
Another impact of the introduction of modern education was the fact that not all 
Western educated priyayi supported the idea of the acculturation policy. This was due to 
the fact that some priyayi had a strong Islamic background because they worked within an 
Islamic kingdom. This was the case of R.M. Tirtoadisoerjo who quit from the colonial 
bureaucracy. He was a modern intellectual who graduated from OSVIA (a training school for 
native government officials in the Dutch East Indies). 
He, then, established NV Sarekat Dagang Islam in 1909. Moreover, the majority of 
these priyayi came from the families of religious officers who had a strong Islamic 
background and who advocated the Fiqh paradigm.57 It was believed by Zaini Ahmad Noeh 
in his introduction to Daniel Lev’s book titled Islamic Courts in Indonesia. In this regard, he 
challenged Lev’s statement that penghulu were not in the forefront of an Islamic 
movement. He argued that the important founding figures of Muhammadiyah, the 
modernist Islamic movement, namely K.H. Achmad Dahlan and K.H, Abdullah Sajad, were 
respectively a penghulu at the Jogjakarta Sultanate and the Pakualaman Courts. Last but not 
least, he argued that many NU leaders graduated from Madrasah Mamba’ ul-Ulum, a 
traditionalist training school for penghulu, established by the royal family of Surakarta 
Sultanate of Central Java as a part of the modernization of pesantren which had been in 
existence since 1906.58 For that purpose, they copied the tactics and methods of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
result of the modernist and traditionalist Muslim leaders to unify under the auspice of MIAI in 1937 in the 
cause of Islam. Please see: Noer, 1978, pp. 26-27. 
56
 Abdullah & Hisyam, 2003, p. 148.  
57
 It was not surprising that many priyayi had strong Islamic background because majority of kingdoms were 
Islamic kingdom. It was the case of R.M. Tirtoadisoerjo who was quit from the colonial bureaucracy and 
established NV Sarekat Dagang Islam in 1909. He was an modern intellectual because he graduated from 
OSVIA. Pelase see: Abdullah & Hisyam, 2003, p. 152.  
58
 Latif, 2008, p. 82. In 1914 it was then followed by the establishment of Nahdlatul Wathan by Abdul Wahab 
Chasbullah and Mas Mansur, the pesantren reform in Jombang, East Java, in 1916 by Kyai Ma’sum, and the 
pesantren reform in Padang in 1918 by Siradjuddin Abbas. 
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opponents, namely the Dutch and the Muslim modernists, to deal with the issue of 
modernity.59 In this regard, he mentioned K.H. Masykur who was, then, a minister of 
religious affairs, many times, and vice head of DPR/MPR.60  
In order to deal with the Muslims more effectively, the NEI government established 
another institution of Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken. Regarding the fact that the 
majority of the people were Muslim, this Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken was popular as 
Kantor Urusan Agama (KUA) amongst Indonesians.61 It was established in 1899 in Java and 
later in 1918 in Sumatera. This institution was to provide advice on native people’s affairs, 
especially related to Islamic movements, to the General Governor, and Snouck Hurgronye 
was appointed as the first chief. In this regard, Sayyid Utsman of the Muslim traditionalist 
accepted the offer of the Dutch as the Honorary Advisor for Arab Affairs at KUA as well as a 
religious officer in 1889 until his death in 1914. He also assumed the role of Mufti in Batavia. 
The traditionalist Muslims accepted this colonial interference in religious affairs as long as 
this helped in the establishment of public order as well as religious order. However, this 
appointment of Mufti did not nullify the rights of the clerics to issue religious laws.62 
Sayyid Utsman had an important role in the legal recognition of Sarekat Islam (SI) by 
the NEI government. His role was related to his position as a Mufti besides his position as 
one of the SI leaders in Batavia63. Accordingly, he was asked by CSI to provide religious 
justification for the purpose of obtaining legal recognition from the government.64 However, 
after SI obtained the recognition of the NEI government, it became more radical under the 
leadership of H.O.S. Cokroaminoto and and at the 1917 national congress in Bandung it 
demanded Indonesian independence. However, SI obtained approval to become a political 
party from the NEI government, and it sent its representatives to Volksraad65 (a form of 
parliament) which had just been established in 1917.66 Then, the ideological paradigm 
advocated by the Muslim modernists dominated SI67 and had directed SI to not 
accommodate the voice of the traditionalist Muslims at the Congress of Islam in 1924, which 
would send its representatives to the caliphate congress in Hejaz. Accordingly, the 
traditionalist Muslims quit from SI and established NU and consequently, this became the 
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beginning of the set back of SI, as its members who aspired to the Fiqh paradigm moved to 
Nahdlatul Ulama.68 In this regard, NU continued Sayyid Uthman’s Fiqh approach toward the 
NEI government while SI tended to follow HOS Cokroaminoto’s ideological paradigm.69 
The NU traditionalist Muslims and their paradigm in relation to the Dutch colonial rule  
The establishment of NU on 31 January 1926 can be viewed as a response of the 
traditionalist Muslims to both the global and national situations of the Muslim communities 
(ummah).70 In the global context, NU was organized to send its representative to King Abdul 
Aziz ibn Saud in Hejaz because the former was worried about the latter’s intention of having 
Wahabism71 as the state ideology. It was feared that this adoption of Wahabism may lead to 
intolerance to different understandings of Islam, namely the Fiqh paradigm, which 
maintains the classical school of Islamic law. King Abdul Aziz responded positively to some 
NU requests and was relatively tolerant to the existing schools of Islamic law as he did not 
want to lose political support from the followers of the Fiqh paradigm. 
In the national context, NU was organized to limit the influence of the Muslim 
modernists such as the followers of Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam who supported the 
movement of purification by the Wahabis, besides their advocacy of the modernization of 
Islam.72  As the consequence of the Congress of Islam in 1924, NU was pessimistic about the 
idea of an Islamic state when the Muslim modernists would not tolerate any representative 
from the traditionalist Muslims to the caliphate congress. NU, then, was only concerned 
with the idea of the independence of Indonesia, although this idea was not a formal 
decision of this organization. Accordingly, NU leaders were willingly to develop cooperation 
with the secular nationalists, besides trying to develop a better understanding with the 
Muslim modernists. This establishment of NU also inferred that the traditionalist Muslims 
did not agree with the idea of transforming Sarekat Islam into both a political and religious 
organization which might be detrimental to Islam. Consequently, NU, organizationally, did 
not want to challenge the NEI government as it meant contrasting Islam to the state. 
However, NU respected its personal members in their involvement of nationalist 
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movement. The Fiqh paradigm enabled NU to differentiate religious legitimacy from political 
legitimacy, and, accordingly, this enabled NU to have devotion to Islam and to a non-Islamic 
state.73 
Being traditionalist Muslims did not mean that they were anti-modernization. They 
committed to modernizing their societies, but they wanted to preserve tradition, following 
the principle of the Fiqh paradigm, namely “al-mukhafadzatu bil-qadimish-shalih wal-
akhdzu bil-jadidil-ashlah”, meaning maintaining the good old methods and adopting the 
new better methods. In line with this, they accepted Indonesian local cultures as a means 
for the manifestation of Islamic teaching and challenged the modernist Muslims who 
accused this adoption of Indonesian local cultures of diverting from the true Islam. Wahid 
believes that it was due to NU’s denial of judging the societal system as a dichotomy of black 
and white, namely the dichotomy of Islam and non-Islam, but acknowledging the area in 
between: namely that NU made uses of the existing societal system, including the political 
system, as a means of implementing Islam. In other words, NU did not see Indonesian local 
cultures as non-Islamic as it acknowledged an overlap between the societal system, namely 
the life in this world, and that of Islam, namely the guidance for a success life in hereafter. 
Accordingly, it is compulsory for Muslims to consider this worldly life, namely the societal 
system, including the political system.74  
NU was concerned with politics in terms of a public order which constitutes a 
requirement for a religious order. Accordingly, NU was willing to accept the existence of the 
NEI government as a tool for establishing public order. Apart from the state only being a 
tool, it became compulsory in regard to its status as a tool for public order as a foundation 
for the establishment of religious order. NU viewed that what is important for religion is 
considered as compulsory; however, the state is not the main objective of NU. In this 
regard, NU was realistic towards worldly life and acknowledged that the societal system 
exists because of the realization of power in society.75 
NU justified the NEI government because the traditionalist Muslims believed that it 
was the state, namely the government, which had the authority to establish public order, 
namely judging those who commit crime. Accordingly, it is not allowed for individual 
persons or a group to punish somebody else because it may directly lead to counter-
violence. The supporters of the Islamic ideological paradigm often misunderstand this 
hadith: “Whoever observe wrongdoer, he/she should face it with his/her hand and if he/she 
is not able to do so, he/she should use his/her mouth to criticize him/her and still he/she is 
not able to do so, at his/her heart he/she should oppose him/her and it is the lowest level of 
faith (iman).” What is meant by capability here is not physical strength to punish or hit, but 
capability based on Shari’a (Islamic law). Accordingly, it is the ruler who has the capability to 
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punish those who commit crime; meanwhile, the Muslim people only have rights to explain 
about the truth and restrain themselves from engaging in any misconduct or crime.76 
Recognizing the fact that there is no definitive form of Islamic state, KH Hasyim 
Asy’ari, Rais Akbar NU, was accommodative towards the NEI government because he was 
concerned with the ‘social order’ as the prerequisite for ‘religious order.’ NU justified the 
existence of the NEI government after the latter’s success in destroying Sultanates, because 
this implied that the NEI government had the power to establish public order. It was in line 
with the Sunni tradition which considered that political chaos (fitnah) was undesirable and 
worse than one century under a tyrannic ruler, such as believed by al-Ghazali, Mawardi, and 
also Ibn Taymiyah, a cleric often referred to by Muslim modernists.77 Responding to the 
issue of a tyrannical ruler, KH Hasyim Asy’ari referred to the Sunni tradition such as written 
by Imam Mawardi (991-1031M) in his book titled ‘al-Ahkamus Sulthaniah’ which mentioned 
the hadiths narrated by Hisyam bin Urwah from Abi Shalil from Abu Hurairah r.a.: 
After my death there would be some rulers who ruled upon you. The good rulers 
would rule with their wisdom and the bad rulers would rule with their witches. And 
you should hear and obey their orders. If they rule over you with wisdom, you are 
lucky and they are also lucky. If they rule over you with the witches, you are free 
from their responsibility.78 
In regard to the political system, KH Hasyim Asy’ari believed that Islam does not regulate a 
special societal structure and system for Muslims to follow. It is logical based on the fact 
that Muhammad the Prophet intentionally left the issue of succession open and Muslims 
had the freedom to solve the problem independently because it was not a part of Islamic 
teaching. Accordingly, he had an open mind on the plurality of the existing societal system 
which can be infused with Islamic values, and considered the state was not the only 
acceptable societal system. In this regard, he followed the Fiqh paradigm which classified 
three categories of state that are: an Islamic state (dar al-Islam), a war state (dar al-harb), 
and a peace state (dar al-sulf). Accordingly, he idealized an Islamic state that adopts Shari’a 
as the law of the state, apart from his belief in the plurality of Shari’a. Therefore, he was not 
ideological in terms of the political system because of its willingness to negotiate the form 
of the state based on the sociological context of the society.79  
In 1936, NU categorized the NEI government as “peace state” because of three 
factors: Nusantara was previously ruled by Islamic kingdoms, the majority of its people were 
Muslim, and Islam was not in danger. Categorizing the Dutch East Indies into a peace state 
was based on a Fiqh paradigm such as interpreted by a Syafi’i jurist Syaikh Hasan al-Hadrami 
in his book Bughyat al-Mustarsyidin (those who get guidance).80 NU should decide the 
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status of the Dutch East Indies because it is related to religious affairs, such as how to treat 
someone who was found dead in the forest. NU assumed he/she was a Muslim because 
Indonesia was an Islamic country and accordingly, he/she would be buried by Islamic 
injunction. Moreover, if NU classified the Dutch East Indies into a non-Islamic state, it 
implied that all facilities provided by the state for managing the Muslim affairs became 
illegitimate.  
Accordingly, Muslim affairs handled by clerics at the Court of Penghulu became 
unjustifiable. If this is the case, it would cause religious disorder. By so doing, NU did not 
unify the leaderships of politics and religion. For example, the validity of marriage, as a 
religious affair, could not be mixed with political matters. If NU considered as adultery the 
marriage held by the above mentioned court of penghulu, it would have other implications 
related to issues of inheritance and children. Theologically, NU had based its fatwa on public 
reasoning about the interest of a religious Muslim rather than that of the abstract political 
interest.81 In this regard, Abdurrahman Wahid thought that the above fatwa on the status of 
the Dutch East Indies was concerned with two important things for the existence of the 
state: a) Islam requires freedom to practice the religion as conditio sine qua non for the 
acceptance of Muslims to the existence of state; b) on other hand, Islam leaves state affairs 
such as the form of state, the governmental system, and political ideology to the historical 
process of the society of the country. These two things make it possible for Muslims to have 
devotion to Islam and to a non-Islamic state. In other words, its members are capable of 
having both nationalist and religious orientations at once.82 
NU as represented by K.H. Hasyim took an accommodative approach toward the NEI 
government as a method of avoiding a break in public order as well as to avoid premature 
rebellion. He instructed his students not to challenge the NEI government overtly and he 
was not reactive to the Dutch, although once he received unjust treatment when in 1913 his 
pesantren was burnt by The Dutch. This evolutionary method was also developed by the 
other Traditionalist Muslims in Sumatera, in the case of the cancelation of the establishment 
of Persatuan Pendidikan Islam Indonesia (PPII). This was due to the Dutch colonial ruler not 
agreeing with using the word Indonesia in this organization and considering it no longer a 
religious organization but a political party. In this regard, PPII was the further development 
of Persatuan Madrasah Tarbiyah (1928) which then changed into Persatuan Tarbiyah 
Islamiyah in 1930. Another clear example was K.H. Ahmad Sanusi’s low profile response to 
the Dutch colonial ruler which forced him to leave for Jakarta from his hometown Sukabumi 
because of his involvement in SI and his close relation with some nationalist leaders. In 
Jakarta, he was not involved in any political activities; instead, he was active in many 
educational, social, and publishing activities, which, then, in 1931 were incorporated into 
the institution of al-Ittihadiyah al-Islamiyah (Kesatuan Islam). As a result, he was released 
from his exile in 1934. 
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Politically, NU did not give strong support to the existence of this NEI government in 
regard to its policies which did not try to support the development of Islam as well as to 
identify with Islam. On the contrary, the NEI government tried to find legitimacy from the 
concept of the modern state emphasizing the episteme of liberal thoughts that advocates a 
secular state which is neutral towards the religions.83 However, in practice, the NEI was not 
neutral to religion, but favoured the development of Christianity84 and tried to halt the 
development of Islam by issuing some policies of Islamic affairs.85 For example, it tried to 
incorporate Shari’a into adat laws and controlled the clerics’ activities. Moreover, the 
government discriminated towards Islam and supported Christianity missionaries. It paid the 
priests and their staff highly, but it did not pay the clerics.86 
Indeed, the NEI government also pursued discriminatory policies toward the 
majority of Muslim people so that the former did not receive strong political legitimacy from 
the latter. This discriminatory policy was manifested in the institution of the judiciary where 
Landraad was for the native people and Raad van Justice for the Dutch and those who were 
acknowledged as having the same status.87 In this regard, Penghulu, the court of religion, 
was a part of the Landraad and the NEI government tried to reduce the authority of this 
court of religion and transferred it to the Landraad. First, it tried to reduce the scope of this 
office’s affairs through the change of the name of the Court of Religion (Priesterrad) into the 
Penghulu Court (Penghulu Gerecht) in 1931. Second, in 1937 it reduced the authority of this 
office in dealing with inheritance cases and transferred them to the State Courts (Landraad). 
Apart from the NEI government’s efforts of reducing the power of Islam clerics, there were 
less people filing inheritance cases with the State Courts and the majority filed their cases 
with the Penghulu Courts, but had to find the approval of the State Courts.88  
Apart from the NU’s acceptance of the NEI government, politically K.H. Hasyim 
Asy’ari did not want to identify with the Dutch. He encouraged the Muslims to build Islamic 
identity through cultural identity such as by not allowing the Muslims to imitate the Dutch 
customs. For example, he did not allow Muslims to put on ties.1 He also did not send 
representatives to Volkraad, an institution similar to parliament, as he did not give political 
legitimacy to the NEI government.89 KH Hasyim did not involve himself in political activities 
directly, but he prepared the students (santri) to take responsibility for political affairs in the 
future. He made efforts at fostering a feeling of nationalism amongst his students. He even 
trained former students who had dedicated their knowledge to society, when, periodically, 
they came back to his pesantren at certain times. These occasions were very useful for his 
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students because the latter had the chance of getting up-dated political information from 
around the country. It was not surprising that his students took the role of informal leaders 
focussing on religious activities with a nationalistic orientation. It was likely that NU 
positioned itself to play the role of civil society, which is accommodative, but critical toward 
the NEI policies. For example, 1937 KH Hasyim was reluctant to receive an award from C. O. 
van der Plas,90 the governor of East Java, in 1937, when the latter visited his pesantren as a 
part of the latter’s move to obtain sympathy from the traditional clerics. K.H. Hasyim also 
refused a financial subsidy for his pesantren.91 In this regard, Wahid considers that NU’s 
religious justification did not mean to limit its political struggle for improving the existing 
political system. It was possible for NU to remove its religious justification to the NEI 
government, such as later when NU no longer supported the existence of the NEI 
government, because NU considered the Republic of Indonesia had more political 
justification and consequently, NU sifted its religious justification.92  
NU was a part of the nationalist movement which tried to guide the Indonesian 
societal system, including state system, based on the Fiqh paradigm which recognized the 
plurality of Shari’a. It was possible for NU’s followers to have an idea of an Islamic state, but 
this should tolerate different understandings of Islam, besides recognizing the equal status 
of non-Muslims. Indeed, NU was very concerned with the plurality of Shari’a, following the 
Sunni tradition which recognizes some schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Its establishment in 
1926 was to persuade the Muslim modernists in order to respect different understandings 
of Islam as these Muslim modernists advocated a monolithic Shari’a as a method for 
unifying all Muslims in the pursuit of the glory time of Islam. On the contrary, NU believed in 
the plurality of Shari’a as different areas had different cultures which constitute the context 
for the implementation of Islam. In 1927, through its second congress, NU issued a 
recommendation to the Netherland East Indies government for having approval from the 
local clerics upon the appointment of religious officer (penghulu). NU also required the 
religious officer (penghulu) should come from one out of the four existing Islamic schools of 
jurisprudence, namely the followers of the Sunni tradition.93  
As a part of the nationalist movement, NU tried to develop a good understanding 
with the modernist Muslims in its pursuit of an independent state. As the leader of NU K.H. 
Hasyim Asy’ari always reminded Muslims, either from the traditionalists or the modernists 
to tolerate each other’s views and to unite into joint action for the interest of all Muslims. In 
1936 K.H. Hasyim paid a special attention to this problem when both accused each other of 
being unbelievers (kafir) and he delivered a speech al-Mawa’iz (Nasihat) at the NU congress 
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in 1937.94 This congress was attended by the modernist Muslim leaders such as KH Mas 
Mansur, Umar Hubaisy, KH Faqih Usman of Muhammadiyah and Wondoamiseno, Dr. 
Sukiman, and Sastrawijaya of SI. They, then, tried to establish a federation which would 
coordinate the activities of Islamic organizations and respond to external threats.95 This 
initiation was also a response to the establishment of GAPI (Gabungan Politik Indonesia) and 
PVPN (Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri). On 21 September 1937, they successfully 
established MIAI which unified 13 Islamic organizations into one front.96 
The establishment of MIAI provided Muslims the power to challenge any attacks 
which endangered the interest of Muslims. In 1937, both were unified to oppose some 
regulations detrimental to Islam, such as a draft of the Marriage Act 1931 which justified the 
idea of secular marriage; a Teacher Act of 1925 which required religious teachers to have 
permission from the head of regency; military inscription for Muslims; transferring the 
authority for managing alms (waris) from the Religious Court (Pengadilan Agama) into the 
Civil Court (Pengadilan Negeri); the ban on polygamy; and the divorce case only being valid 
through decree from the civil court.97 Such a strong denial was recorded by Pijper who 
acknowledged it as a proof of the power of Islam. In this regard, Benda98 affirmed that 
within three decades, this strong reaction reflected the power of Indonesian Muslims to 
challenge the interventions imposed by the Dutch colonial ruler.99 These joint oppositions 
between the traditionalist and modernists Muslims to the Dutch colonial ruler did not imply 
that they had settled their different views on the state, but they were optimistic about 
resolving the problems by means of dialogues, besides being optimistic about their 
capabilities to control the development of the modernist Muslims. 
Conclusion 
From the above discussion, I find that the traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia followed the 
Sunni tradition which would justify the existing political system: the Sultanates and the 
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Netherland East Indies. They provided justification for any political system because they 
considered it as a tool for public order which constitutes a pre-requirement for a religious 
order. Their support for the existing political systems depended on the latter’s capabilities 
to attract the political participation of Muslims. The Sultanates had the strongest religious 
justification because they tried to implement Shari’a, but it was not always the case with 
political justification for any Sultan. The Netherland East Indies had the less religious 
justification as they constituted a foreign political system, and, accordingly, the traditionalist 
Muslims still aspired to establish an independent state. Actually, their aspiration for an 
independent state were likely due to the Netherland East Indies’s lack of political 
justification as the latter did not want to identify with Islam or to expand the Muslims’ 
political participation.  
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Abstract 
Politeness is one of the essential elements in society. Currently, politeness is not only used 
to show good etiquete in general daily conversation but is also be applied in the business 
field. The service in this business industry is competitive. Thus, giving the best service quality 
from politeness perspectives becomes a significant factor to attract the customer’s 
attention. In so doing, the service acts as a key point for the success of companies. In this 
case, politeness is displayed through good manners such as greeting, giving assistance, and 
thanking others. This paper focuses on interactions between front counter Indonesian staff 
and customers seeking service in an Indonesian “X” mini market. It examines politeness in 
openings and closings in that business setting. The data show that the staff more often 
employed impolite openings-closings (52%), whereas (18%) provided polite actions, and the 
rest (30%) were semi-polite openings-closings.  
 
Keywords: Politeness, Indonesian Culture, Greeting, Closing, Politeness Strategies 
Introduction 
Service encounters are one of the social encounters most typically practiced in a society, in 
which they have particular patterns of language use and behavioral patterns in a certain 
period of time (Pan, 2000). A service encounter is an instance of face-to-face interaction 
between a server who is ‘officially posted’ in a particular service area and a customer who is 
present in that service area. The encounter is oriented to the customer’s satisfaction with 
the service given and the server’s obligation is to provide that service (Merritt, 1976 cited in 
Pan, 2000). At this rate, facework is then requisite to ensure the business transaction 
between servers and customers is smooth, wherein politeness strategies are realized within 
it. 
Politeness issues have been of interest to many researchers in research on 
workplace discourse such as doctor–patient interactions (Odebumni, 2013; Iragiliati, 2012), 
legal language, which mainly focuses on courtroom discourse (Cashion, 1985; Penman, 
1990) and in the area of corporate settings (Kong, 1998; Pan, 2000; Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 
2006). In recent years, the scope of the corporate setting has been extended to being 
focused on politeness strategies practiced by service staff. 
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Several examples of the extended studies are Liu (2008) who investigated the 
politeness strategies applied in sales encounters in Hong Kong. By implementing Brown and 
Levinson's politeness framework, the research aimed to explore specific ways of enacting 
politeness occurring between the interlocutors’ different native languages and the 
challenges due to the lack of language proficiency, which may impact the flow of interaction 
between the two parties. The findings revealed four preliminary conclusions: (1) if one of 
the interlocutors is a non-native speaker, the native speaker repeats important points until 
the message is understood and a response is given, (2) if the salesperson has lower language 
proficiency compared to the buyer, the sales person would use minimal responses to signal 
positive politeness to the customer, (3) As Hong Kong is a fast-paced commercial society, 
the opening and closing of a sales encounter might lack in politeness strategies for efficient 
communicative purposes (4) if the customer’s speech act was a bald-on-record FTA, the 
salesperson tried to save his or her own face. 
Conducting similar research, Sriyam (2010) investigated customers’ satisfaction 
towards service quality in the front office staff at the Mercure Hotel, Pattaya. She assessed 
customers’ expectations and perception levels towards the service quality of the front office 
staff at the hotel, and analysed the discrepancy between customers’ expectations and 
perception levels towards the service quality. Applying the five dimensions of service quality 
which are tangibility, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy, the findings show 
that most respondents identified tangibility as the most important factor in determining 
satisfaction.  
Multiplying the study in another context, Kuang, David, Lau, and Ang (2011) 
investigated openings and closings in front counter transactions at a Malaysian Government 
Hospital. By applying Brown and Levison’s (1987) politeness strategy, they attempted to 
show that politeness can be gauged through these two features of conversations, 
appropriate greetings in openings and closings, classified into polite, semi polite, and 
impolite. The findings revealed that the front counter Malay staff reverted to using more 
polite closings than openings, while in fact, openings and closings are both important 
features of face-to-face interactions since both elements suggest the acknowledgement and 
recognition of the other party have been fulfilled.  
Two years later, Kuang, David, and Kia (2013) conducted a similar study on the 
politeness of front counter staff, yet in a different setting which was a Malaysian private 
hospital. They investigated the politeness level of the Malaysian private hospital staff’s 
opening and closing interactions compared to the Government hospital. The findings show 
that even though the patients pay more at private hospital, it does not guarantee they will 
be served well by the staff. 
The five studies above analyzed politeness strategies done by staff using the theory 
of Brown and Levinson (1987). The results mostly show that the prominence of the staff’s 
role is taken for granted in fulfillment of customers’ satisfaction through politeness 
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strategies. Another study dealing with politeness strategies applied in a work place setting 
was conducted by Sangiorgi (2006). The study discussed the issue of manipulated politeness 
displayed by Disney theme park staff in order to increase the company’s profit. It is revealed 
that the politeness strategies applied had become an artificial device implemented for profit 
purposes. Likewise, Dunn (2013) established that politeness business training in Japanese 
settings had been formed purposefully for the company’ sake.  
This present study attempts to (1) analyze how politeness is practiced by “X” Mini 
market staff in welcoming and closing interactions, (2) investigate whether or not the 
practice of politeness done by the “X” market staff is a part of commercial strategy. The 
parameters of politeness used by Kuang, David, Lau and Ang (2011) and Kuang, David, and 
Kia (2013), which are (1) polite, semi polite, and impolite and (2) verbal and nonverbal, are 
treated as the core analytical tools to measure the politeness levels. In addition, the 
theories of Lakoff (1973; 1990) and Brown and Levinson (1987) are also applied to disclose 
the politeness phenomena within the transactions. This study is considered crucial, as the 
use of certain language forms and attitudes may have a significant impact, once used orally 
and implemented for a particular purpose and situation.  
Literature review 
Politeness 
Yule (2006:119) conveys that politeness can be defined as “showing awareness of and 
consideration for another person’s face”.  Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) introduce the 
concept of “face” which is the public self-image that everybody wants to claim. In their 
framework, face includes two related aspects: (1) Positive Face (desire to have one’s 
contributions approved of) (2) Negative Face (desire to express one’s ideas without 
resistance). Since most speech acts are intrinsically face-threatening acts (FTAs), politeness 
strategies are employed to minimize FTAs: on-record with positive politeness or negative 
politeness, and off-record politeness (unless the speaker chooses to do the FTA bald on 
record). Off-record politeness denotes the method of a speaker doing an FTA without 
unequivocal imposition, i.e. to hint instead of to request. The level of politeness is 
determined by three independent social factors: solidarity or social distance between 
interlocutors (D), relative status or power difference between interlocutors (P), and culture 
ranking of the imposition (R). 
However, the weighting of those independent social factors differs from culture to 
culture, and also depends on the situation in which an interaction takes place (Pan, 1994, 
1995). Referring to Lakoff’s rules (1990), culture can be said to adhere to strategies of 
distance (rule 1), deference (rule 2), and camaraderie (rule 3). European cultures tend to 
emphasize distancing strategies, Asian cultures tend to be deferential, and modern 
American cultures tend to camaraderie (Eelen, 2001). 
Scollon and Scollon (1995 cited in Pan 2000) state that the factor of social distance is 
of primary importance in Asian society. It is classified into two factors which are (1) the 
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inside relationship, which are the five classical Confucian relationships (ruled-ruled, father-
son, husband-wife, elder-younger, friend-friend) and same relationships (same school, same 
town, same employer), and (2) the outside relationships, which are occasional and 
temporary relationships that a person happens to come into contact with, such as shop 
clerks, bank tellers, or taxi drivers. In face-to-face interaction, something as simple as topic 
introduction is determined by the type of relationship between the participants. In an 
outside relation, topic initiation is based on the task, while in an inside relation, the topic is 
introduced by the person who is in a higher position in the hierarchical structure (Scollon 
and Scollon, 1991 cited in Pan 2000).  
Politeness in the Indonesian context 
Forshee (2006) conveys that most of kinship status in Indonesia is formed by the base of 
people's idea about society and good behaviour.  Generally, Indonesian society is very status 
conscious. It is important to address others with the proper title such as “Bapak” (Father, 
Sir) or “Ibu” (Mother, Madam) for older people and “Mbak” (Miss, Sister) or “Mas” (Brother) 
for younger people. Forshee (2006:32) claims that Indonesians become uncomfortable 
when addressed by Westerners who drop these formal titles when talking to them, as they 
then feel disrespectful to those with whom they are speaking. Such formality confuses 
Americans and Europeans, especially in casual situations. However, unlike the Javanese 
language, which contains “high” and “low” levels of speech depending on interlocutor’s 
background (social status, age, education background), the Indonesian national language 
(Bahasa Indonesia) does not contain “that extent of class-marking (i.e., ‘high’ and ‘low’) 
ways of speech” (Forshee, 2006:32).  
Mills (2006) states that probably the most important element in most Asian 
interpersonal relations either private, business or diplomatic related, is the matter of face or 
respect of self. Indonesians tend to be polite and wise in their speech by avoiding any 
confrontation to the extent of even providing an untruthful answer. The researchers 
acknowledge that ethnic diversity and varying cultural traditions in Indonesia is an 
influential issue during business transactions. Gray (2012:154) states that “different ethnic 
groups in Indonesia have their unique cultural traits which influence their behaviour in 
business, from the ‘Javanese way’ of passive and apologetic communication, through to the 
aggressive and assertive behaviours of the Batak of Sumatra”. The ethnic groups of Sumatra, 
Sulawesi, and West Papua are more direct and have a style similar to Western 
communication patterns such as those of Australia (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010 
cited in Gray, 2012). However, as a result of the population density and government 
centrality in Java, “much of business behaviour in Indonesia is conducted in the Javanese 
Way” (Gray, 2012:156).   
 “X” mini-market profile 
“X” mini market is a company located in Indonesia, which specializes in customer goods 
trading and a distribution business. Its branches number 6,585 mini markets. It is somewhat 
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similar to Woolworths in the Australian context. The company not only provides the goods 
but also sets out its expected politeness in the service delivery to its customers by 
promoting itself  to the public with a jargon of best service quality.  
Relating to the focus of this paper, front counter staff are expected to be polite all the 
time. As new trainees, the staff in “X” mini market obtain knowledge and experience in the 
convenience store on becoming a staff member. Before working, the staff have been given a 
short course for one week, according to which position they are employed. The materials 
given to all employees/ staff are generally the primary standard procedure in the store, SO 
(stock opname) which means supplying goods, operational conductivity, overcoming the 
complaints of customers, and other issues. For front counter staff, practically, they are 
trained in the polite greetings and the closings expected during any conversation with 
customers. For the greeting, they enact particular utterances such as “Selamat datang di 
“X”, selamat berbelanja “ (welcome in “X”, happy shopping) along with smiling and 
promoting the recent discount products. During the payment process, several principles are 
practiced by the staff, as follows: 
a. Introducing themselves 
b. Asking about the member card  
c. Offering and promoting other goods with or without discount 
d. Offering customers to fulfill credit 
e. Saying thanks, smiling, and putting the hands together before the chest 
Interaction between the staff and the customers in “X” mini market 
Pan (2000) states that there are differences in the ways the clerks talked to customers with 
whom they were acquainted and those with whom they were not acquainted, which are 
also related to inside and outside relations. The relationship between a clerk and an 
unacquainted customer is contact for a short time, or might be recognized as an outside 
one. Whereas, with the acquainted customers, staff and client are connected in some way, 
for instance sharing a common group identity. In the case of “X” mini market participants, 
the interaction between the clerk and their unacquainted customers is characterized by 
minimal verbal exchange, lack of face strategies, and being task-oriented (outside relations).  
The study 
Research Questions 
1. How do the employees of “X” mini market implement politeness strategies in their 
transactions? 
 2.  What types of politeness are being displayed by “X” mini market staff? 
Research design 
The research utilized two approaches, case study and conversation analysis under the 
typeform of a qualitative case study. The type of case study used was a single instrumental 
case study, since it solely focused on an issue and was concerned with one bounded case to 
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illustrate the issue (Creswell, 2007). The case study began with the description of “X” mini 
market’s profile applying several unique actions to greet the customers. Firstly, the 
researchers constructed a table to distinguish between opening and closing parts using 
conversation analysis transcription (Jefferson, 1985). Conversation analysis contributes to 
establish the existence of stable organizations of human interaction, and to situate them 
firmly within an understanding of social relations (Heritage, 2008). 
Procedure 
The data in this study were recorded in 20 “X” mini markets in Malang, East Java, Indonesia. 
Three “X” mini markets located in Sawojajar, five “X” mini markets in Sukun, five “X” mini 
markets in Dinoyo, two “X” mini markets in Galunggung, two “X” mini markets in Kawi, and 
three “X” mini markets in along Soekarno Hatta Street.  
http://www.google/map/indonesia (taken from https://maps.google.com/) 
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(taken from http://malang.endonesa.net/index.php/galeri-foto-utama/malang-
maps-peta?picture_id=673) 
The records were taken for one week from March, 20th 2013 until March, 27th 
2013. The researchers recorded data manually either as personal experiences or other 
transactions executed by looking at other customers’ experiences with a total of 50 
transactions, divided into 20 openings and 30 closings. Acting as customers who bought 
goods, transactions between front counter staff and the customers were observed. The 
staff’s ages were in the range of 18-24 years old with the background education presumed 
to be upper secondary school. From the 20 mini markets, there were 2 male clerks and 18 
female clerks.  The customers were of various age groups and genders.       
After completing the recording, the researchers transcribed the data into the table 
which is divided into four parts, (1) Mini market’s area, (2) Date which is classified into day, 
month, and year (3) Opening part, and (4) Closing part. Codes are used in this paper, since 
codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study (Milles & Huberman, 1994). Therefore, in the second 
table (Date), codes used were “D” for day, “M” for month, and “Y” for year. Meanwhile, in 
the opening and closing table, the researchers provided “S” for staff and “C” for customer.  
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  By using the parameters of politeness levels according to Kuang, David, Lau, and Ang 
(2011) and Kuang, David, and Kia (2013), which are (1) polite, semi polite, and impolite and 
(2) verbal and non verbal, the researchers attempted to identify the specific politeness 
levels delivered by the staff. The expressions and gestures of the staff were included as non-
verbal as recorded by note-taking. Whereas, the utterances without any direct actions were 
included as verbal. The parameters to classify whether an interaction is polite, semi polite, 
and impolite is their accordance with the completeness in application of the “X” mini 
market’s rules of opening and closing (see above). The researchers were not overly 
concerned with the customers’ background -- except their age -- which has been used to 
analyze the kin terms practiced by the staff. The researchers established there was no 
difference in the staff’s attitude in serving customers with a higher position or social status.  
Since the transactions used by both front counter staff and customers were in 
Indonesian, an English gloss is provided. The transcript is also put on the first table and the 
second table equated with the English gloss and the non-verbal actions. The transcript has 
the aim of making it easier for the readers to imagine the situation on the stage even 
though they do not listen to the audio directly for proponents of conversation analysis 
would posit the reverse: that ‘talk-in-interaction’ provides extraordinarily rich evidence of 
the underlying rules of how language works (Litosseliti, 2010). However, since the 
researchers were not overly concerned with the changes in intonation, the length and so on, 
the conversation analysis is only used to enrich the knowledge of the human interaction.  
Findings and discussion  
All interactions have two symmetrical framing sequences termed “opening sequence” and 
“closing sequence” (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2006 cited in Liu, 2008). 
A ) Opening 
The table below summarizes the overall precentage of opening occurences. It displays that 
impolite verbal opening assume the highest rank of the percentage which means that 
impolite openings in greeting the customers are often applied by the staff. 
Verbal opening Non-verbal opening 
Polite verbal                  3               15% Polite non-verbal                 2            10% 
Semi-polite verbal        7                35% Semi-polite non-verbal        -              - 
Impolite verbal             8                40% Impolite non-verbal             -              - 
Total                             18                 90% Total                                       2             10% 
 
From the above data, it is shown that in the interaction, 40 % of impolite openings are 
applied, even though there is not a significant gap among polite, semi-polite, and impolite. 
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Greeting is often done verbally rather than non-verbally. FTAs (Face Threatening Acts) seem 
to not occur in this section, since there is no turn taking between the participants. 
 Polite verbal opening 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These utterances were considered polite seen from how the staff greeted the customer 
appropriately and completely (greeting rules) followed by promoting a recent discount. 
Ordinarily, Indonesians greet others by saying “Assalammualaikum” (peace be upon with 
you) as the dominant cultural group are of the Moslem faith. As this is a formal context, 
greeting with “good morning, good afternoon, or good evening” have been considered as 
indicative of a polite attitude. In addition, smile (nonverbal) is also reviewed as indicative of 
a polite attitude, as Indonesians commonly use smiles to show friendliness towards others.  
• Polite nonverbal opening 
 
The above conversations illustrate that the staff showed a courteous abide by offering help 
without being asked first. At this rate, the politeness is observed either verbally or non-
English Gloss 
welcome. Happy shopping in X. We have 
a free hello kitty for you 
good morning. Happy shopping  
good morning. We have a hello kitty for 
you 
 
Example 
S:selamat datang ::,Selamat berbelanja di 
X,  Hello kittinya  ↑ gratis lho::: 
S : selamat pagi, Selamat berbelanja ↑ 
S : selamat pagi,  Hello kittinya ↑ gratis 
lho:::  
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Example English Gloss 
S: Selamat siang :: Good afternoon (look at glance) 
S: selamat pagi :, Parade doraemon seru 
:: 
Good morning. Parade doraemon seru 
(looking at the computer) 
 
verbally. As Lakoff’s principle (1973:298) of “make others feel good”, the polite attitude of 
proposing help to the customers is perceived as an attempt to show friendliness. This 
principle roughly corresponds to Brown and Levinson’s (1987 cited in Sangiorgi, 2006) 
principle of positive politeness which is basically geared towards the satisfaction of the 
customers' wants and needs. 
Semi polite verbal opening 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The above utterances are included as semi polite. Regardless of the presence of polite 
greetings (good morning, good afternoon) delivered by front counter staff, it is established 
that the front counter staff were less respectful by losing eye contact with the customers. As 
shown in the table, the “X” staff only looked to glance at the customer, while another staff 
was busy with the computer. Hence, it may be explained that the values of politeness in this 
interaction are premature, as the point of “creating eye contact is a part of politeness 
principles in the reflection of behavior” (Yuxian, 2013:55), and were noticed as missing.  
 Impolite verbal opening 
There was no greeting when the customers entered the mini market. The staff seemed very 
busy arranging the goods, making notes, or calling someone. They simply turned their heads 
and looked to glance at the customers without any intention to greet them. Therefore, both 
verbal and non-verbal are not applied in this occurrence. 
B)  Closing 
This table shows the precentage of closings, which are divided into two types: verbal and 
non-verbal. 
Closing verbal Closing non-verbal 
Polite verbal                         1       3,33% Polite non-verbal                  3        10% 
Semi-polite verbal               5     16,67% Semi-polite non-verbal        3        10% 
Impolite verbal                  18     60,00% Impolite non-verbal              -          - 
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Total                                    24     80,00% Total                                        6         20% 
The above table reveals that impolite closings mostly occur in “X” markets. This table, 
however, is dominated by the verbal impolite closing. Moreover, saying “thank you” after 
getting assistance is done by both the customers and the staff either in polite, semi-polite, 
or impolite closings and followed by the non-verbal action, for instance, smiling and 
nodding. More detailed explanation is provided as follows: 
 Polite verbal closing  
Example English Gloss 
S: selamat pagi↑, nama saya Ima, Mau 
tambah apa lagi mbak ? 
Good morning. I am Ima. Do you want to 
add something else? 
C: gak ada mbak, Ini aja ↓ Nothing, miss. That’s all. 
S: sekalian pulsanya mbak ?↑ Do you want to fill the credit, miss ? 
C: gak mbak, makasi. ↓ No, thanks. 
S: atau minumnya sekalian mbak ? 
sekarang ada [promo the racik, beli= =dua 
gratis satumbak. 
Or how about the drink, miss? there is a 
discount for racik tea, if you buy two, 
you’ll get one for free 
C : gak mbak ↓ No, miss, (smile) 
S: totalnya Rp 7.700,- ya mbak, ada kartu 
pelanggan ?↑ 
The total is Rp 7000,- miss, is there a 
member card ? 
C: gak ada mbak ↓  no, it’s not ( giving Rp 10.000,-) 
S: uangnya Rp 10.000,- ya, kembalinya Rp 
3.300,- . Terima kasih, selamat datang 
kembali. 
Your money is Rp10.000,- and the money 
back is Rp 3.300,- . Thank you, please 
come again.  
C: makasi : Thank you 
S: iya :: You’re welcome 
 
The above examples demonstrate the complete closing part in an “X” mini market. 
Surprisingly, this occurrence was rarely undertaken by other “X” mini markets’ front counter 
staff since only two mini-markets applied this sort of closing. The use of a kin term “Mbak” 
(miss) during the transaction expresses that the staff respects the customer by using an 
addressee term. Furthermore, the staff was the one who initiated first to persuade the 
service (promoting a discount product, offering to fulfill credit, asking for member card) 
implying efforts to satisfy the customer. The end of the  transaction was settled by saying 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e6
2
 
“thanks and please come again” conveying that the staff member was glad to serve the 
customer. This conversation proceeded courteously as the customer also gave a response 
back with “thanks” before leaving the line.  
 Polite nonverbal closing 
Example English Gloss 
S : Selamat siang:: ibu Good afternoon, mam. ( put the hands in front 
of the chest) 
C : (no response) (no response) 
S: ini aja ibu?↑>Tambah minyak= 
=gorengnya? Lagi ada promo= 
=minyak bimoli ibu, ada diskon15% 
kalo beli 2< 
 
Is that all ? do you want to add  the fried oil ? if 
you buy 2, you will get 15% discount 
C: gak mbak ↓ No, mam 
S : sekalian pulsanya,bu ? do you want to fill the credit, mam? 
C : gak mbak, makasi ↓  no, thanks 
S: totalnya 113.000, ada kartu= 
=pelanggan ? 
 
the total is Rp 113.000,-, is there any member 
card ? 
C: gak ada mbak ↓ Nope(giving Rp 120.000,- ) 
S : kembalinya 7000 ya bu, <ibu= 
=juga dapet satu stiker = 
=doremon>untuk pembelian diatas 
100.000 bu, [hhh kalo dikumpulin bisa 
dapet doorprize bu ↑ 
the money back isRp7.000,-,mam. And you get 
one doraemon sticker for buying above 
Rp100.000,-. if you collect it, you can get 
doorprize from us,mam.  (giving the money 
back and the sticker) 
C: (smile) (smile) 
S: terima kasih::, selamat datang= 
=kembali :: 
Thanks, come again ( put hands before the 
chest) 
 
Non verbal polite closing was expressed through either utterances or attitudes. The 
questions asked were similar with the preceding table. The use of kin term “Ibu” (Mam) was 
also applied in this case. However, the staff delivered more respectability by adding good 
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manners such as smiling and placing hands together before the chest both in the beginning 
and ending transaction. Despite the fact that the front counter staff did not introduce 
herself first, the researchers noted that the staff’s attitude followed by the good manners 
can be considered as polite closing.  
 Semi polite verbal closing 
Example English Gloss 
S : tambah apa lgi mbak ? ↑, sekalian= 
=pulsanya mbak? 
Do you want to add something else? How 
about fill the credit, mam ? 
C : udah mas, ini aja. ↓ No, that’s all 
S : totalnya Rp 3.400,- ya: The total is Rp 3.400,- ,yes ? 
C : (giving Rp 5.000,-) (giving Rp 5.000,-) 
S: kembalinya 1600>langsung minum= 
=atau pake kresek,mbak ?< 
the money back is Rp 1.600,- Do u want 
to drink it directly or use the plastic bag ? 
C: kresek ↓ plastic bag,please 
S: terima kasih thanks( giving the stuff ) 
The above table illustrates the examples of semi polite verbal closing. The staff did not apply 
the complete closing rules and directly served as it was. Nonetheless, the rules of offering to 
fulfill the credit to the customer and using a kin term “Mbak” (Miss) were completed, 
although it might not be seen as polite as the two tables above. Thus, the researchers argue 
that the staff still implied an attempt to be polite. In addition, the staff also said “thanks” at 
the end of the transaction.  
 Semi polite nonverbal closing 
Example English Gloss 
S : sudah mbak ↑? sebelah sini mbak? is that all ? Over here, mam. (pointing out 
to the left with right hand) 
C : ( move to the left ) ( move to the left) 
S : Totalnya Rp 3.300,- . Isi pulsanya, mbak 
↑? 
the total Rp 3.300,- do you want to  fill 
credit too,mam ? ) 
C: gak mas, makasi ↓ no, sir. Thanks. ( giving the money ) 
S: kembalinya mbak, terima kasih: this is the money back, thank you(put the 
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hands in front of the chest) 
     
This example illustrates that the attitude is more emphasized than words. The staff 
displayed a lack of respect in the form of the verbal interaction, yet the staff directed the 
customer politely by pointing out the right place for a product. At the end of the 
transaction, the staff also put her hands together before the chest while saying “thanks”. 
Yuxian (2013:55) states that “hand and body gestures are often used to emphasize a point 
and add meaning to the spoken word”. As a listener, watching out for the hand movements 
or body gestures used by the speaker can give an interesting insight into the true attitude 
behind the words. 
 Impolite verbal closing 
Example English Gloss 
S : selamat pagi::,Tambah apa lagi ?↑ good morning. Do you want to add 
something else ? 
C : udah mbak, ini aja ↓ nope, that’s all 
S : totalnya Rp 3.500,- ya::, the total is Rp 3.500,-, yes ? 
C : (giving Rp 50.000,-) (giving Rp 50.000,-) 
S : ada uang kecil ? ↑ is there any smaller amount ? 
C: gak ada mbak ↓ Nope 
S : kembalinya 46500. Gak pake print, 
gapapa ? 
the money back is Rp 46.500,-. Is it okay if 
there is no print out ? 
C : gapapa ↓ that’s fine 
S : pake kresek ? ↑ do you need a plastic bag ? 
C : iya Yes 
S : ( hadling over the stuff ) ( handling over the stuff) 
C : makasi : Thanks 
S: (unanswered) ( unanswered) 
The above table shows that the front counter staff directly served the customer without 
offering anything else. At the end of the transaction, the customer even initiated first to say 
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“thanks”, yet did not get response in return from the staff. Regarding the distance between 
the customer and the staff, it was not close and this action may appear an FTA.  
 Impolite nonverbal closing 
The researchers did not find any closing impolite non verbal, since all of the staff are 
necessitated to say “thanks” after ending the transactions. Phrases such as “thanks/ thank 
you” are considered as a verbal expression of appreciation or gratitude. Besides, considering 
the courtesy showed by Indonesians mostly, it might be concluded that Indonesians tend to 
be accustomed to saying “thank you” after accepting an offer or dealing with some business 
transaction.    
Politeness in “X” mini market 
From the data above, in addition to the rules of ‘X” mini market greetings, the researchers 
found that three principles were mostly followed by the front counter staff in “X” mini 
market:  
a. Opening by greeting with “X” mini market jargon 
b. Giving assistance 
c. Closing by asking “X” mini market question rules and saying thank you 
Point number one and three (opening and closing) reveal that the politeness strategies have 
been implemented in the beginning and the end of the service encounters between front 
counter staff and the customers. According to Lakoff's theory (cited in Sangiorgi, 2006), 
participants at the beginning of conversation expect that the other party is interested and 
comfortable with them, while at the end of the encounter it is crucial to ascertain that the 
conversation ends well. This company realizes that the opening and closing greetings are 
crucial to give a good impression towards the customers.  
 Displaying good manners is not simply a matter of creating a positive impression of 
ourselves as individuals, but also creates a positive image for an entire company in a 
business setting. Unsurprisingly, showing good manners is regarded as part of a larger 
project of creating customer satisfaction. Honorific usages such as Bapak (Sir), Ibu (Mam), 
Mbak (Miss) may function not only to express deference to others, but also to display the 
speaker's identity as a refined speaker. In short, the use of polite expression and honorific 
terms in “X” mini market is regarded as an attempt to please the customers. 
In relation to point number two (the deference rule), although the staff’s position is 
at the front front, they are required to be well-informed as to what services should be 
offered to the customers such as member cards, credit agencies, or discount products. 
Besides, offering help (proposing a basket or a plastic bag) is observed as the realization of 
positive politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987). 
In the case of the customers’ background, the researchers did not see any 
differences or classifications in serving the customers based on the diverse backgrounds of 
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the customers. The transaction is a short conversation, the purpose of which is business; 
therefore, the level of politeness due to customers’ background is noticed unconsidered: 
In Asia in an outside relationship the position of the parties are tightly fixed within a 
server role relationship; one is a teller, the other a customer; one is a waitress, the 
other a customer. Before the encounter begins the possible moves are limited within 
a narrow range...Because this is an outside relationship Asians regard it as impossible 
for any other topics to be introduced or for any other relationship to develop; 
therefore, no face work is required, no preliminaries are necessary to establish who 
you are or why you are there. This topic can (and, in fact must) be introduced 
directly. (Scollon and Scollon, 1991: 118 – 119) 
However, the addressee term is still applied during the transaction such I(bu) literally 
“Mother/ Mam” or Ba(pak) literally “Father/ Sir” are directed to the older customers and 
Mbak literally “ Miss” is for older sister.  
Conclusion 
The use of opening and closing as markers of politeness seems not to be implemented 
perfectly throughout the case study.  
Transaction Percentage 
Polite openings and closings                                                     9 ( 18 % )
Semi-polite openings and closings                                                                15 ( 30% )
Impolite openings and closings                                                                     26 ( 52% ) 
Total 50 (100%) 
From the table above, the percentage of impolite opening and closing occurrences is 
surprisingly higher than the polite and semi polite ones. The researchers assume that given 
the goal of their encounter is selling and buying, the staff’s awareness of using facework 
(politeness strategy) wholly and perfectly -- according to the rules -- is incompletely 
practiced. With the understanding that as long as the business transactions are done 
without any party losing face, it is insignificant whether or not the rules are delivered 
completely. Consequently, the customers’ background is also a negligible factor in the 
politeness strategies in “X” mini market. Service encounters in “X” mini market are 
perceived as an outside relationship, where the customers are regarded as unacquainted 
clients. Therefore, the relationship is simply based on reaching the company’s business goal 
of gaining more profit by prioritizing customers’ satisfaction. Thus, every customer should 
be treated equally and politely without differentiating on the basis of their background.  
Specifically, either language or courtesy behavior applied by the staff is used to assist 
and facilitate the process of the transaction smoothly rather than to exchange information 
or to create a social relationship (Pan, 2000). However, in the instance of politeness 
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implemented in “X” mini market, the researchers perceive that the company attempts to 
appeal to its the customers through their settled courtesy regime in service encounters. This 
accords with Tanned’s (1986 cited in Pan, 2000) notion of a stylistic effect of camaraderie, 
wherein the opening and closing transactions are formulated structurally and with heavy 
use of positive politeness strategies. Similarly, this occurrence might support what Sangiorgi 
(2006:190) sought to reveal in his findings about “profit politeness” which suggests 
politeness is treated as an artificial tool for business purposes. In addition, Dunn (2013:229) 
also argues that “politeness in business context has been (re) established in one specific 
term that is the business manners, in which the staff are trained to reshape their language 
use and presentation of self in ways that are considered appropriate for business matter”. In 
this process, communicative skill and performances themselves become a commodity 
(Urciuoli, 2008; Heller, 2010 cited in Dunn, 2013). Consequently, politeness is manipulated 
for a company’s larger goal to create a positive corporate image, wherein “politeness is not 
culturally implemented but textually, specific” (Dunn, 2013:241-242).  
Nonetheless, the politeness strategies applied in the “X” mini market roughly adopt 
the values of Indonesian politeness, which are (1) the use of kin terms such as Bapak (Sir), 
Ibu (Mam), Mbak (Miss), (2) nonverbal attitudes such as smiling, slightly bowing, and putting 
the hands before chest, and (3) interrogative expressions showing the staff do not presume 
the customers’ want, but offer an option to choose. Furthermore, a general question can 
provide an objective condition and make the interaction less direct (Yuxian, 2013). Thus, 
regardless of whether those principles of politeness are implemented for the sake of the 
company’s business goal (artificially), the values of Indonesian politeness are still inserted in 
doing so.  
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Abstract 
As a national symbol, the Indonesian language has played a crucial role in unifying 
Indonesia’s highly diverse communities, which consist of over a thousand tribes with over 
six hundred vernaculars. Recognising the value of Indonesian, the government has 
endeavoured to maintain it, especially through the standardisation of grammar and 
vocabulary and the development of language teaching. However, translation, which should 
be able to enhance the functions of Indonesian, is one area that seems to have been 
neglected. Despite the country’s staggering reliance on translated literature, the quality of 
the translations (especially from English) is generally very low. In translated texts Indonesian 
is becoming more Anglicized instead of being enriched by the creative incorporation of 
foreign elements. This corrosion of Indonesian may pose a serious threat to the language as 
a national symbol that sets the nation apart from others. With globalisation contesting 
national borders at an unparalleled rate, it is imperative that translation be seriously 
considered in the country’s language policy to ensure the national symbol’s vitality and 
protect its linguistic and cultural wealth.  
Key words: National Identity, Translation, Language Policy, Globalisation. 
 
Introduction 
As a national symbol, the Indonesian language has played a crucial role in unifying 
Indonesia’s highly diverse communities, which consist of over a thousand tribes with over 
six hundred vernaculars. Recognising the value of Indonesian, the government has 
endeavoured to maintain it, especially through the standardisation of grammar and 
vocabulary and development of language teaching. As the major medium of state 
administration, education, media and communication across the archipelago, the 
Indonesian language may be considered to be one of the most successful imposed 
languages in the world. However, translation, which should be able to enhance the 
functions of Indonesian, is one area that seems to have been neglected. Despite the 
country’s staggering reliance on translated literature (40-60% of the national production, 
excluding mass-media), the quality of the translations is generally very low. Many, if not 
most, of the translations seem to have been heavily influenced by the source language 
(normally English), not only in lexicon but in structure as well. As a result, in translated texts, 
Indonesian is becoming more Anglicized instead of being enriched by the creative 
incorporation of foreign elements. This corrosion of Indonesian may pose a serious threat to 
the language as a national symbol that sets the nation apart from others, especially with the 
increasing hegemony of English through globalisation.  With globalisation contesting 
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national borders at an unparalleled rate, it is imperative that translation be seriously 
considered in the country’s language policy to ensure its vitality and protect its linguistic and 
cultural wealth as it plays a role in representing the nation. I will address this issue by first 
looking at the significance of national identity and Indonesian as a symbol of national 
identity. Later, I will move on to address translation in Indonesia’s language planning and 
the pandemy of translationese in the country. I will conclude the discussion by emphasising 
the need for a specific language policy on translation to maintain Indonesia’s national 
language and recommend programs for improving the situation. 
National identity: why it matters 
The Indonesian term of national identity (identitas nasional) is normally understood as the 
manifestation of a nation’s cultural values and characteristics which makes it different from 
other nations (Siswomihardjo 2005). Such a definition reflects the two faces of identity. On 
the one hand, it is concerned with a shared association to common beliefs and attributes, 
and, hence, as Kumaravadivelu (2012: 142) puts it, “sameness”. On the other hand, it refers 
to “an awareness of difference” – “a feeling and recognition of ‘we’ and ‘they'” (Lee 2012: 
29). National identity seen in this way is fluid as the nature and relationship of Self and 
Other, also constantly change.   
In a developing country with a highly pluralist society such as Indonesia, national 
identity is crucial in order to build unity and stability to accelerate development 
(Budhisantoso 1996). Endeavours are therefore made in politics to continuosly revitalise and 
strengthen symbols of national identity to make the nation “differ” from others 
(Budhisantosa 1998: n.p).  Indeed, as Watson points out, “[n]ational identity does not grow 
“naturally” in any society; it has to be created, nurtured and carefully promoted” (1993: 80). 
Efforts in the construction of national identity is becoming more and more important to 
“hold the citizenry closer to the state” as the world is increasingly globalised (Bechoffer & 
McCrone 2009: 4).   
Indonesian: symbol national identity and policy 
The significance of language as the major vehicle of a people’s culture, which is a central 
dimension of national identity (Guibernau 2004, Smith 1991), cannot be overemphasised. 
According to Jiang, language is “the symbolic representation of a people”  because it is 
shaped by its historical and cultural background, including their approach to life and ways of 
thinking (Jiang 2000: 328). Language is naturally a basic symbol of identity since it 
determines much of how a person is perceived and perceives. As Joseph (2004: 225) puts it:  
‘Language’ in the sense of what a particular person says or writes, considered from the 
point of view of both form and content, is central to individual identity. It inscribes the 
person within national or other corporate identities  [...]. It constitutes a text, not just 
of what a person says, but of the person, from which others will read and interpret a 
person’s identity in the richest and most complex ways.   
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e7
2
 
So close is the link between language and identity that Orman (2008: 46) argues that 
language planning may be seen as the “most salient [...] type of  identity planning”. To this 
he adds:  
If we can talk of language planning as a type of identity planning, it follows that we 
can view language policies as types of identity policy and when they operate at the 
level of nations and states we may then talk of language-in-national-identity policies. 
(Orman 2008: 47) 
As a unifying symbol of its highly diverse people, Indonesian is a vital part of Indonesia’s 
national identity. Its role was proved indispensable in bringing different ethnic groups 
together during the country’s nationalist movement. It was proclaimed as the nation’s 
language of unity in the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda) in 1928, which gave impetus for 
the people’s independence movement. In this sense, Benedict Anderson (1991) is correct in 
saying that national language serves as a bedrock for nationalism - which, in my view, is 
inseparable from its unifying aspect. This integrative function of Indonesian continued to be 
pivotal after the birth of the country in 1945. Both the national and official language, 
Indonesian is not only the language of administration, mass media and education, but the 
language most commonly used by people from over a thousand different ethnic groups 
speaking more than 600 local languages. While it was a dialect of Malay, it has grown into a 
major language influenced by Indonesia’s various regional vernaculars and distinctly 
represents the country’s national culture.  
Recognising the crucial role of Indonesian, a great deal of efforts have been made to 
maintain and develop the language, e.g. vocabulary and grammatical development, 
promotion through education (especially language teaching) and mass media. The efforts in 
language policy have been generally very fruitful.100 Errington (1998: 2) says that “Now 
Indonesian is a fully viable, universally acknowledged national language.” Indonesia’s 
national language policy has also often been deemed a great success (Pauuw 2009). 
However, translation, which should be able to enhance the functions of Indonesian, is one 
area that seems to have been neglected. There is no particular language policy and planning 
in the field by the Indonesian government. Consequently, starting from 1998, when the 
need for translation began surging with the country’s adoption of more liberal democracy 
and increasing globalisation, the quality of Indonesian in translations started to drop (see 
also Agustinus, n.d.  in Thipani 2014). As we shall see in the next section, while there has 
always been recognition over the importance of translation in language development, there 
has not been serious effort on the part of the government to develop the area since early in 
the country’s history of language planning.  
 
                                                          
100
 The imposition of Indonesian in education has to some extent undermined local languages, which is an 
important issue the country needs to deal with. There is an absolute need to create a balance between the 
promotion of the national languages and local ones, but it is not my concern in this present article.  
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Translation in Indonesia’s language planning 
In addition to its vital role in transfer of knowledge and information for nation building, 
translation is paramount in the development of national languages by enlarging their 
capacities as a medium of communication, be it in vocabulary and organisation of ideas. As 
an act of mediated interlingual communication, however, translation is far beyond, 
borrowing Shing’s (2007: 37) words, “a pure linguistic transfer”. With language manifested 
itself with social, political and cultural values, translation is often positioned at the very 
frontier in constant negotiation with the Other. In this way, according Paul St-Pierre, 
translation is central in shaping national identity:  
Translation [...] plays an essential role in determining how a nation establishes its 
identity in terms of others, be this through opposition through foreign influences, 
through assimilation or “naturalization” of the foreign whereby differences are 
erased to as great a degree as possible, or through imitation of another, usually 
dominant culture. These are all different strategies of translation, becoming 
possibilities at different moments in history and underlining the various types of 
relations between nations which can exist. (In St-Pierre, n.d,  as cited in Das 2005:  
79-80, cf. St-Pierre n.d: 2) 
The significance of translation for the development of Indonesian was recognised and 
encouraged by the government, especially in the early decades after Indonesia’s 
independence. At least eight of ten National Congresses on the Indonesian Language, which 
give input to the National Institute for Language Cultivation and Development (Badan 
Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Bahasa - BPPB), mentioned the need for translation in their 
recommendations, especially in regard to developing the country’s literature, enhancing 
literature’s function as a medium of education, and disseminating science and technology. 
The government was also advised to establish a national body for translation (KBI III, 1978) 
and introduce Indonesian literature to the world through translation (KBI VII, 1998).  The 
need for translation was mentioned again inthe last KBI in 2013, to “enhance the status and 
functions” of the national language. One recommendation concerned the proper use of 
Indonesian in translation (KB III, 1983), although the recommendation was not meant for 
translation per se but for publications in general. 
Not all of these recommendations have been put into practice. A great deal of 
literature has been translated into Indonesian, but no government body has been set up to 
deal specifically with matters related to translation in the country, especially with the 
quality of the rendering. Although the government (Ministry of Education and Culture) pays 
attention to the quality of texts, most translations in the country are produced by 
commercial publishers without any quality-related supervision from the government. This, 
however, echoes the general outlook of the Indonesian Language Congresses which seem to 
emphasise the volume of translation over content.  
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Translation is not specifically mentioned in the current strategic programs of the 
National Institute for Language Cultivation and Development (Badan Pengembangan dan 
Pembinaan Bahasa, BPPB), Ministry of Education and Culture (n.d.):  
 Strengthening of the Indonesian Language as a medium of education 
 Certification of language use in public spaces, especially at territorial borders 
 Improvement of the quality and number of literary works and criticism 
 Improvement of the function of Indonesian as an international language 
 Development of instructional materials for language and literature 
 Standardisation of proficiency in Indonesian 
 Improvement of reading, writing and communication competencies in Indonesian in 
literacy education  
 Preservation of language and literature  
 Facilitation of Indonesian language and literature study programs in senior high 
schools and universities.  
Unlike language teaching, literature and language standardisation, translation is not 
explicitly specified in the above-mentioned programs. Although, of course, translation might 
be considered a part of the strengthening of Indonesian as a medium of education and the 
improvement of the quality and number of literary works and criticisms, it should be dealt 
with specifically since the country relies on translation so heavily. As Grin (n.d.: 1) observes, 
translation “seems to be affected by a strange fate” with its underepresentation. Grin (n.d.: 
1) states: 
[I]n a multilingual world, [translation] is, arguably, indispensable; yet in discourses 
about multilingualism, its role is frequently overlooked: issues such as to foreign 
language learning, language rights, multilingualism in the classroom, the use of a 
lingua franca, etc., usually take centre stage, and translation is often treated as merely 
residual.  
Grin (n.d.) suggests several reasons for the position of translation in Europe, such as the fact 
that people can learn foreign languages rather than using translation and the preference for 
using a lingua franca. In the context of translation into Indonesian, the first factor seems to 
be more relevant since the government has paid more attention to foreign language 
teaching, especially English. Another important factor seems to be the misconception of the 
nature of translation. People often mistakenly believe that once one learns a foreign 
language, he/she should be able to translate, which may be one reason why translation is 
often seen as subsidiary to foreign language learning. While it is true that one cannot 
translate without knowing another language, translation requires a completely different set 
of skills than those for monolingual communication. This misconception contributes to the 
low appreciation of Indonesian translators and leads to poor decisions in its production, 
especially the impossible time limits set for translators.  
The situation is worsened with the Indonesian book market’s low affordability. People 
who have more money, on the other hand, generally do not have any choice but to use 
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whatever is available in the market because they lack competence in the source language 
(normally English). In 2014 a national book publisher, for instance, pays a translator around 
US$1.40 per page for translating into Indonesian. If a translator could finish, say five to six 
pages of translation per day, then, he/she would only get US$154 to US$184.80 a month 
(excluding weekends), which is much lower than Jakarta’s regional minimum wage set by 
the government. The government clearly needs to support Indonesian translators if the 
quality of translation in the country is to be improved. 
Lost in translation:  Translationese in Indonesia 
The qualities of translations in Indonesian are notoriously low (Taryadi, 2003, Sinaga, 2003, 
Kurnia, 2009, Nababan, et.al., 2012, Wijava 2013, Wijaya 2014). Many, if not most, 
translations have problems with mistranslations and unnatural expressions. The renderings 
are even often so literal that the language is difficult to understand. A quick search on the 
Internet will reveal numerous complaints on the poor quality of translations into 
Indonesian. Prasetyo (2013), an Indonesian reader, for instance, laments:  
“Many complaints are raised on the poor quality of the translation of books [...] 
circulating in the market. The translators seem to have worked carelessly and as a 
result the rendering is confusing and makes you dizzy. You may even find some 
“unintelligible”. The translators seem to chatter in chaotic language grammar [...].”101 
Another reader, Wiguna (2009) writes in his blog:  
“When the translation is difficult to understand, I would normally try to guess the 
English form of the rendering. But then I could not imagine how the text might have 
been written in the English version of the novel. There were paragraphs I had to skip 
because I couldn’t understand the sentences.”102 
The more acceptable translations from English, on the other hand, are still normally 
characterised by relatively strong interference of the source language, not only by the 
tendency to use loan words but also at the level of syntax. The Anglicized influence on 
grammar is often shown by the use of a standard active construction in the contexts where 
a passive construction or a topic comment structure would be more natural in Indonesian. 
The following, for instance, are just two examples of the numerous parts that simply follow 
the active voice in the English source text in a translation of Steinbeck’s “Of Mice and Men”:  
 
                                                          
101 Indonesian: “[B]anyak muncul keluhan tentang rendahnya mutu penerjemahan buku [...] yang beredar di 
pasar. Penerjemahnya terkesan bekerja asal-asalan, sehingga hasil terjemahannya membingungkan, bikin 
pusing, bahkan mencapai taraf “tak bisa dibaca”. [...]. Mereka seperti berceloteh dalam struktur bahasa yang 
kacau [...].” 
102 Indonesian: “Biasanya kalau terbentur maka saya coba menerka kata atau kalimatnya dalam bahasa 
Inggris. Nah kali itu saya sama sekali tidak bisa membayangkan versi bahasa Inggris dari novel terjemahan itu 
dan akhirnya ada paragraf-paragraf [buku terjemahan itu] yang terpaksa saya lompati karena tidak bisa 
mencerna maksud kalimatnya”  
 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e7
6
 
Example 1 
From his side pocket he brought out two spoons [...]. p.17 
 
a. translation 
Dari saku sisinya,          ia mengeluarkan dua buah sendok [...] 
From his side pocket   he     brought out         two spoons 
                                        Subject      v active               object 
                         (Steinbeck, 1930/2006, Koesalamwardi, Trans, p.30) 
b. more natural translation 
Dikeluarkannya dua buah sendok dari saku sisinya 
Be brought out               two spoons          from his side pocket  
Passive verb                      object                   adv. modifier    
Example 2 
I ought to of shot that dog myself, George. P.53 
a. translation 
“Seharusnya aku menembak anjing itu   sendiri, George. [...]”  
        should            I      shoot        the/that dog   mysef 
       I should have shot the dog myself 
                  (Steinbeck, 1937/2006, Koesalamwardi, Trans., p. 115) 
b.  more natural version 
Seharusnya anjing itu aku tembak sendiri 
        should        the/that dog I     shoot     myself 
                                            topic comment 
 
        the dog    I should have shot  myself 
This tendency of strong syntactic interference of English also appeared in translations 
in Japan after WWII until recently. Interestingly, translationese has not been seen as 
something necessarily negative, especially in non-fiction texts (Furuno, 2015). According 
Furuno (2015: 147), this is because the contemporary Japanese community, who wanted to 
import information and knowledge from abroad, “had a higher regard for Western culture 
than its own at that time”. The “adequacy” of the translation, i.e. the orientation towards 
the source norms, therefore, seems to have been more important than the use of natural 
Japanese language.  
Unlike in the Japanese case, online comments seem to indicate that Indonesian 
readers tend to have a negative view of unnatural translation both in fiction and non-fiction. 
Further research, however, is necessary to find out to what extent they “tolerate” the 
source language’s influence on the translated texts - whether, for example, they tend to 
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oppose the use of more obvious unnatural structure and expressions103 but do not mind the 
use of active rather than passive constructions. The latter is more subtle since Indonesian 
also has an active voice (but with a different distribution than in English). It would be even 
more interesting to find out why they approve of such syntactic imports if they do. With 
translationese so pervasive in Indonesia since the reformation era (from 1998), Indonesian 
translation readers may have become used to the active voice in translated texts and may 
see it as natural. Such an attitude would show a more fundamental shift of Indonesian by 
the adoption of source language (SL) norms (English) compared to a mere tendency to 
follow the SL norms due to poor workmanship.  Such unnecessary adoption of SL norms 
would be undesirable for the development of Indonesian as a symbol of national identity 
because it would only make the language more like English rather than improving its 
function.  
Conclusion 
As a form of language contact, translation shapes the development of national languages, 
hence national identities. With escalating globalisation and a continuous or increased need 
for this secondary communication, there would be a greater chance of language shifts, 
which will affect the dynamics of national identities. It is therefore hightime for Indonesia, 
whose language plays a very significant political and cultural role, to set up an adequate 
policy to deal with translation.  Specific planning is necessary in order to enable translations 
to enhance the functions of Indonesian while keeping the borders that set the nation apart 
from others “safe” by maintaining the language’s linguistic and cultural wealth. Several 
programs that may be incorporated into this are translation quality control, the 
establishment of translation training programs and an accountable national accreditation 
body for translators, as well as the promotion of the translation profession and welfare of 
translators. Considerable resources would be required to implement this, but in that 
Indonesian is vital for the country and good translations would go a long way for its 
development, it would be well worth the effort.   
Acknowledgements: 
The writer sincerely thanks Rosella Kameo for her keen editorial eye. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the Asiascapes: Contesting Borders Conference that was held in 
Perth, July 2014. 
                                                          
103 Example of glaring unnaturalness: 
“Kita hanya harus mendapatkan tanah itu,” [...]. 
We   just     have to/must get        the land 
‘We just gotta get the land’ 
(Steinbeck, 1937/1970, Koesalamwardi, Trans. p. 114). 
 
In Indonesian, the word “just” is not natural when used in the above way. It needs to be deleted. 
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Abstract 
This research was aimed at studying the extent to which the principals of the excellent 
schools in Aceh, Indonesia practiced the second dimension of the instructional leadership: 
Managing the Instructional Program comprising three functions, Coordinate Curriculum; 
Supervise & Evaluate Instruction; Monitor Students’ Progress. The research employed Mixed 
Method Designs. The Systematic Sampling Technique was chosen in determining the sample 
of the study. The Principal Instructional Management Rating Scales (PIMRS) developed by 
Hallinger & Murphy (1985) was used to collect the quantitative data from  120 teachers of 
the 4 excellent senior high schools in Aceh, and 4 principals, 4 vice principals for curriculum 
affairs and 4 heads of the school committees were interviewed to gather qualitative data. 
The results of the quantitative study are consistent with those of qualitative investigation. 
The findings indicate that the principals of the excellent schools in Aceh, to certain extent, 
practiced the second dimension of the instructional leadership: Managing the Instructional 
Program. Further inquiry on the school principals’ leadership especially in Aceh is strongly 
recommended. 
 
Keywords: Instructional Leadership, Excellent School Principal Leadership, Managing the 
Instructional Program 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘instructional leadership’ is associated with measures that a principal takes, or 
delegates to others, to enhance students’ learning (Flath, 1989). The instructional leader 
gives the top priority to improving instruction and making efforts to realize the vision.  
Principals who sustained diverse responsibilities for many aspects of school 
management, did not focus on the core business of schooling, teaching and learning, were 
urged to pay more serious attention to the matters of instruction (Little & Bird,  1987, in 
Greenfield, 1991). One out of the three dimensions of the instructional leadership construct 
is Managing the Instructional Program. Managing the Instructional Program is associated 
with the principal’s role in working with teachers in areas specifically related to educational 
technology, curriculum, and instruction (Hallinger, 1983). School principals play the most 
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important role in managing the instructional program, the second dimension of instructional 
leadership. Unfortunately, instructional leadership is not very popular yet, particularly in 
developing countries.   
 Most school principals especially those in developing countries, have yet to prioritize 
instructional leadership. A research carried out by Hallinger and Taraseina on the principals’ 
instructional leadership in Thailand in 1994 indicates that the secondary school principals in 
Northern Thailand do not exercise active instructional leadership in the domains measured 
by deploying the PIMRS (Principal Instructional Management Rating Scales) developed by 
Hallinger and Murphy (1985). Before  Hallinger and Taraseina conducted this research, using 
the same instrument, the PIMRS, researchers had studied the secondary school principals in 
the United States (Haack, 1991, Pratley, 1992), Malaysia (Saavedra, 1987), and Canada 
(Jones, 1987). The results of these studies prove that the scores are consistently higher 
across the subscales compared with those of the assessment of the secondary school 
principals executed in Northern Thailand. In India, the educational regulations of the 
country do not seem to side with the shift of school management to the prime business of 
schooling, teaching and learning yet. For example, the educational code of the country still 
assigns the school head the duties concerned with general control of the school (Dash, 
2008). However, if our goal is to have effective schools, then we must seek for ways to 
emphasize on instructional leadership (Chell, 1995). 
 An excellent school is often referred to “sekolah model,” or “sekolah percontohan,” 
or “sekolah unggul,” or “sekolah unggulan” in Bahasa. In literature, the excellent 
schools,“sekolah unggulan,” commonly share most of their characteristics with effective 
schools or high performing schools or “sekolah berkesan” in Malaysia. However, indeed, the 
terms excellent schools in this context are not identical with effective schools, high 
performing schools or “sekolah berkesan” in Malaysia, although it is hoped that these 
excellent schools would become effective schools one day. The schools under investigation 
are state senior high schools under the Education Service Office (Dinas Pendidikan) of the 
Aceh Province, meaning those under the control of the Ministry of National Education of the 
Republic of Indonesia.  
 Aceh is an autonomous territory (daerah otonom) of Indonesia located on the 
northern tip of the Sumatra Island. It also used to be called Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam. Past 
spellings of its name include Acheh, Atjeh and Achin. Aceh is the area where Islam was first 
established in Southeast Asia. In the early seventeenth century the Sultanate of Aceh was 
the most wealthy, powerful and cultivated state in the Malacca Straits region. Aceh, which is 
presently inhabited by 5.006.807 inhabitants (the result of census carried out by the Aceh 
Government in 2010), has a history of political independence and fierce resistance to 
control by outsiders. It has substantial natural resources, including oil and natural gas. Aceh 
is partly implementing syaria law now. The capital of Aceh is Banda Aceh. It was the closest 
point of land  to the epicenter of the terrible 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, which 
triggered a tsunami that devastated much of the western coast of the region, including part 
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of the capital, Banda Aceh. The massive earthquake and tsunami killed 226,000 people 
(Ilyas, 2008). This deadly disaster helped peace initiators bring the warring parties, the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of the Republic of `Indonesia, to the 
negotiating table to end 30-years of war. Mediated by the former Finnish president Martti 
Ahtisaari -- the head of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) Agency -- the peace 
agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, MoU Helsinki, was signed in Helsinki, 
Finland, on August 15, 2005. The end of long war accelerated the well-managed 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process and resulted in significant changes and continuous 
development in Aceh. The fast development remarkably impacts education including school 
management and leadership practices.      
Conceptual framework  
The three dimensions of Instructional Leadership are Defining School Goals, Managing the 
Instructional Program and Developing School Learning Climate. This study concentrated on 
the second dimension of the instructional leadership practices formulated by Hallinger and 
Murphy (1985), Managing the Instructional Program comprising Coordinates the 
Curriculum; Supervises and Evaluates Instruction; Monitors Student Progress subscales.          
      
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework: Instructional Leadership Practices of the Principals of the 
Excellent Schools in Aceh, Indonesia. This conceptual framework is adopted from: Hallinger, 
P., & Murphy, J. (1985). Assessing the instructional leadership behavior of principals.  
Elementary School Journal, 86(2), 217-248.  
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Literature review 
Definition of Excellent/Effective School 
In most literature, the term ‘effective school’ is more frequently found than the term 
‘excellent school,’ which is often associated with ‘sekolah unggul’ or ‘sekolah unggulan’ in 
Bahasa. In international literature, the effective schools/excellent schools are frequently 
associated with lab school, effective school, demonstration school, experiment school, or 
accelerated school (Abidin, 2007).  In Malaysia, effective school is often referred to ‘sekolah 
berkesan’ or ‘high performing school.’ It can be found anywhere both in urban and rural 
areas and it is a dynamic process. Today a school is an effective school. In a couple years in 
the future, the school may become a regular school, and this also applies in reverse (Reuter, 
1992). Output, which is normally expressed in terms of students’ academic achievement, is 
commonly measured as a standard of school effectiveness (Rahimah & Zulkifli, 1996). In 
Aceh, the status of the excellence is decided and inscribed in an official decree by the Head 
of the Education Service Office of Regency/City level together with regents or mayors, and 
school administrators (Laisani, 2009). The table below depicts eleven characteristics of 
effective schools.     
Table 1: 
 Eleven Characteristics Found in Effective Schools Resulting From a Review of 
 International School Effectiveness Literature 
 Characteristics Elements 
1 Professional leadership Firm and purposeful 
A participative approach 
The leading professional 
2 Shared vision and goals Unity of purpose 
Consistency of practice 
Collegiality and collaboration 
  
3 A learning environment An orderly atmosphere 
An attractive working environment 
 
4 Concentration on teaching and 
learning 
Maximization of learning time 
Academic emphasis 
Focus on achievement 
 
5 Purposeful teaching Efficient organization 
Clarity of purpose 
Structured lessons 
Adaptive practice  
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6 High expectations High expectations all around 
Communicating expectations 
Providing intellectual challenge 
 
7 Positive reinforcement Clear and fair discipline 
Feedback  
 
8 Monitoring progress Monitoring pupil performance 
Evaluating school performance 
 
9 Pupil rights and responsibilities Raising pupil self-esteem 
Positions of responsibility  
Control of work 
 
10 Home-school partnership Parental involvement in their children’s 
learning 
11 A learning organization School-based staff development 
  Source. Sammons, Hillman and Mortimore (1995, p.8) 
             
Instructional leadership 
Instructional leadership is a change from conventional management practice of the schools, 
in which principals were seen as general managers of the schools, to a principal as 
instructional leader. Hallinger and Murphy (1985) whose instrument, the Principal 
Instructional Management Rating Scale (PIMRS), is widely used for school principal 
leadership assessment including for this study, state that instructional leadership in an 
effective school comprises three dimensions: Defining the School Mission, Managing the 
Instructional Program and Promoting a School Learning Climate.                            
 Previous studies using the PIMRS have been conducted in many different school 
settings especially in the United States. Among others, a study carried out by Brendan J. 
Lyons in 2010: Principal Instructional Leadership Behavior, as Perceived by Teachers and 
Principals, at New York State Recognized and Non-Recognized Middle Schools. The study 
compared the principals’ instructional leadership practices between the recognized and 
non-recognized schools. The results indicate that, on the average, principals of recognized 
schools are demonstrating the leadership behaviors measured in the PIMRS more frequently 
than their counterparts of non-recognized schools.  
Based on the bulk of research, lack of instructional leadership of the principal is blamed for 
school ineffectiveness (Findley & Findley, 1992).                                    
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Managing the instructional program 
Managing the Instructional Program, for the purpose of this study, is defined as the 
principal’s role in working with teachers in areas specifically related to educational 
technology, curriculum, and instruction (Hallinger, 1983). It is divided into three 
instructional leadership functions: 
Coordinating the curriculum  
Supervising and evaluating instruction  
Monitoring student progress (Hallinger & Murphy, 1985).  
 Coordinating the curriculum is as the degree to which school curricular objectives are 
aligned with course content, achievement tests, and the continuity in a curricular series 
across grade levels (Hallinger, 1983). Murphy, Elliot, Goldring, and Porter (2006) state that 
“school leaders in effective schools are knowledgeable about and deeply involved in the 
school’s curricular program.” Principals manage and support the teaching and learning 
program; they apply the highest standards of teaching and learning; they solve the problems 
emerge (Chapman & Mongon, 2008).   
 Supervising and evaluating instruction is defined as activities that involve interaction 
between the principal and teachers regarding classroom practices (Hallinger, 1983). It is a 
job function which is most often than not refers to the role of the principal as instructional 
leader. The classrooms of the effective school are frequently visited by the principal 
(Hallinger & Murphy, 1987).  
 Monitoring student progress is defined as the extent to which principals take 
responsibility for developing a systematic and comprehensive testing program. Test results 
are discussed with the staff as a whole, and are provided interpretations or analyses for 
teachers detailing the relevant test data. Test results are used for goal setting, curricular 
assessment, planning, and measuring progress toward school goals (Hallinger, 1983). Good 
school principals provide teachers and parents with assessment results on an ongoing basis 
(Levine & Stark, 1982; Venezky & Windfield, 1979). In this way, they know the progress the 
students make concerning their study.     
The study 
Research purpose  
In response to the importance of instructional leadership, this study intended to focus  on 
one of the three instructional leadership dimensions based on the Hallinger’s Principal 
Instructional Management Rating Scale (PIMRS) model developed by Hallinger and Murphy 
(1985), Managing the Instructional Program.  
Research question 
This research was aimed to serve one research question: To what extent have the Excellent 
Senior High School Principals in Aceh practiced the second dimension of the instructional 
leadership construct: Managing the Instructional Program?  
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Research design 
This investigation employed Mixed Methods Designs. Mixed Methods Designs are 
“procedures for collecting, analyzing, and linking both quantitative and qualitative data in a 
single study or in a multiple series of studies” (Creswell, 2005). According to Creswell (2005), 
mixing both quantitative and qualitative data provides better understanding of a research 
problem than one type of data. In this study the emphasis was put on quantitative data as a 
basis for further gathering of qualitative data.  
The PIMRS as a main instrument 
This research was carried out in two main phases. The first phase was for gathering the data 
on principal instructional leadership practices by means of the teacher versions of the 
Principal Instructional Management Rating Scale (PIMRS), developed by Hallinger & Murphy 
(1985). The instrument provides a “1” to “5” response scale accompanied with each item 
with 1 representing “almost never”; 2 representing “seldom”; 3 representing “sometimes”; 
4 representing “frequently”; and, 5 representing “almost always” (Hallinger & Murphy, 
1985). It was completed by participants, teachers of the four excellent senior high schools, 
during the quantitative phase, the first phase of the study.  
Interview as an instrument  
During the second phase, principals, vice principals for curriculum affairs and the heads of 
the committee of the four schools were interviewed on their perceptions on the principals’ 
instructional leadership practices. The interview questions were designed to complement 
and enrich the data gathered by using the Principal Instructional Management Rating Scale 
(PIMRS) of the teacher versions.    
The process of mixed method 
 Figure 3.1 Sequential Explanatory Strategy. Source: Creswell et al, (2003). 
 
   
Figure 3.1 presents the data collection stages. Quantitative data were collected during the 
first phase of the study. The quantitative data were analyzed prior to qualitative 
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investigation. Then, the qualitative data were gathered during the second phase of the 
study. After qualitative study was carried out, the qualitative data were analyzed followed 
by interpretation of the whole data analysis.     
Systematic sampling and samples 
In this study systematic sampling was used. The researcher studied instructional leadership 
practices of 16 principals of excellent/effective senior high schools in Aceh, Indonesia under 
the administration of the Education Service Office (Dinas Pendidikan) of the Aceh Special 
Province or the National Education Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia. Referring to 
systematic sampling procedure, 20% out 16 is 3.2. This means that 3.2 excellent senior high 
schools would become the sample of this study. However, it is advisable to select as large a 
sample as possible from the population, because the larger the sample, the less potential 
error, which is called sampling error (Verma & Mallick, 1999). Therefore, the sample of this 
research was slightly larger than it is supposed to be, 120 teachers out of 480 teachers, 4 
principals out of 16 excellent senior high school principals in Aceh, 4 vice principals for 
curriculum affairs and 4 heads of the school committees.    
Data analysis 
The qualitative data gathered by using interview, was organized and transcribed. The field-
notes, interview results, were typed and the qualitative data was analyzed by hand. The 
findings and interpretations were validated to check the accuracy. Finally, for this study the 
qualitative data were just presented in common themes; quantitative and qualitative 
findings were linked; pertinent theories of previous studies were also connected with these 
findings.    
Findings 
Quantitative data of PIMRS 
This section discusses the results of quantitative study using PIMRS (Principal Instructional 
Management Rating Scales) developed by Hallinger and Murphy (1985). The tables below 
present quantitative data of teachers’ responses derived from the PIMRS (Principal 
Instructional Management Rating Scales), the second dimension: Managing the Instructional 
Program consisting of three subscales : Supervise & Evaluate Instruction; Coordinate 
Curriculum; Monitoring Students’ Progress   
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Table 2: 
           Mean Scores of Supervise & Evaluate Instruction 
Items N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Ensure that the 
classroom priorities of 
teachers are consistent 
with the goals and 
direction of the school  
 
104 2 5 4.22 
Review student work 
products when 
evaluating classroom 
instruction  
 
104 1 5 3.59 
Conduct informal 
observation in 
classrooms on a regular 
basis  
 
104 1 5 3.70 
Point out specific 
strengths in teacher’s 
instructional practices in 
post- observation 
feedback  
 
104 1 5 3.58 
Point out specific 
weaknesses in teacher 
instructional practices in 
post-observation 
feedback 
104 1 5 3.15 
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Table 3: 
           Mean Scores of Coordinate the Curriculum 
Items N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Make clear who is 
responsible for 
coordinating the 
curriculum across grade 
levels  
 
104 1 5 4.38 
Draw upon the results of 
school-wide testing 
when making curricular 
decisions 
 
104 1 5 3.99 
Monitor the classroom 
curriculum to see that it 
covers the school’s 
curricular objectives 
 
104 1 5 3.88 
Assess the overlap 
between the school’s 
curricular objectives and 
the school’s 
achievement tests 
 
104 1 5 3.90 
Participate actively in 
the review of curricular 
materials 
104 1 5 3.91 
 
Table 4: 
             Mean Scores of Monitor Student Progress 
Items N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Meet individually with 
teachers to discuss 
student progress 
 
104 1 5 3.67 
Discuss academic 
performance results 
with the faculty to 
identify curricular 
104 1 5 3.86 
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strengths and 
weaknesses 
 
Use tests and other 
performance measures 
to assess progress 
toward school goals 
 
104 1 5 3.83 
Inform teachers of the 
school’s performance 
results in written form 
104 1 5 3.95 
Inform students of 
school’s academic 
progress 
104 2 5 4.43 
 
 Taken as a whole there are similar level of the mean scores of the three subscales. In 
each of the three subscales just one of the five items displays above 4.0 mean scores. Most 
of the items of the three subscales show similar mean scores 3.5 or above.     
Supervise and evaluate instruction 
Apart from to “ensure that the classroom priorities of teachers are consistent with the goals 
and direction of the school,” items with a relatively high response, meaning that principals 
‘frequently’ perform this particular subscale, the teachers reported a lower mean score 
overall for each items of the Supervise and Evaluate Instruction function. This indicates that 
principals practice ‘sometimes’ most of the item in this subscale. The results suggest that 
principals’ instructional leadership practices in this particular area should be improved.     
Coordinate the curriculum 
Except for “make clear who is responsible for coordinating the curriculum across grade 
levels” item which was responded at the highest mean score meaning that principals 
‘frequently’ practice the item, the rest of the items were reported at slightly below 
frequently threshold. The results indicate that principals almost ‘frequently’ practice these 
four items of the subscale. Although most of the items were reported  at relatively higher 
mean scores, it also reveals that there is room for enhancement.     
Monitor student progress 
Similarly, only one of the items, “inform students of school’s academic progress” was 
responded the highest of the five items indicating that principals ‘frequently’ practice the 
item.  The rest of the items fell below ‘frequently’ threshold. Even though the responses to 
the items are relatively high, they are still considered low. Low responses in these particular 
items indicate that the principals need to practice these items more frequently.  
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Linkage between quantitative and qualitative findings 
One of the most important findings is that there was a high consistency between the 
teachers’ responses in the quantitative research and those of the interview sessions.  
Qualitative    
On the whole, qualitative findings enrich the quantitative data. For “Supervise and Evaluate 
Instruction,” the results of interview sessions display that the principals are mobile 
throughout the building and classrooms supervising instruction. To a certain extent, 
principals perform this instructional leadership function. 
For “Coordinate Curriculum,” almost all participants stated that principals are doing 
well on curriculum coordination, meaning that principals practice this instructional 
leadership function. They coordinate curriculum.  
For “Monitor Student Progress,” the results of qualitative study indicate that 
principals also exercise this instructional leadership function. They monitor student 
progress. Almost all respondents stated that principals rely on evaluations in terms of 
monitoring student progress 
Discussion 
In terms of “Coordinate Curriculum,” based on the result of the quantitative study, 
principals of the excellent senior high schools in Aceh, Indonesia ‘frequently’ practice the 
items under this subscale. All respondents of the qualitative study stated that principals are 
doing well and collaborating with teachers on curriculum coordination. The principals  not 
only rely on a single method in coordinating curriculum but also use multiple approaches, 
such as teaching program checks, vice principal’s information, the MGMP(the Discussion 
Forum for the Teachers Who Teach the Same Courses)/teams, test results, the KKM (Passing 
or contract Grades), and classroom visits. This finding is aligned with existing theory that 
principals of effective schools work collaboratively with the teachers to ensure that the 
schools apply a rigorous curriculum program and all students learn rigorous content of high 
quality curriculum (Newmann, 1997; Ogden & Germinario, 1995).  
 Concerning “Monitoring Student Progress” which was responded at almost 
‘frequently’. Almost all respondents of the interview responded that principals not only rely 
on evaluations, tests, and classroom teachers, but also successes in certain competitions. 
The finding corresponds to previous studies which indicate that effective schools are 
characterized by systematic, school-wide procedures for monitoring student progress 
(Baron & Shoemaker, 1982; Cohen, 1981; Edmonds & Fredericksen, 1978; Sweeney, 1982).  
In regard to “Supervise and Evaluate Instruction” which was rated at an average score of 
below ‘frequently’ but still at ‘sometimes’ or higher, meaning that principals also practice 
this particular instructional leadership function “sometimes.” They see this function as one 
of the most important functions of the instructional leadership. The principals are mobile 
throughout the building and classrooms supervising instruction. To a certain extent, 
principals perform this instructional leadership function. They supervise and evaluate 
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instruction. However, some respondents failed to specifically mention the principal 
instructional leadership practices on reviewing student work products, the length of time 
spent on the classroom observations, and feedback of specific strengths and weaknesses of 
the teacher’s instructional practice. The findings are consistent with those found by Little 
and Bird (1987) who emphasized the significance of the supervision and evaluation.  
The schools, whose principal leadership under study, are excellent schools. These schools 
are called “sekolah unggulan” in Bahasa. They are favourite schools in Aceh, Indonesia. 
 The findings of this investigation support the contention that principals of the 
excellent senior high schools in Aceh, Indonesia, to certain extent, practice instructional 
leadership functions specifically those under Managing the Instructional Program 
dimension-items of “Coordinate the Curriculum; Supervise and Evaluate Instruction; 
Monitor Student Progress’ functions.  
 The result is not in line with the findings of a survey conducted by Hallinger and 
Taraseina on the principals’ instructional leadership in Thailand in 1994 indicating  that the 
secondary school principals in Northern Thailand do not exercise active instructional 
leadership in the domains measured by deploying the PIMRS (Principal Instructional 
Management Rating Scales) developed by Hallinger and Murphy (1985), and is not consitent 
either with the findings of a study in India. In India the educational regulations of the 
country do not seem to side with the shift of school management to the prime business of 
schooling, teaching and learning yet. In this country, the educational code of the country 
still assigns the school principals the duties that are concerned with general control of the 
school (Dash, 2008).                                     
Conclusion 
Based on the findings of the study, it is concluded that the principals of the excellent senior 
high schools in Aceh, Indonesia, to certain extent, exercise the second dimension of 
instructional leadership functions: Managing the Instructional Program. Since this report 
just focused on the three functions of the principal instructional leadership, it is impossible 
to draw the conclusion of the whole picture of the instructional leadership practices of the 
excellent senior high school principals in Aceh, Indonesia. The principals of the excellent 
schools in Aceh should practice the instructional leadership functions more frequently. All 
stakeholders should be aware of the significance of the principals’ instructional leadership 
practices for school improvement. Further study on other principal instructional leadership 
functions of the excellent schools or instructional leadership of regular schools is strongly 
recommended.  
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Abstract  
Having one of the largest consumer bases in the world does not necessarily entail Indonesia 
has strong consumer organizations and high consumer protection. This paper addresses this 
issue and responds to the following questions: what activities has Yogyakarta Consumer 
Institute (YCI) conducted for mainstream consumers’ rights at the grassroots? What factors 
are identified as supporting and constraining the delivery of these activities? How are they 
managed?  In general, what do activists believe the activities’ effects have been and how it 
has been assessed? Interviewed members of executive board and board of directors, the 
present research found that the main activities of YCI were advocacy and education to 
mainstream consumerism in Indonesia. The first provides consumers a place to report their 
problems and defends consumers’ rights in dispute and resolution processes. The later 
intends to induce awareness and critical thinking to consumers based on solidarity as its 
core values. The existing solidarity among YCI’s volunteers and its well-established networks 
were factors strengthening YCI as a self-reliant organization. YCI struggled with several 
factors such as volunteer management, finance, and consumers’ ignorance. The first relates 
to “moonlighting” volunteers lingering program implementations. The second appears as 
YCI had no major funding due to a strict ideological policy not to seek or earn money from 
external parties. The last factor is associated with the general situation of consumer 
awareness in Indonesia that is still low and lacks solidarity. The general belief of YCI’s 
consumerism activists has been that consumerism is still an unpopular issue in Indonesia. 
Although the consumer protection law has been enacted for more than a decade, it has not 
brought significant changes due to embedded weaknesses, low law enforcement, political 
willingness, and the influence of the mass media. 
 
Introduction 
As the fourth most populous country, Indonesia is a huge market for various products. For 
instance, in terms of information and technology consumption, Indonesia is the largest 
Internet user in Southeast Asia with more than 70 million users as of June 2014. More than 
50 million Facebook subscribers in 2012 (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm, 
retrieved December 22, 2014) and close to 20 million Twitter users 
(https://www.techinasia.com/rick-mulia-twitter-indonesia/, retrieved December 22, 2014).  
Considering these facts alone, Indonesia is such a huge market for various products. 
The high numbers of consumers and their purchase power potential, however, has 
not resulted in corresponding leverage for consumerism in Indonesia. The idea of enforcing 
                                                          
104
 Trans. Lembaga Konsumen Yogyakarta 
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consumer rights, such as the right to have adequate information, the right to be protected 
from product side effects, and so forth, is far from recognized. There is only one non-
governmental organization at the national level, and it is unknown how many there may be 
at the provincial levels. 
One of consumer organizations with a state level operation is YCI, established in 
1968; the name YCI is derived from the city’s name [Yogyakarta] that was also a national 
capital from 1946 to1949. YCI is different from the Consumers Association in Indonesia 
(Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia)  , which works at the national level through 
lobbying and advocacy. YCI mainly focuses on educating people at the grassroots level and 
trains members of society to be consumer defender agents as a long-term outcome. 
Besides the small number of organizations voicing consumerism, the consumers 
themselves have insufficient motivation to assert their rights. There are many reasons for 
this, such as a cultural mental block and unequal power relations. As a collective culture, 
most Indonesians perceive that a stable relationship with groups is important and tends to 
avoid conflict by sacrificing individual happiness. Expressing individual interest causes 
breaks in personal relationships and group cohesiveness. During childhood, most in the 
young generation are conditioned to be uniform and have limited freedom to assert 
themselves as individuals. School activities are focused on memorizing facts instead of 
fostering creativity (Kompas, 2012) (Jakarta Globe, 2013). Therefore, most people lack the 
ability to exercise critical thinking and are inclined to accept a situation as taken for granted. 
A more philosophical reason for the lack of consumerism in Indonesia is the unequal 
power relations between producers and consumers. Most consumers perceive that it will 
take a lot of energy to balance the relationship since the producers have more resources 
than they do. It is a common belief, for instance, that a 2000 rupiahs (about US$ .50 cents) 
increase in train fare, without corresponding facilities improvement, does not really matter 
compared to the costs consumers may spend to fight against it. Lacking solidarity among 
consumers caused by power inequality has created ignorance and demobilized society’s 
power to balance the existing relationship. This situation is aggravated by weak law 
enforcement from the authorities in which the sanctions given to the rule-breakers are 
limited to non-legal treatment such as warning and supervision for unethical conducts. 
(http://rrijogja.co.id/berita/regional/berita-sosial-politik/967-perlindungan-konsumen-
belum-berjalan, retrieved December 22, 2014) 
In order to remedy the situation, YCI invests in people through education, 
communication, and information programs. It has been empowering communities through 
consumerism literacy programs by initiating community groups to have regular meetings to 
discuss their rights as consumers and by providing community training to enhance solidarity. 
As a self-reliant organization, YCI relentlessly fights for consumer justice through 
various efforts from education and information to legal and compliant advocacy. In doing 
these activities, the organization might be dealing with wide variety of challenges that need 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e9
8
 
to be overcome using its own resources as an organization independently, seeking for 
potential sources to sustain the operation, or utilizing the combination of both sources in 
the continuum. At the macro level, the organization also needs to map their impact by 
learning how the efforts have contributed to create justice for consumers and critical 
consumers in the region. In line with the aforementioned introduction, the paper addresses 
questions: what activities has YCI conducted for mainstream consumers’ rights at the 
grassroots? What factors are identified as supporting and constraining the delivery of these 
activities? How are they managed?  In general, what do activists believe the activities’ effect 
has been and how it has been assessed?  
Background 
This section discusses three main background factors related to the examined case: the 
geographical profile of Indonesia and Yogyakarta, the development of NGOs, and a brief 
profile of YCI. This background presents a simple context for the study and does not aim to 
provide details of each aspect; therefore, further investigation is suggested. 
Profile of Indonesia and Yogyakarta 
Indonesia is a democratic country, in which, since 2009, the president was elected directly 
by citizens. The Indonesian political system has adopted the Trias Politica to separate 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The legislative power is vested in the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) that consists of the House of 
Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and the Regional Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). 
The organization under examination is situated in Yogyakarta Special Region, known 
as Yogyakarta. In 2010 the Yogyakarta population was 3,457,491 people, 66.44% and 
33.56% were living in urban and rural area, respectively and the distribution was 31.62% in 
District of Sleman and 11.24% in the Municipal of Yogyakarta. In those who are above 15 
years old, the literacy rate was 89.73%. 
The province is located in Java Island, headed by a King that also rules as governor, 
and has an area 3.185,80 km². It consists of 4 districts (Sleman, Bantul, Gunungkidul, and 
Kulonprogo) and the municipality of Yogyakarta, and in general it has the same governance 
system as the national government. A special region classification is embedded due to 
Yogyakarta being the only region in Indonesia that still has a king with legitimate power over 
his people; it was also Indonesia’s capital during the Indonesian National Revolution from 
1945-1949.  Yogyakarta is well known as a college city as it has many universities and is one 
of the main study destinations throughout the country. Because of its cultural heritage and 
diverse natural scenery, it has also become a popular travel destination. 
Development of NGOs in Indonesia. 
Most NGOs in Indonesia are registered as private foundations and are community and mass-
based organizations. Since 1998, after the resignation of General Soeharto, the number of 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e9
9
 
NGOs has exploded with significant support of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). After more than three decades of dictatorship, regional autonomy 
and decentralization have brought large opportunity to organize citizens in public affairs 
(Antlov, Brinkerhoff and Rapp, 2010 p. 419) where the roles of NGOs in democratic 
governance vary as independent oversight through watchdog organizations, serving as 
formal facilitators of government-organized meetings, and independent advocacy 
campaigns on a variety of public issues (p. 428-429). 
A report provided by International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2003 describes a new 
activism in Indonesia after 32 year of the New Order regime under President Soeharto. The 
report mainly emphasizes Civil Society Organization (CSO) as a broad entity in 
democratization processes. The term was popularized by scholars, media, and activists in 
the country including NGO workers. From NGO activitsts’ point of views, the term is a “good 
cover” for their work (Harney and Olivia, 2003). Which means the use CSO as a label is 
perceived as a mask to deliver their missions due to security reasons and some other 
negative stigma to NGOs. A 2009 Survey report used Nonprofit Organization (NPO) as a term 
to map the NGO sector in Indonesia. The report is a preliminary description of NPO 
accountability in Indonesia in terms of their legal accountability, program accountability, 
fiscal and financial accountability, and process accountability (Aritonang, Yusran, & 
Promedia, 2009). 
According to an NPO Domestic Report (2010), the term non-profit organization is 
rarely used; however, non-government organization or Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat 
(LSM/self-reliant organization) is a more common name. According to the Ministry 
Instruction No.8 1990, an LSM has the main role of increasing social, economic, and welfare 
of local communities through community involvement. It is not allowed to become actively 
involved in political activities or in any movement against government jurisdiction. Citing the 
Ministry of Law and Human Right’s data, the report states in 2009 there were 21.669 
nonprofit organizations having legal status in Indonesia in which 98% have a foundation 
(yayasan) and 2% of the population has association (perkumpulan) as their legal status. It is 
also estimated that there were thousands of NPOs in district level that have no legal status 
(Team, 2010). 
Several studies related to the legal environment of NGOs in Indonesia can be traced 
through online sources such as www.ngoregnet.org and www.indonesiango.org. Article 28 
of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia recognizes freedom of speech and 
assembly to every citizen, and it becomes an “umbrella” of any regulations covering NPO in 
Indonesia. There are three laws regulating NPOs: Law No.16 2001 about Foundation, Law 
No. 28 2004 regarding the amendment of Law No. 16 2001, Staatblad 1987 about 
Association, and the Law No. 8 1985 regarding Social Organization. In total, there are 15 
laws, 4 government regulations, and 7 ministerial decrees related to NPOs. The law on 
Foundation regulates non-membership NPOs, while Staatblad emphasizes mass-based 
NPOs. Both of these laws are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights 
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and apply to any type of LSM/NPO. The Law of Social Organization is carried out by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and regulates any types of NPO including labor union. The 
International NPO is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination 
with other governmental institutions.  
Profile of YCI 
YCI is a nonprofit organization focusing on consumer protection and movement as its raison 
d’être. It was established in April 12, 1978, and formerly was a representative of the 
Consumer Association from Indonesia in Yogyakarta. In 1999, it voluntarily separated from 
the Indonesia Consumer Institute Foundation withholding YLKI Yogyakarta as a name. Six 
years later it formally became Yogyakarta Consumers Institute (YCI).   
YCI has a vision of creating consumers who have awareness, knowledge, and skills in 
consumer protection. This involves four missions: a) to increase quantity and quality of 
consumers who have a good perspective on consumer protection; b) to form a society 
composed of people who through education and training are aware of their rights and 
obligations as consumers; c) to increase knowledge and skill of individuals and 
organizational entities in the field of consumer protection; and d) to give consumer 
protection knowledge to business entities. 
In order to accomplish the visions, YCI mainly has three divisions: a) division of 
education, b) division of consumer protection, and c) division of advocacy. The division of 
education primarily works with communities to transfer knowledge and awareness of 
consumerism. It offers direct services to community groups that want to increase their 
understanding of consumer rights. This division also has initiated community groups to 
organize themselves and have regular meetings to intertwine their potentials. The division 
of consumer protection also provides a direct service to those who have issues with 
producers by offering them legal consultation and mediating consumer-producer disputes. 
The division of advocacy mainly works with decision makers to establish pro-consumers 
policy either through dialogue or by mobilizing society members to express their interests 
publicly. 
Those divisions are within a program department under the supervision of executive 
boards. The executive board members include an executive director, treasurer and finance 
secretary, and a head of each aforementioned division. The executive board has collegial 
relations with each other and is under the supervision of board members, who consist of 
those who founded the organizations and are perceived as seniors in the field. 
 Literature review 
Consumerism: a brief overview 
It is difficult to say accurately when consumerism was first used in the literature of 
consumer movements. It seems it was in use conversationally in 1965 or 1966, and then it 
first appeared in The Journal of Consumer Affairs in 1970 (Roger, 1994). Consumerism is not 
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a static concept and there is no single definition that can comprehensively explain it. The 
most common understanding of this term is the widening range of activities of government, 
business, and independent organizations that are designated to protect individuals from the 
negative actions of the other two entities that can potentially violate their rights as 
consumers (Day & Aaker, 1970 p. 13). Regardless of its various definitions and uses, Day and 
Aaker identified three forms representing the term: protection against clear-cut abuses, 
provision of adequate information, and the protection of consumers against themselves and 
other consumers. These major themes will evolve since its complexities in the field increase.  
Buskirk and Rother (1970) defined consumerism as the organized efforts of 
consumers seeking redress, restitution and remedy for dissatisfaction they have 
accumulated in the acquisition of their standard of living.  Its movement is catalyzed by 
several factors: a) increased leisure time, rising incomes, higher educational levels, and 
general affluence of individuals; b) inflation that made purchase behavior more difficult; c) 
unemployment; d) demands for product improvement; e) increase of political will in 
business policy (Buskirk and Rother, 1970 p. 62-63). 
Herrmann (1970 p. 57) identified a typology of groups who make up the consumer 
movement: a) the adaptationists who emphasize the importance of consumer education to 
protect themselves from fraud and deception. Empowering consumers to be more 
intelligent with the market has a larger portion in their organization missions than seeking 
new customers’ protection legislations; b) the protectionists that are mainly concerned with 
individuals’ physical health and safety issues. Scientists, physicians, nutritionists, and other 
professionals fall in this category; and c) the reformers that have the same focus as the 
adaptationists but also like to increase consumers’ voices with policy makers and business 
entities. 
In the U.S., the consumerism movement was not only affected by social phenomena 
and political factors; it was also influenced by rapid urban population increase. During the 
1970s-1980s, the general causes of consumerism were mainly themed around social and 
economic issues resulting in various outcomes such as consumer boycotts, an increase in 
fragmented consumerism, consumerism as part of the general dissatisfaction with society 
and capitalism, and consumerism as social movements (Carlson and Kangun, 1988). 
To highlight consumerism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Hilton (2007 p. 134) 
proposed two perspectives. First, it has to do with the Americanization or westernization of 
global campaigning within civil society by pointing out the liberal rights-based philosophy 
during President Kennedy’s administration. Second, consumerism in the developing world is 
associated with post colonialism focusing on the question of poverty and basic needs 
provision. Mayer (cited in Darley and Johnson, 1993 p. 38) mentioned consumerism in 
developing countries is different from well-developed countries in terms of the indigenous 
characteristics of markets and consumers and external factors influencing the development 
of consumerism such as product exports, consumption standards, aspirations and 
conceptions of consumer policy. 
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Managing nonprofit organizations 
In order to deliver the program, every organization needs a reliable management. 
Ideological foundations that often become a spirit of an NGO to assert the public interest 
are important in order to stay in touch with the organizational visions, and along with it 
outstanding managerial structures are crucial to the organizational mission. Those elements 
are necessary to keep the organizations accountable from stakeholders’ point of views. This 
section touches on aspects of management to deliver services in general nonprofit 
organizations, such as activities management and managing external and internal 
environments. 
Najam has suggested four categories of roles that NGOs can carry on: service 
delivery, advocacy, innovation and monitoring, and policy entrepreneurs. Within this model, 
NGOs may take a role to stream policies as service providers, advocates, innovators, and 
monitors (Lewis, 2001 p. 109). There is also the possibility to combine all those roles to gain 
success as shown in Dawson’s study of NGOs in Peru (p. 138). 
The NGO is one of the actors in the development field. It means an NGO needs to 
build its networks with other parties to foster partnerships in harnessing the accessible 
benefits of development for everyone. De Graaf provides a framework to examine NGO’s 
circle based on its relationship with the related environment. His framework has three 
layers: a) controlled, which covers any aspects that NGOs can manage by themselves such as 
budgeting, staffing, planning and so forth; b) influenced which explains NGOs ability in 
persuasion, lobbying, patronage, co-option and collaboration; and, c) appreciated, in which 
NGOs should establish priorities according to international contexts, or to draw a big picture 
of global issues (p.141). 
Lewis (2001) highlights the importance of managing relationships and partnerships 
with communities, government, business sectors, and international development agencies 
(2001, p. 146-160). These entities can work together to create “megacommunities” to tackle 
global challenges (Gerenser, Kelly, Napolitano and Lee, 2008). However, the environment of 
this sector is characterized by goal ambiguity, conflicting performance standards, value 
differences, polycentric authority structures and dialectical change strategies  (McGill and 
Wooten, 1975 p. 455); thus, NGOs should respond to this situation appropriately address 
respective issues caused by environmental changes. 
Lewis (2001) suggested three managerial issues that apply to most nonprofit sectors 
such as leadership, governance, and volunteerism (p.187), and Ronalds (2010) elaborates 
external challenges faced by NGOs. Mostly he examines the shifting focus of developmental 
issues such as human rights, climate change, natural disaster, poverty, agriculture, 
international migration, and global economic recession. Along with it, he also emphasizes 
those issues which affect human rights mainstreaming on every line of developmental 
strategies causing the politicization of international aid. The later situation should be 
managed carefully by an NGO in order to assist and protect the most vulnerable sides in 
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developmental activities. Ronalds suggests NGOs improve stakeholder accountability, 
demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency, increase harmonization and coordination, and are 
able to respond to great expectations from stakeholders by building capacity, deepening 
policy skills, and seeking media exposure. 
Ronalds also interrelates internal challenges of NGOs such as the legitimacy 
challenge, the human resources challenge, the leverage challenge (advocacy, partnering, 
and harnessing market), the technical challenge in conducting social analysis, the learning 
challenge in order to adapt to rapid shifting in the information age, and the fundraising 
challenge. Due to those identified challenges, Ronalds encourages INGOs to effectively 
modify their managerial system. Failing to reform, may cause the de-legitimacy of an NGO’s 
work. 
Data and method 
Data was collected through 9 open-ended interview questions addressing participants’ 
experience during their involvement in promoting consumerism with YCI. The participants 
range from board members, the executive director, the head of the education division as a 
representative of the executive board, and volunteers. The qualitative data gained from this 
procedure were analyzed using the interpretative method to synthesize participants’ 
responses.  
Findings and discussion 
The power of solidarity and networks 
YCI has been involved with consumerism issues for 30 years. During that time their works 
mainly related to advocating consumer rights e.g. consumers’ rights to have proper public 
transportation, healthy food, and so forth. In the early 2000s, the organization started 
paying more attention to delivering consumer education through training, media, and 
forming community groups. Both activities have similar long-term outcomes to create 
critical consumers who are aware of their rights and obligations in the midst of unequal 
relations between producers and consumers. However, they have a special mission in the 
execution process of its organizational missions as mentioned by one of the founders, “our 
main programs are associated with consumer education and advocacy. Education has 
mission to get consumers understand and aware that they are being treated unjustly caused 
by unbalance system in the society. The other activity provides consumers a place to report 
occurring issues that appear during their relations with producers.” To return to the 
typology of consumerism groups suggested by Herrmann (1970 p. 57), according to its 
activities, YCI falls into the reformers category since YCI displays an element to apply 
consumer education activities as a strategy to protect consumers from fraud and deception, 
but also focuses on increasing consumers’ voices with policy makers and business entities. 
In their service delivery, YCI identifies several supporting and constraining factors. 
The positive factors are maintained and the others are suppressed with respective 
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responses; however, in the managerial level, there is a different perception. The executive 
director perceives that the constraining factors can be responded to through building and 
maintaining the existing networks that YCI strongly has. The head of the education division 
sees that the organization is going too far in approaching the unfavorable factors. 
These differences can be explained from a managerial level perspective in which the 
first party primarily deals with issues in the macro level, whereas the later has to face the 
real situation in the field. Managers perform three categories roles: a) the interpersonal 
roles that pictures managers as figureheads, external liaison agents, and leaders; b) the 
information processing roles that describe managers as a center of information in the 
organization’s system; and c) decision-making roles that grants power to managers to 
determine allocations of organizational resources (Mintzberg, 1971). 
In this context, the head of education perceives the issues from a practical-solution 
approach, whereas the executive director seems to see the cases from a broader point of 
view. Regardless of this slight difference, in terms of leadership aspects, both are able to 
collaborate based on solidarity as an organization’s raison d’être:  
“As one of the founders, myself and colleagues have a similar concerns to 
consumers, including ourselves, that have been treated unjustly. That motivated us 
to initiate a “group” to defend consumer justice that later we consciously called 
ourselves as consumer rights defenders.” 
Solidarity is a major strength that exists within organizations supporting the organization’s 
wellbeing. This common wisdom contributes to organizational success in difficult times. 
According to the head of education division, there was a moment when the organization 
had insufficient budget to fund World Consumer Day celebrations in 2009: “It was the first 
attempt to celebrate the day, and then it becomes an annual event, therefore it was a very 
important stage for us. Amazingly, although it was tough, through networks that we have 
the situation was resolved. Our volunteers’ solidarity and persistence strongly helped.” 
Lindenberg, Fetchenhauer, Flache, and Buunk (2006) refer to solidarity as the 
willingness of society’s members to help those in need, to contribute to a common good, to 
show themselves worthy of trust, and to be fair and considerate (p. 3). According to their 
frameworks, behavior is affected by a person’s personality, skills, and learning history, and 
situational contexts such as social, institutional, and cultural. These factors influence an 
individual’s definition of the situation through framing and a mental image of the 
relationship explaining why people behave with solidarity. The behavior includes five key 
elements: a) cooperation referring to a common good situation; b) fairness referring to a 
sharing situations; c) altruism referring to a need situation; d) trustworthiness referring to 
avoid violation of implicit and explicit agreements or promises, and e) consideration 
referring to abstaining from offense and making up when things go wrong (p.9). See 
Habermas (2013), Ryan (2013) and Soffer (2013) for more discussions.  
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Emphasizing networks, the executive director mentioned that YCI invests effort to 
implement collaborative programs with government, university, and other NGOs. 
“At the late 90-s when I started joining in YCI, civil society networks programs were 
warm post-Soeharto’s fall down105 YCI and other NGOs intensively involved in 
Yogyakarta Self-reliant organization forum (Forum LSM) to fight for civil society 
strengthening through capacity building activities and policy advocacy. In 2001, YCI 
directly involved in the formation process of Consumer Dispute Resolution Body in 
Yogyakarta as mandated by Consumer Protection Law. This was a pilot project of 8 
cities in the country to initiate the body. YCI was part of the selection team to 
establish selection instruments to recruit candidates for the body. This role was 
maintained until next two periods after.” 
The urgency of networks and partnership were highlighted by Lewis (2001, p. 146-160) as 
part of elements to manage a relationship with communities, government, business sector, 
and international development agencies. These entities can work together to create 
“megacommunities” to tackle global challenges (Gerenser, Kelly, Napolitano and Lee, 2008). 
This is also in line with what Frederickson (1997, p. 84) pointed out in order to efficiently 
achieve its mission an organization and administrators need to exercise their ability to build 
networks with other entities in their work’s complexity. Establishing networks with 
governance enables organization to link and engage in delivering public activities. 
Several Issues: volunteer management, finance, and consumers’ ignorance 
Despite its supporting factors, YCI faces the constraining internal and external factors 
hampering the organization. Those factors are volunteer management, financial issues, and 
consumers’ ignorance. 
As nonprofit entities, YCI is heavily run by volunteers. However, volunteers 
themselves also have their own daily issues to resolve. As stated by the head of the 
education division,  
“As a voluntary organization, creating a condition in which every job is delivered 
professionally and time allocation is still hard. It happens because the volunteers 
have responsibilities and jobs in other places outsides YCI.  To some extent, it 
becomes a particular barrier in program implementations”. 
The advantages and disadvantages of volunteers are addressed by Grobman (2008 p. 135-
140). He also provides practical ways to recruit, orient, and reward volunteers. Pynes (2009, 
p. 115-143) suggested developing human resources management policies and procedures to 
integrate volunteers into the everyday activities of the agency. It can be started by 
                                                          
105
 Soeharto was the second president of Republic of Indonesia that headed the country for 32 years. Although 
had been recognized for his achievement to make the country as “a tiger from Asia” in the mid 1980s and 
supported the non-bloc movement in the Cold War era, Soeharto’s administration (well-known as New Order 
to proceed the Old Order under Soekarno’s administration) exercised authoritarian government, corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism. Soeharto left office in May 2008 after civil society and democratization movement 
demands.     
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identifying volunteers’ motivations, time availability, expertise and interest. It is also 
effective to establish a volunteer database, and to train volunteers to carry out the 
organization’s missions. Evaluation also matters in volunteer management in order to 
increase performance, maintain volunteers, or reallocate them to other areas. Farr (cited in 
Pynes, p. 127-128) identified responsibilities that a program manager should do to manage 
volunteers: a) obtaining and maintaining support for the volunteer program, b) developing, 
monitoring, and evaluating the volunteer program budget, c) keeping key officials informed 
about the scope of volunteer services, d) establishing and monitoring program goals, e) 
assigning volunteer responsibilities and monitoring results, f) assigning volunteer 
responsibilities and monitoring results, g) recommending policy changes or action steps to 
top management to maintain, improve, or expand the volunteer effort. 
The financial issue is a classic issue that most organization faces. Although YCI can 
still survive due to its powerful volunteers and networks, the organization needs to work on 
the budgetary side:  
“In terms of human and financial resources, YCI is far from to be called strong. YCI 
has no major funding sources from anywhere, and therefore, volunteer 
contributions are expected to support the organization.”   
Aligned with the situation, a volunteer mentioned that YCI has less flexibility to earn money 
from donors that are perceived as neoliberal and/or capitalist agents. Dove (2001) gave a 
practical guidance on how to conduct fundraising program from potential donors, regardless 
of their ideological basis. According to Dove, establishing a fundraising management 
through campaigns, grant-writing, private donations can attract significant funds. He also 
identifies the role of leadership in organizations that might affect the fundraising program’s 
success, e.g. setting goals, encouraging the staff, formulating plans, for example. 
A more macro constraining factor identified by executive directors constraining 
consumerism is consumers’ ignorance. For example, when YCI encourages consumers to 
boycott a certain product, they are inclined not to respond to it since they still perceive it as 
an individual’s problem. The majority of consumers have not been aware if they can build 
solidarity with others, then an extraordinary power can emerge:  
“When we advocate for a victim of a train accident from various consumer 
backgrounds, at the end the consumers “step back” one by one when we suggested 
them to fight for their right in the court. We hadn’t been there yet, but they already 
“gave up” over the situation, and again, it was caused by individual reasons.” 
In general, YCI’s consumer activists believe that consumerism in Indonesia still needs to be 
improved. Although the Consumer Dispute Resolution Law has been established, the law 
has not brought significant changes in the years since it was enacted. Regardless of the 
weaknesses of the law and weak law enforcement in the country, consumers’ participation 
in decision-making is still far from being optimal. On the other side, business interests in 
Indonesia still places economic growth as a primary option for policy maker, and 
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consequently, consumers’ interests tend to be neglected. The consumerism issue in 
Indonesia is buried under a deep sea of politics and economics issue that are consistently 
mainstreamed by mass media. The issue is like “a voice screaming in a desert”; a few people 
hear it but they are reluctant to either respond or actively join in. 
Conclusion and recommendations  
This research demonstrates that the main activities of YCI are advocacy and education to 
mainstream consumerism in Indonesia. The first activity provides consumers with a place to 
report their problems and defend consumers’ rights in dispute and resolution processes. 
The later has a specific goal to induce awareness and critical thinking to consumers based on 
solidarity as its core values. The existing volunteer solidarity and well-established networks 
are factors strengthening YCI as a self-reliant organization to mainstream consumerism in 
the region and country in general. 
YCI is still struggling with several factors such as volunteer management, finance, 
and consumers’ ignorance. The first has to do with “moonlighting” volunteers that become 
particular constraint in the program implementation. The second appears since the 
organization has no major funding due to a strict ideological policy not to seek or earn 
money from external parties. The last factor associates the general situation of consumer 
awareness in the country that is still low and lacks solidarity. 
The general belief of YCI’s consumerism activists is that consumerism is still an 
unpopular issue in the country. Although the law has been enacted for more than a decade, 
it has not brought significant changes due to the embedded weaknesses, low law 
enforcement in general, political will, and mass media. 
Considering those issues, the following idiosyncratic recommendations are offered. 
First, it is important to maintain the established networks, and further assessment related 
to this governance is required. Several questions to address the evaluation are as follows: 
How do the networks benefit YCI to achieve its goals? Does the partnership have a long-
term impact? How is the governance process managed?  
Second, YCI has a powerful voluntary solidarity and it needs to be sustained by 
establishing human resources management. This does not necessarily mean creating a new 
division if efficiency is an issue, but putting a person in charge to manage volunteers in 
terms of recruitment, training, evaluation, and recognition process can be an alternative. 
Third, financial issues within YCI might be addressed by maximizing the role of board 
directors. Those who are sitting as supervisors of the executive board hypothetically were 
recruited to bring financial and nonfinancial support to the organization. Further dialogue 
between two levels is necessary to set fundraising goals and strategies to achieve them. 
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Abstract 
This paper aims at promoting prospective Intellectual Property (IP) securitization as a 
feasible mode of financing creative industries demanding instant capital to operate, 
develop products and promote market expansion. The proposed approach is dedicated to 
accelerate new financial sources of support to strengthen and develop creativity and 
productivity in the creative industries. The current paper introduces a new legal 
institution which is not regulated yet under Indonesia’s positive laws. It shows how 
creative companies might use the institution to gain direct and indirect benefits. It is 
acknowledged that this proposal may spark challenges at the doctrinal, normative and 
practical levels. At the doctrinal level, the potential for challenge refers to the 
philosophical issue related to exclusive rights doctrine. At the normative level, the 
challenges are caused by the absence of regulation concerning IP securitization in 
Indonesia influencing the validity and viability of IP securitization transactions. At the 
practical level, this proposal may not guarantee the certainty of IP valuation as a unique 
asset involving complex procedures, interdisciplinary laws, profesionals and so forth. In 
order to overcome the doctrinal challenge, this paper offers relevant principles which 
may function to balance the acceleration of IP securitization as a new financing 
mechanism for creativity and prevent unrestricted exploitation of IP exclusive rights. For 
addressing any normative and practical challenges, this work promotes the need for 
government involvement in developing and promoting IP securitization by providing 
economic and legal frameworks, started by enactment of IP securitization regulation and 
the establishment of infrastructures for IP securitization.   
Key words: Intellectual Property, Securitization, Creative Industry Financing 
Introduction 
Intellectual Property (IP) assets can be monetized because IP offers a variety of financing 
and economic opportunities to the owners. IP can be sold, licensed, used for collateral or 
transformed into securities.  Like other valuable assets, IP can be recognized as financial 
assets because IP owners can achieve future cash flow streams.  As a cash flow generating 
asset, it is possible to set up tools and financial instruments for IPs via securitization. 
Securitization has become a popular technique to raise capital and to obtain liquidity in 
exchange for the transfer of certain assets.  
            While asset securitization itself is not new, IP securitization has become a 
revolutionary mechanism in commercializing IP after the structuring of David Bowie’s music 
catalogue into saleable bonds in 1997. The success of the Bowie Bond shows that IP owners 
may obtain financial reward alternatives from IP securitization. In theory, securitizing IP is 
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no different than securitizing any other asset; whereas, on a practical level, securitizing IP 
presents a number of challenges and problems.    
             This paper explores the prospect of Intellectual Property (IP) securitization as a 
feasible financing method for the creative industries in Indonesia. It introduces the prospect 
of IP assets as a new vehicle for raising liquidity and financing creative industries in order to 
strengthen and develop creativity and productivity. It also describes how creative industries 
in Indonesia could use IP securitization to gain direct and indirect benefit by showing the 
cost and advantages ssociated with IP securitization.   
            Since IP securitization is a new legal institution in Indonesia, its application may spark 
problems at the doctrinal, normative, and practical levels. At the doctrinal level, the 
problem refers to the philosophical issues related to exclusive rights doctrine. At the 
normative level, the absence of Indonesian regulation concerning IP securitization may a 
fundamental problem drawing into questioning and casting doubt on the validity and 
viability of IP securitization. At a practical level, challenges arise from the uncertainty of IP 
valuation as a unique asset: the complex procedures, interdisciplinary laws and profesionals 
involved and so forth. In addition, while IP securitization has been growing rapidly in the 
United States after the successful securitization of the ‘Bowie Bond’, it has not taken off on 
a cross border basis because of the diversity of laws and practices.   
              This work offers relevant principles which may function to balance the acceleration 
of IP securitization as a new financing mechanism for creative industries and prevent 
unrestricted exploitation of IP exclusive right, in order to overcome doctrinal challenges. 
Furthermore, the paper proposes that government involvement in developing and 
promoting IP securitization by providing the economic and legal frameworks is needed to 
overcome the normative and practical challenges. The enactment of IP securitization 
measures and the establishment practical frameworks and infrastructures for the IP 
securitization transaction will be the first step.   
Basic concept of IP securitization 
IP securitization definition    
There are several different definitions of securitization. Nevertheless, all refer to the process 
of pooling assets in order to sell them as securities (Fairfax, 1999). According to Thomas 
Fitch (2000, p. 25), securitization is "the conversion of assets into marketable securities for 
sale to investors". Similarly, John M. Gabala (2004) defines securitization as the conversion 
of illiquid assets into marketable securities to investors to provide immediate access to cash. 
The Indonesia Capital Market Supervisory Agency/BAPEPAM-LK (2003, p. 9) provides a 
similar definition of securitization as a process of transferring illiquid assets into tradable 
securities in accordance with the needs of investors. According to Bryan Garner, 
securitization is a process whereby the right to receive certain future payments is united 
and then sold in the form of securities (Garner, 2009, p. 1475). Securitization is essentially a 
process of creating financial instruments that can be marketed to investors based on 
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underlying assets or financial obligations (Nikolic, 2009, p. 398). The process of issuing 
securities backed by assets in structured financing is sometimes called “securitization” 
because assets are turned into securities: they are monetized, not through traditional 
secured borrowing or factoring, but through the issuance of asset backed securities (Sylva, 
1999, p.198).  
           IP securitization is defined as "a financing technique whereby a company transfers 
rights in receivables (e.g. royalties) from IP holders to an entity, which in turn issues 
securities to capital market investors and passes the proceeds back to the owner of the IP" 
(Pandey, 2006, p.2). According to Medansky & Dalinka (2005), IP securitization can also be 
defined as a financial technique allowing IP owners to obtain lump sums of cash ‘up front’ 
from IP receivables, predictable cash flow or royalties. Based on these definitions, it can be 
concluded that IP securitization is a device of structured financing where IP assets or rights 
to receive future payments originating in/from IP are converted into marketable securities.  
IP securitization moments 
At the beginning of the 1970s, securitization started in the United States when the 
Government National Mortgage (GNME - Ginie Mae) issued pass through-mortgage backed 
securities (Culver, 2008).  In Indonesia, the term securitization was recognized at the 
beginning of 1997. In 2003, there was a formal regulation of the asset backed securities i.e. 
BAPEPAM LK Regulation No. IX.K.1 regarding “Guidelines for Collective Investment Contract 
of Asset Backed Securities”, Regulation No. Kep-28/PM/2003. This Regulation was then 
amended by BAPEPAM LK Regulation No. KEP-493/BL/2008  in 2008. 
           Conventionally, securitization is backed by traditional assets, such as a mortgage, 
credit card and auto loan receivables, equipment lease, franchise or service fees (Glasner, 
2008, p.27).  All of these assets are similar in nature because they represent  payment 
obligation, in the form of receivables or other financial obligations (Glasner, 2008, p.29). 
More recently, companies have been able to securitize all assets including IP rights because 
IP is considered a valuable asset. As a valuable asset, IP demonstrating a royalty revenue 
stream can be transformed into securities traded to investors. IP securitization most 
commonly involves copyright, trademark and patent assets.  Copyright asset is given to the 
original works and gives the exclusive right to copy, distribute copies, make derivative works 
and take other defined actions with respect to that expression (Nimmer, 2001, p. 294). 
Trademark protects the trademark holder's right to use a mark to designate origin and signal 
quality on products traded through commerce (Nimmer, 2001, p.294). Patent protection 
provides the owner a monopoly of an invention for a limited term if the invention is non-
obvious, novel and useful (Chu, 1999).            
              The important momentum for IP securitization started in February 1997 when David 
Bowie, through David Pullman, introduced a new form of securitization by converting his 
future royalties to be received from certain record sales into securities and sold those 
securities in a private offering for $55 million (Fairfax, 1999, p.442). The form of the David 
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Bowie securities was a bond (called a Bowie Bond) offering a 7.9% interest rate with a 10-
year average life and a 15-year maturity (Sylva, 1997). The bonds were backed by royalties 
on a 25 album catalogue consisting of about 300 songs of Bowie's recordings and song 
copyrights (Roberts, 1997, p.23). The "Bowie Bond" was the first IP backed securities and 
the first product of IP securitization (the first music royalties future receivables 
securitization). The securitization of song royalties by David Bowie begun a new trend that 
could extend not only to other musicians, but other types of copyrighted works (films, 
books, etc) or other IP assets (patents, trademarks, for example). 
             After the Bowie Bond success, several musicians structured song royalties 
ecuritization such as James Brown, The Isley Brothers, Iron Maiden and Rod Stewart (Morris, 
2009). Other copyright works (films) were also securitized, for instance, Bear, Stearns & Co., 
Inc. securitized 10 films’ future revenues made by Dreamworks - a production company 
owned by Steven Spielberg (Euromoney, 1998). Merrill Lynch structured a securitization 
involving revenues of films library owned by the Italian film company Cecchi Gori (Serwer, 
1998). While film securitization by New Line Cinema was completed in 1998; in 2003, 
Vivendi Universal films securitized film royalties (Morris, 2009). PolyGram, a Dutch 
entertainment company generated a US $ 650 million bond issue backed by cash flow from 
films produced over the next three years (Davies, 1998). 
            Although IP securitization was dominated by copyright assets such as films or music, 
the other types of IPs such as trademarks and patents were also securitized. Trademarks 
securitization such as Triac, Guess, BillBlass, Dunkin and drug patent royalties by BioPharma 
Royalty Trust and Royalty Pharma Finance Trust were examples of IP securitization following 
the David Bowie securitization transaction (Morris, 2009).  
IP securitization processes 
The process of IP securitization involves six basic structures. First, a company or individuals, 
known as the "Originator," must have a pool of quality rights to receive future payments, 
receivables or income producing assets derived from IP assets (Culver, 1994). The Originator 
is the entity that originates or generated the receivables that are backed by finance raised 
(Deacon, 2004, p.575).   
               Second,  the originator valuates  and  pools  receivables or  income producing assets 
(Benneth, 2006, p.402).Third, the originator transfers these assets to Special Purpose 
Vehicle (THE SPV) which is an independent standing entity, specifically created for 
securitization transactions and protected from any bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings of 
the Originator  (Klee & Butler, 2002).  
              Fourth, the SPV issues securities to investors which are backed by the assets 
transferred. The SPV generally issues securities in the form of debt or equity instruments. 
The type of securities depends on whether the SPV will be structured as a pay-through or 
pass-through vehicle. The SPV issuing equity securities is a "pass-through vehicle which 
spread over payments proportionally to the security holders based on the receivables' cash 
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flow and their ownership share (Fairfax, 1999, p. 448).  On the other hand, a pay-though 
vehicle issues debt instruments and allows security holders to receive fixed payments 
(principal and interest) that are secured by the receivables based on anticipated cash flow 
(Fairfax, 1999, p. 448). 
               Fifth, the proceeds from the sale of securities are used to pay the Originator for the 
transferred assets. Finally, the payments to the investor purchasing the securities issued by 
the SPV are paid out of the cash flow generated by the receivables (Shaw, 1990, p. 251).     
Benefits of IP securitization   
 A new funding source is desirable in the vast IP market dominated by record masters, 
publishing, television, film libraries, high tech and biotech licenses and where production or 
research costs are high (Haber, 1997).  Creative industries, similar to other businesses, need 
ready capital not only to operate, research and develop the products, but also to expand 
their market. Creative industries, for instance film companies or music studios, have a 
difficult time making money on their products instantly. IP securitization seems an 
appropriate method for funding or financing creativity and productivity in creative 
industries.Through IP securitization, creative companies can tap into their future cash flows 
and keep up with the marketplace. IP securitization offering ready capital also benefits film 
and music studios that need large amounts of money for movies and music productions and 
promotions. 
             Accordingly, IP securitization may increase liquidity while diversifying funding 
options by enabling creative industries to access future income immediately (Scott, 
2003).The ability of IP securitization to increase liquidity renders securitization termed 
"alchemy" because it creates valuable things from what has not existed before, especially in 
its ability to transform illiquid assets into liquid assets or cash (Fraga, 2005). IP securitization 
has become a popular technique to obtain liquidity in exchange for the transfer of certain 
assets (Fraga, 2005, p.5) and to increase liquidity by providing immediate access to cash 
(Gabala, 2004). More specificaly, IP securitization essentially also replaces the rights to 
future receivables (royalties) with presently available cash, while Lois R. Lupica (1998) 
argued that process of securitization transforms assets into an instant cash payment future.          
              Since IP securitization is an essential mechanism for corporations to access ready 
capital by borrowing against future income streams, it has essential advantages as it allows 
the company or individual to raise money at a lower cost than conventional financing 
techniques. IP securitization diversifies financing option to companies unable to access bank 
and the capital markets. IP securitization seems an attractive financing mechanism for IP 
owners or creative industries when searching for liquidity because of the great possibility of 
those parties to access ‘instant’ money for their operation and development activities. IP 
Securitization is particularly beneficial to creative companies wishing to accumulate 
"generalized purchasing power" or engage in long-term investments (Lupica, 1998). 
Proceeds from IP securitization transactions can be utilized by the IP owners to support new 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e1
1
5
 
start ups, expansion, manufacturing or product development, introduction and promotion 
of new products to the market or to improve their financial performance and investment. 
              The concept of IP securitization resolves the difficult options of raising a large 
amount of money, while still retaining ownership in the underlying IP asset. Traditionally, in 
the world before securitization, creative industries as Originators had two options: borrow 
money by using their assets as collateral for a secured loan or to sell assets (Janger, 2005, 
p.303). Whereas, in the era of securitization, the companies/Originators can raise money 
without selling their property since in IP securitization, the financer purchases mostly the 
right to the receivables or royalties income but not the underlying IP itself.  
              IP securitization is also beneficial for society since it offers an alternative investment 
to investors and provides opportunities to society for obtaining income distribution.The 
instruments of investment issued by IP securitization will offer safer and stable income. 
Since IP securitization products are asset backed securities/bonds, they are generally more 
stable than corporate bonds, and are not as vulnerable to possible future negative ratings of 
the Originator. In addition, securitization is attractive for investors because the 
securitization products represent a fixed income investment and a constant rate of return. 
IP securitization also allows investors to design their investment based on their risk 
preferences. Investors can compare the risks of securities and identify securitizations with 
the credit risk they are looking for and invest accordingly (Mclean, 2008, p. 564). Moreover, 
IP securitization also allows society to become involved in funding creativity and 
productivity. By purchasing IP backed securities, investors/society provide ‘instant’ cash for 
creative and productive companies to develop and create new IP products. 
              Other benefits of IP Securitization techniques are new possibilities for unlocking the 
wealth contained in intellectual property (Chu, 1998-1999, p. 471). If IP securitization 
financing can be successfully applied to creative industries and other IP based companies, 
many more creative and productive activities can be undertaken and utilized by IPs to 
develop wealth.    
The cost of IP securitization 
Although a certain IP asset is securitizable, it does not mean that IP securitization runs well. 
Structuring IP securitization should consider costs and benefits. An estimate of costs is 
needed to structure a securitization transaction such as fees for professionals in law, 
accountancy, tax and financial affairs, an amount that would be expected to be large. IP 
securitization involves more technical expertise than traditional asset securitization and 
requires more due diligence, affecting the expense and complexity of the overall process. 
Therefore, the standard of assets to be securitized must indicate the break even point in 
order to avoid the risks of acquiring benefits from securitization (Kumar, 2006, p. 98). This 
standard is sufficient to cover the cost to be paid for setting up a complicated scheme of IP 
securitization. 
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The challenges of applying IP securitization in Indonesia 
At the doctrinal level 
There will be a conflicting interest in applying IP securitization because of the doctrinal 
problem of exclusive rights. IP laws promote and protect two conflicting interests: 1) the 
stimulation of creativity and productivity; and 2) the exclusive right of creators or inventors 
to exclude others from using the products of such creative efforts (Chu, 1998-1999). The 
principle of exclusive right is principally aimed at protecting the interest of the individual 
(creator/inventor) who actualizes his/her existence and potential (Haq, 2008). For instance, 
copyright protects original works and provides the author the exclusive right to exclude 
others from using, copying, or compiling the work. The trademark right prevents others 
from using any distinctive images, mark or terms that identify the products or service of a 
company in order to protect against consumer confusion or dilution of the mark (Frymark, 
Julie C., 2003, p.172). Patents based on novel, non-obvious and useful standards provide for 
the right to prevent anyone else from making, using, selling or offering to sell the patented 
inventions.   
            The exclusive right of IP is aimed principally at protecting individual interests and 
seems incompatible with Indonesian values focusing on communal interest (Agus Sardjono, 
2007). The communal nature of society makes it difficult for its members to accept an IPR 
concept that emphasizes individual rights (Agus Sardjono, 2007, p.160). Since IP 
securitization strengthens the exclusive and monopoly rights of individual IP owners to 
monetize and commercialize their IP assets, it is difficult to meet communal interests to 
achieve social welfare. Although the exclusive right is the central concept to protect 
intellectual products and plays an important role in improving industry and trade 
development toward economic progress, unfortunately, the exclusive right has been 
manipulated by a few large corporations which have exploited exclusive rights as the main 
instrument to accumulate and maximize the interest and profit  for IP capitalism (Haq, 
2008). The over exploitation of exclusive rights results in misappropriation -manipulation 
and encourages self interest (Drahos, 1996, p. 119) and capitalism. The spirit of capitalism 
allows and strengthens the companies’ aggressiveness to surpass the social interest (Haq, 
2006, p.14).   
            Since several huge corporations control and dominate IP products and their 
derivatives in the global market (Haq, 2006), these corporations may be involved in 
misappropriations and IP exploitation in securitization schemes. If these corporations 
structure IP securitization in the interests of greed and inordinate self interest in a financial 
system such as Indonesia’s, the beneficial and efficient form of securitization will be 
changed as commentator has described as “a serpent-like grip” on the real economy 
(www.sodahead.com/48493/securitization-as-satan). Consequently, IP securitization 
becomes an ‘evil’ interfering with the flow of money and ultimately can disrupt the financial 
system. Extreme securitization will expose the root of financial crisis. According to Niall 
Ferguson (2008), the global financial crisis in 2007 was relative to the rise and fall of 
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securitized lending which allowed banks to originate loans but then repackage and sell 
them. 
At the normative level 
 Indonesia has not regulated IP securitization in any specific sue generis system or integrated 
it into capital markets, or regulation under corporate or financial IP laws. Even for general 
asset securitization, the regulation is insufficient. Due to the lack of securitization regulation 
by specific means,  some  Indonesian banks  (BII, Bank Bira, Citibank) and some companies 
(Astra Sedaya Finance, Bunas Finance Indonesia, and Surya Multidana) have proceeded with 
asset securitizations in Malaysia and Singapore (Manurung & Nasution, 2007).     
             The absence of regulation concerning IP securitization certainly sparks a fundamental 
problem for the application of IP securitization in Indonesia. Without specific regulation, the 
validation of IP securitization will be questioned. In addition, the uncertainty of the law may 
raise doubts about determining whether an IP securitization will be worthwhile. Moreover, 
without certain regulation, there is uncertainty whether the securitization of intellectual 
property rights is part of the securitization of assets or should be separated and treated 
differently from the asset securitization. Furthermore, uncertain rules over IP valuation, as 
well as uncertain laws in relation to IP pertaining to the ownership and perfection of a 
security interest can delay and risk the abandoning of IP securitization possibilities.  
             The existing regulations supporting securitization in Indonesia are very limited. 
Although Indonesia’s government has provided President Regulation No. 19 /2005 for  
“Financing Secondary Mortgages Facility”, this regulation is limited for securitization with 
the underlying asset of housing mortgages only. In the banking area, it can be noted that the 
Central Bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) has released a regulation of the “Prudential 
Principle in Asset Securitization for Banks”  (BI Regulation No. 7/4/PBI/2005), but it has also 
a limited scope which is applied for securitization structured by banks only. The current 
regulations on capital market law are also limited, since they are only related to the 
issuance or trading of asset backed securities as the products of the securitization process, 
not the securitization itself. 
              In addition, there is a conflicting norm between the bankruptcy remote principle as 
the main principle of IP securitization and Indonesia’s bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy 
remote principle is applied to the SPV specifically created to complete securitization. The 
insulation of the SPV from bankruptcy is an important pillar of a securitization scheme 
(Locke, 2008, p. 180). The use of the SPV is simply a disguised form of bankruptcy waivers 
(Klee & Butler, 2002). However, the Indonesian Bankruptcy Act (UU 37/2004) cannot apply 
the bankruptcy remote principle to the SPV because Article 2 (1) of UU 37/2004 stipulates 
that every debtor having two or more creditors and failing to pay at least one debt  which 
has matured and became payable, shall be declared bankrupt through a court decision, 
either at his own petition or at the request of one or more of his creditors. Under the 
Indonesian Bankruptcy Act, an SPV may not be protected from bankruptcy or insolvency 
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proceedings because an SPV can be a potential debtor due to the obligation of an SPV to 
pay the securities holder’s investment revenue and other financial obligations.   
At the practical level 
The critical aspects of IP securitization are the valuation and calculation of IP assets. 
Calculation and valuation are necessary to determine the feasibility of securitization and to 
predict future cash flow (Rosenberg & Weiss, 2003). However, at the practical level, IP asset 
valuation uncertainty is the main practical challenge to structuring IP securitization. IP 
securitization presents significant difficulties due to valuation issues regarding the intangible 
nature of IP assets (Lev, 2001). As an intangible asset, the real value of an IP asset cannot be 
measured accurately. Generally, the real value of particular IP assets cannot be measured 
accurately because of the nature of IP assets as intangible. Therefore, future cash flows, 
receivables or royalties with elements that can be analyzed quantitatively are usually 
considered as suitable for the underlying asset of IP securitization because they can be 
easily measured. Future cash flow generates assets, receivables or royalties all of which are 
a better form to be chosen for IP securitization because they demonstrate that the firm has 
buyers and they are more liquid since they are one step closer to cash (Kirsch, 2007, p.10).  
 Any IP asset with a cash flow such as receivables or royalties can be securitized 
because the most important characteristic of the cash flow is predictability (Gabala, 2004, 
p.331). However, the predictability of IP cash flow or royalties seems uncertain in the era of 
massive infringement of IP rights. In the digital era, copyright securitization presents 
uncertainty in royalty collection in the illegal peer-to-peer (“P2P”) music file-sharing and 
illegal downloading sphere, for example. High speed internet technology also contributes to 
fast-massive infringement which can reduce royalty streams of copyright works. Illegal P2P 
file sharing and downloading music reduces sales, and harms the market for copyrighted 
music by reducing sales, depriving copyright owners of royalties (Gabala, 2004, p.323).   
 The IP infringement precisely affects to the unprectability of IP or royalty cash flow. 
Any unpredictability of royalty income due to such infringements may diminish the 
attractiveness of the future royalty/cash flow/receivables-based securitization. Therefore, it 
is difficult to securitize IP assets in Indonesia; since in Indonesia, infringements of IP by 
illegal downloading or digital file sharing or counterfeiting still occur at an alarming rate. 
Based on the number of IP infringements, the United States Trade Representative continues 
to include Indonesia with 12 other countries on a priority watch list indicating by country 
the highest ranked rate of copyright infringement. The International Data Corporation ranks 
Indonesia eleventh worst of software infringer countries with pirated software circulation 
running at a rate of 86 % (International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA, 2012, 51).  
  Awareness of IP values and the experience to practice IP securitization    are also 
practical problems in Indonesia. In the United States and other developed countries, 
companies are increasingly aware of their intangible assets, including IP. They have 
experienced a shift in the focus of a company’s value from tangible to intangible IP assets 
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and more frequently monetize IP through IP securitization. However, Indonesia has no 
regulation or experience to structure IP securitization. Most Indonesian creative industries 
remain dependent on tangible assets and conventional financing transactions. Not many 
creative industries know how to protect and comercialize their IP assets in IP securitization 
schemes. 
   Another practical challenge also arises since IP securitization involves many parties, 
complex interdisciplinary laws and economic infractructures. IP securitization is a very 
challenging area of study because it involves interdisciplinary study and laws including 
intellectual property, corporate law, capital market, corporate finance and other areas. 
According to Tamar Frankel (1991), securitization involves not only a part of a financial 
system, but the whole system, not one or a few branches of law, but most branches of the 
law. IP Securitization requires professionals and practitioners such as the SPV, servicers, 
rating agencies, credit enhancers, insurance companies, appraisers, capital market 
professions and the financial intermediaries. It does not simply need the traditional 
intermediaries, but the finance subsidiaries of operating companies and government 
intermediaries (Frankel, 1991).   
      Indonesia still faces the problem of effectively structuring IP securitization because 
of this complexity. Financial infrastructures, professionals, the fields of interdisciplinary law 
and research are not yet ready to support IP securitization in Indonesia. Indonesia has no 
professionals/practicioners mastering or experiencing the IP securitization process such as 
appraisers/rating agencyes for calculating IP assets, the SPV for transforming IP assets into 
securties,  insurance companies for backing securitization risks, and so forth. Significantly, 
the current legal and economic infrastructures do not also provide the frameworks, tools 
and mechanisms for supporting IP securitization such as foreclosure procedures, credit 
enhancement and credit ratings or markets for IP securitization products. 
Solutions for IP securitization challenges 
Creating appropriate models for IP securitization   
To address problems at the doctrinal level, it is necessary to formulate an appropriate 
model of IP securitization by analysing some relevant principles. These principles may 
function to balance the acceleration of IP securitization as a new, alternative form of 
financing for strengthening and developing creativity in creative industries so as to prevent 
unrestricted exploitation of the exclusive rights of IP in Indonesia. The principles analysed 
include legal certainty, justice/proportionality and utility.    
Principle of legal certainty 
  An appropriate model of IP securitization should reflect legal certainty. The legal certainty 
principle is crucial to resolve the normative problems caused by the absence of IP regulation 
in Indonesia. According to Gustav Radbruch (2000), legal certainty, along with justice and 
policy, is one of three fundamental pillars of the idea of law. The importance of legal 
certainty transcends that of its constituent rules and principles (Radbruch, 2000, p.661).  
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The legal certainty principle consists of the general rules enabling individuals to be 
aware of what actions should or should not be done (Marzuki, 2008). The general rules are 
necessary in social life as a guide for individuals to behave in social life and as a means of 
protection for accommodating the interests of society. In contemporary Indonesian society, 
the general rules are set up in the form of acts or regulations. The availability of regulation 
and the implementation of these rules will create legal certainty. Thus, the regulation of IP 
securitization is a necessity for the reason of legal certainty. IP regulation that consists of 
general rules is not only a useful guide for individuals or companies to securitize their assets, 
but also to accomodate all interests, those of the IP owners and the social interest. 
           Legal certainty also provides legal safety for individuals from governmental power 
abuses, because the general rules allow individuals to determine the government’s 
obligation and restricts the unprohibited action of states. James R. Maxeiner (2006) argued 
that legal certainty protects those subjects to the law from the arbitrary use of state power. 
By regulating IP securitization, individuals will be protected from the arbitrary use of 
government power such as a high rate of tax burden for securitization products or 
maladministration procedures. 
             By regulating IP securitization, legal certainty will be created. Legal certainty in IP 
securitization is important since legal certainty may ensure predictability (Maxeiner, 2006, 
p. 522). It is generally believed that legal rules provide the virtues of certainty and 
predictability, while legal standards afford flexibility, accommodate equitable solutions and 
allow for a more informed development of the law. Legal rules framed in clear and 
unambiguous language are essential for capitalism because they allow the certainty and 
predictability that capitalist systems require. The important of legal certainty for capitalism 
was famously articulated by Max Weber: “capitalistic enterprise ….. cannot do without legal 
security because such security was essential for the investment of capital” (Weber,  1978, p. 
833). Capitalists need a legal system that functions in a calculable way; calculability means 
an unambiguous and clear legal system. A clear and determinate set of legal rules provides 
certain delimitations of capitalist economic rights and duties.  
              Since IP securitization aims at raising instant capital, it can be interpreted as a form 
of capitalism. Thus, it needs certainty and predictability which can maximize economic 
efficiency. The predictability of IP securitization in raising capital may be assured by creating 
IP regulation to support legal certainty. Jan Michiel Otto (2003) noted that the legal 
certainty is reflected by the availability of a regulation which is clear, consistent, accessible 
and issued by or recognized by state power. According to Maxeiner (2007, p. 522),  legal 
certainty means that: "(1) laws and decisions must be made public, (2) laws and decisions 
must be definite and clear, (3 ) decisions of courts must be binding, (4) limitations on 
retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed; and (5) legitimate expectations must 
be protected”.   
               IP securitization is a legal process involving interdisciplinary law and many parties 
and highly regulated institutions. Thus, the regulation of such securitization cannot be 
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delayed. IP securitization regulation is necessary as the basis for the validity of the 
implementation of IP securitization in Indonesia. 
 Principle of justice and proportionality 
The principle of justice in the securitization of intellectual property rights relates to fair and 
just regulation of IP securitization. Fair regulation means that   every interest is protected in 
a balanced way; thus, everyone may earn as much as what is a part of the right. Since justice 
can be interpreted as balance or equality (Haq, 2008), IP securitization regulations should 
ensure a balance between rights and duties, between individuals (IP owners) and the social 
interest. 
    The concept of justice expressed by Ulpianus is continuous human will to keep giving 
everybody his/her own (Constans et Justitia est Perpetua voluntas is suum cuique tribuendi) 
(Marzuki, 2008, p.157). By referring to Aristotle’s famous proposition "justice consists in 
treating equals equally and unequal unequally, in proportion to their inequality" (Wacks, 
1995, p.178), justice cannot be interpreted as being that every person receives the same 
portion, but that what is received should be proportional. 
            Proportionality is interpreted as a distribution or exchanges of rights and obligations 
based on the values of equitability, freedom, the proportionality distribution, thereby 
attaching to the principles of accuracy and equity (Hernoko, 2010). The principle of 
proportionality emphasizes the fair and reasonable, not the mathematic-base notion of 
equality. The basic idea of proportionality is to balance conflicting interests (Hilf, 2001, p. 
121). This approach facilitates a proper relationship between competing considerations 
(Nygh & Butt, 1997, p. 941). According to Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig (2007, p. 372), 
proportionality is associated with the factors of "necessity and balancing", while George 
Bermann (1977, p. 415) noted that the principle of proportionality provides a guide to 
balance conflicting rights, interests, values or other purposes. 
     The proportionality principle can be applied to Indonesian IP securitization 
regulation by balancing IP owner interest and social interest. It may balance the doctrine of 
exclusive right providing strong opportunity for individuals (creators or inventors) to 
manifest  their will or interest and to stimulate the production and dissemination of 
creativity and productivity in science, knowledge and  creative  works under free market 
conditions (Haq, 2008, p.1). It means that promoting and accelerating creativity and 
productivity by structuring IP securitization must be dedicated to also achieving social 
interest goals without damaging individual IP interests. IP securitization regulation should 
ensure the personal rights to IP without ignoring public, national or social interest. The 
regulation should contain the concept of social function utilized so as to restrict IP from over 
exploitation via IP securitization. The social function of IP securitization can be realized by 
balancing the rights and duties of IP owners when structuring securitization. 
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The principle of utility 
The principle of utility reflects the spirit of capitalism, emphasizing "the greater benefit for 
the greatest number" principle as articulated by Jeremy Bentham. Accordingly, based on 
social justice, the appropriate model of IP securitization should take into consideration the 
greatest benefits for people. IP securitization should not only benefit the IP owner in 
commercializing or monetizing IP, but also create welfare for society. It is proven that IP 
securitization  provides  economic benefits to the IP owners because: 
a. Securitization increases liquidity by accessing instant cash immediately. 
b. IP owners raise ready capital without selling IP ownership rights, rather than to 
transfer the royalties, revenues, receivables or income producing assets to the SPV. 
(Glasner, 2008, p. 39)    
c. The IP securitization, including the sale of securities, is an irrevocable sale of 
securities (Hillery, 2004). 
d.        The economic value of IP may be longer and more valuable over time so that it may 
be reused or form the basis of another IP securitization after the maturity of first 
securitization (Katz, 2002). 
e.        IP Securitization may stimulate new innovations, creativities and productivity       
because IP assets can be commercially exploited in more profitable ways (Glasner, 
2008). 
Although IP securitization provides some benefit and advantages for IP owners, some 
argue that IP commercialization in securitization transactions appears to pay less attention 
to social welfare. However, John C. Edmunds (1996, p.118) argued that securitization will 
actually increase global welfare and it is a "new world welfare machine".  Securitization has 
become the most powerful engine of wealth creation in the contemporary world economy 
and creates massive wealth globally (Edmunds, 1996). According to Edmunds (1996, p.118), 
wealth may occur when a portion of income is dedicated not only for consumption but 
there is a portion for investment in housing, equipment and technology changes.  Welfare is 
created if the flow of money runs into a capital markets and securities traded on the stock 
market increases (Edmund, 1996).. Capital generated from capital market will be beneficial 
for companies, increase the value of financial assets, and provide income for professionals. 
The next result of the appropriation capital derived from capital market or securitization 
process will impact on the economic development because it may be used by companies to 
develop their products, expand their companies, build new factories or for many other 
productive activities.  
     Based on the argument that securitization has become the most powerful engine of 
wealth creation in today’s global economy and creates massive wealth worldwide, in some 
respects, IP securitization may benefit society because society may obtain income 
distribution by offering an alternative investment and investment diversification portfolio. 
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The products of IP securitization represents fixed income investment a constant rate of 
return. In addition, it allows investors to tailor their investment based on their risk 
preferences by comparing the risks of securities and identifying securitizations with the 
credit risk they are looking for and invest accordingly. Finally, society has opportunity to 
become involved in funding creativity and productivity. By purchasing IP backed securities, 
investors/society provide immediate cash to creative and productive companies for 
developing and creating new innovative products. 
Government involvement for promoting and supporting IP securitization 
To solve the normative and practical challenges of IP securitization in Indonesia, it is 
necessary for the government to pay attention to and become involved with developing 
economic infrastructures and legal frameworks. The enactment of IP securitization 
regulation with its enforcement as well as the establishment of elements and infrastructures 
for securitization transactions will be the first step for supporting IP securitization. 
           To establish this first step, the requisite elements derived from the most common 
form of asset securitization must be adopted. At the most basic level, IP securitization 
involves a variety of key supporting elements: (a) system finance based upon IP; (b) capital 
market (market for IP based securities); (c) infrastructure to support securitization. 
System finance based upon IP 
A system of finance based upon IP seems a key to financial and economic development.  The 
conceptual framework linking IP to financial and economic development has four key 
elements: (a) the IP securities and inventive linkage; (b) the IP title, collateral and credit 
linkage; (c) IP liquidity and mobilization; (d) the IP market, transactions, and efficiency 
linkage. The four linkages are necessary to support effective IP based finance, and all 
linkages are based upon the existence of the appropriate legal infrastructure.      
            For the supporting system of finance based upon IP, it is necessary to generate a 
functioning system of finance based upon IP. The creation of a functioning system of IP 
based finance involves the precondition of (a) clear property right to IP; (b) clear right to 
transfer property, including IP, (c) clear rules related to the use of IP as collateral; (d) 
financial institutions capable of understanding credit enhancement analysis related to IP 
collateralization for IP backed securities; (e) a clear and predictable system of taxation; (f) 
appropriate financial regulation and supervision. 
            Furthermore, the market development in which IPs have an important role must be 
considered. To establish IP market development, the key elements necessary to reform 
must include: (a) institutional reforms that better define property rights and improve 
contract performance; (b) capital market reforms making IP finance available at reasonable 
rates, especially for individual/retail investors, (c) market reforms such as market regulation 
and fiscal policies that reduce or eliminate the main distortion in goods and services 
produced by IP assets. 
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Capital market (market for IP based securities) 
Governments have an important and catalytic role in developing institutions and a system 
which issues IP backed securities market. To establish the system, the following key 
principles can be suggested: (a) government must create the legal and financial 
infrastructures, foreclosure procedures and secured lending laws; (b) government must set 
up the competition, privatization and sunset provision; (c) the primary role of government in 
the secondary market should be to guarantee IP backed securities; (d) government should 
maintain an appropriate supervisory role through regulation concerning IP assets, liabilities 
and capital.        
          In addition, in processes of capital market development for supporting IP 
securitization, several issues which need to be addressed include: (a) establishment of a 
government supported IP based finance institution; (b) modification of collateral laws to 
support the transfer of IP; (c) development of laws supporting use of intangible (IP) as 
collateral; (d) establishment of credit rating and credit enhancement agencies for IP assets; 
(e) modification of corporation and/or trust laws to support the creation of the SPVs. 
Infrastructure to support securitization 
To encourage IP securitization market, there are recommendations to accomplish the 
following: (a) develop legal infrastructure to support primary and secondary IP backed 
securities market; (b) enhance regulatory capacity; (c) create and improve the IP backed 
securities underwriting process. It is also necessary to (a) create legal infrastructure to 
support credit enhancement and credit rating; (b) improve disclosure and develop a rating 
system; (c) develop appropriate technology for trading, clearing and settlement; (d) create 
IP based finance corporations; (e) create competitive domestic IP backed securities market 
with appropriate taxation. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the presence of three main potential challenges (doctrinal, normative and practical)  
in applying IP securitization in Indonesia, IP securitization should be promoted since IP 
securitization plays the significant roles of providing new  financing alternatives and avenues 
of financial support for developing and strengthening creativity and productivity in creative 
industries, especially. Therefore, the Indonesian government’s involvement is very crucial 
for promoting IP securitization by providing economic and legal frameworks. Since the 
regulation IP securitization is absent in Indonesia, the creation and enactment of IP 
securitization regulation with its enforcement will be the first major step. The regulation can 
be set up through law on securitization, financial law, corporate law, capital market law, 
and/or modification of bankruptcy and collateral laws. Before finding the best model for 
Indonesia’s regulation on IP securitization, the appropriate IP securitization models 
reflecting the principles of justice, utility and legal certainty should be tailored. Along with 
enactment of the regulation, the establishment of elements and infrastructures for the 
transaction will ensure the validity and feasibility of IP securitization transactions.      
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Abstract 
One of the subculture literatures, pesantren literature remains “an unexplored territory” of 
literature study in Indonesia. As the cultural product of the pesantren tradition, it has 
ideologically shaped some significant narrative cultural enterprises. Following Jamal D. 
Rachman’s three main definitions of pesantren literature—as a literature that lives and 
develops in pesantren, as a literature written by people who are from the pesantren 
tradition and as a literature dealing with the pesantren (Ismah, 2011), I only focus on the 
second as the object of the research. By the second, a novel written by an author who is 
from pesantren is investigated, i.e. Kubah by Ahmad Tohari. The analysis shows that in 
regard to general features of pesantren literature, Ahmad Tohari’s novel Kubah strongly 
embodies a form of ideological discourse countering the dominant political ideology at the 
time of 1950’s-1960’s, Communism. All in all, the paper reveals that pesantren literature, 
like other literary works, naturally tends to be positional and political.  
Keywords: Kubah, Communism, Pesantren, Pesantren Literature 
Pesantren literature: A brief introduction 
As a subculture,106 pesantren is perhaps one of the oldest traditional educational systems 
which mainly focus on Islamic-religion knowledge. The uniqueness of this religion-based 
educational system is foundin its boarding school system. The students, called as ‘santri’, 
live in the so-called “pondok pesantren” (pesantren boarding house). The more 
comprehensive definition of pesantren comes from Azra et al. (2007, 175) quoted by Ismah 
(2011, 106-107): 
The Pesantren is a residential school dedicated to the transmission of the classical 
Islamic sciences, including study of the Qur’an and hadith, jurisprudence (fiqh), Arabic 
grammar, mysticism (tasawwuf), and the Arabic sciences (alat). A typical pesantren 
complex consists of a mosque, studyrooms, dormitories, and kyai’s [the Islamic scholar 
who builds and leads the pesantren] 
The students live there for 24 hours a day, not only for schooling but also for all of their 
daily activities, such as eating, washing, cooking, and so forth. The santri studies many 
subjects related to Islamic traditional courses from theology to Arabic grammar, from 
                                                          
106
 The term ‘subculture’ refers to the idea that pesantren culture for a long time has been a unique mode of 
life deviating from the general mode of life in Indonesia. This idea mainly refers to Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
thought in a book chapter “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur” (Pesantren as Subculture) (see “Pesantren dan 
Pembaharuan” (Pesantren and Reformation), Dawam Rahardjo (Ed.) Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988, 4
th
 printed,  p.40)  
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Islamic jurisprudence to theosophy. Besides, one of the courses in pesantren is literature. 
Traditionally, the most common form of its literature is the so-called ‘Syi’iran’ or ‘Syair’ 
(religious-traditional poem) which is mainly written and spoken in Arabic and local 
languages, such as Javanese, Sundanese, Bugis, and so on. The similiarities of the Syi’iran 
works are on the themes they choose which mainly concern the love to God and the 
Prophet Muhammad. It reveals that the literary practices in pesantren are mostly a part of 
religious ritual prayer to God.  
These days, this limitation of the so-called pesantren literature has changed. 
According to Jamal D. Rahman, an Indonesian poet and pesantren alumni, pesantren 
literature covers not only (1) a literature that lives and develops in pesantren, like ‘Syi’iran’ 
or ‘Syair’ (Old religious-traditional poem), but also (2) any kind of literary works which are 
written by people who are from the pesantren tradition, and (3) any kind of literary works 
dealing with the pesantren life as its main theme and issues, including Djamil Suherman’s 
Umi dan Tjerita-tjerita Pendek Lainnya (1963), Abidah el-Khaliqi’s novel Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban (2009), etc. (Ismah, 2011, 107). Based on the definition above, this paper 
only focuses on the second dimensions—literary works which are written by the pesantren 
people. The best example I have chosen to examine is Ahmad Tohari’s Kubah.  
Ahmad Tohari and the pesantren world 
Ahmad Tohari was born in June 13, 1948. He was a ‘pesantren native’ from the very 
beginning of his life. He lives in Tinggarjaya, Jatilawang, Banyumas (Central Java) and grew 
up in the middle of pesantren cultural tradition. In his childhood, he studied “kitab 
kuning”—a type of traditional religious books written in Arabic, from which santri 
(pesantren student) wrote down the meaning of the word in the language of Arab pegon 
(Javanese Arabic). This type of the book—written by Islamic scholars teaching Islamic 
disciplines, such as hadits (the Prophet’s words), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), nahwu (Arabic 
grammar), and so forth—has become a compulsory in the curriculum of pesantren. In a 
personal interview with the author, he recalled his childhood memory when experiencing 
the beauty of the use of Arab pegon words in translating the Arabic Koran.107  
Although Tohari's parents were both from farming backgrounds, his father had 
received a good Islamic education and, while employed as director of the regional office for 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was responsible for the establishment of a pesantren in 
Tinggarjaya. Tohari's father has been described as a "progressive intellectual" and under his 
guidance Tohari developed a deep understanding of Indonesian politics and a strong sense 
of social and environmental responsibility. Tohari has described himself as a mischievous 
child who often visited a neighboring abangan village (i.e., one that practiced a less 
orthodox version of the Islamic faith). Although Tohari's education in the pesantren 
developed by his parents left him with deep religious convictions, as an adult his progressive 
                                                          
107
  Personal interview 
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interpretation of Indonesian Islam has also been criticized by some as being out of step with 
the status quo.108  
As a writer, he has received national and international publicity with his masterpiece 
A Trilogy of Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk (1981), Lintang Kemukus Dini Hari (A Shooting Star at 
Dawn) (1985) and Jentera Bianglala (The Rainbow's Arc) (1986). His other works are Jasa-
jasa buat Sanwirya (in anthology of Dari Jodoh sampai Supiyah, Djambatan, 1976, p. 28-33), 
Senyum Karyamin (A Short Story Collection—written from 1976-1986, published by 
Gramedia, 1989), Di Kaki Bukit Cibalak (1986), and Orang-orang Proyek (2007). Kubah was 
written in 1980 before he got public attention as the author of the famous trilogy.  
Theoretical framework 
New Historicism theory can be used as theoretical optic to comprehend the discourse 
beyond the text. As a tool of analysis, the theory assumes that historical phenomena can be 
read like a text or otherwise. H. Aram Veeser has isolated five key assumptions (Castle, 
2007, 132):  
1) “Every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices”;  
2) Every critique inevitably “uses the tools it condemns and risks falling prey to the 
practice it exposes”;  
3) Literary and non-literary texts “circulate inseparably”;  
4) No discourse “gives access to unchanging truths” nor “expresses inalterable 
human nature”; and  
5) Critical methods under capitalism “participate in the economy they describe.” 
By underlining the third notion, it is clear enough that one should not separate literary and 
non-literary texts. Both are inseparable and complete each other. After all, both “the fact of 
the fiction” and “the fiction of the fact” interchangeably narrate the text.    
Research method  
This paper is a descriptive-qualitative research which mainly applies New Historicism theory. 
The method relevant to the theory is a “thick description” or “in-depth reading” method. It 
means that the researcher reads the same text, Kubah, repeatedly in order to get a 
comprehensive meaning (Geertz, 1973, 25). After finding the “always-temporary-meanings 
of the text”, the researcher tried to locate them in the formative discourse of the historical 
event, which is mainly recorded in the secondary data such as historical books, journals, 
magazines and so forth. All in all, both the meaning from the fiction and the non-fiction are 
challenged and read meticulously, so that the production of ‘new’ meaning becomes always 
possible. 
 
                                                          
108
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Tohari#cite_note-Dancer-1 quoting Tohari, Ahmad (2003). The 
dancer : a trilogy of novels. Jakarta: Lontar Foundation. ISBN 979-8083-49-0. 
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The post-1965 tragedy: conflict, reconciliation and fiction 
In 1950s Indonesia, the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) became one of the major 
political powers in the country. In the first general election of 1955, the party won fourth 
position, following PNI (the Indonesian National Party), Masjumi as the first runner-up and 
PNU (the party of Nahdlotul Ulama). In the 1960’s, the PKI became even bigger and formed 
powerful organization in the fields of politics, economics and culture. Thus, it was the 
biggest Communist party in the world, outside of Soviet Union and RRC. Then, political 
relationship between the PKI and the President Sukarno became more intimate. This was 
proved when Soekarno declared a national slogan that became famous at the time: 
“NASAKOM” (Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis)—the idea of the unity of these three major 
political elements of the nation. This political development created ‘political anxiety’ among 
other major elements of the nation, such as the nationalists, the Muslim parties (e.g. 
Masjumi and PNU), and also the military.   
On the night of 30 September/1 October 1965, something tragic happened. Six army 
generals and one lieutenant were kidnapped and killed at “Lubang Buaya”, in Jakarta. Then 
a military coup happened that finally ended the power of President Sukarno. The new 
president was inaugurated led by General Soeharto, the founder of the so-called “New 
Order”. Soon after the rise of the New Order, the president and his government constructed 
the idea of “the tragedy of 1965”. With his military power, the new order created the one 
and only official historiography that declared the PKI as the mastermind of the tragedy, 
though some recent publications have provided other version of the tragedy. Unfortunately, 
this official version of history soon became the only narration that has been accepted by the 
people. Thus, further consequence in the field of social, politics, culture, and economics 
could not be avoided.   
In the context of global politics, the 1965 tragedy happened at the peak of Cold War 
when the Western alliance (the capitalist USA and UK) had the same global agenda to fight 
against Communism, while at the same time the ideology of Communism was expanding 
rapidly throughout the world.  
What happened next in the aftermath of the 1965 tragedy? There were two forms of 
conflict which happened in the country; vertical and horizontal. Vertical conflict happened 
between the military government and the PKI supporters. Immediately the PKI was listed as 
a forbidden party in Indonesia, all of PKI members and those linked to PKI were jailed and 
many of them were killed.  
Accordingly, the horizontal conflict happened between the PKI and other elements 
of the nation, particularly the Nationalist and Muslim groups. This civil conflict can be seen 
as the result of political propaganda which was controlled totally by the New Order, either 
in the official media or in the private media. In some districts, some mass organizations 
linked to the Nationalist and Muslim parties voluntarily “helped” the military, executing-
killing-murdering PKI supporters, such as Pemuda Pancasila (the Youth of Pancasila) that 
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was linked to the Nationalists, Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (the movement of Ansor Youth) and 
Barisan Serbaguna (Banser) that was linked to the Muslim party, Nahdlotul Ulama (NU). The 
enmity between the Communists and the Muslims particularly happened in some regions 
where NU with its large landholdings were the majority, such as in East Java and many parts 
of Central Java and West Java. In this phase, some elements of Nationalists and Islamic 
groups played significant role in killing and rounding up Communists.  
After the reformation of 1998, some new reports have been published which provide 
more critical accounts of these events. The most recent publication is a report from 
KOMNASHAM (Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights) which investigated the 
mass killings in 1965/66. The Indonesian army unleashed a campaign of terror against the 
supporters of the PKI and groups that were associated to the party. Up to one million people 
were killed and many of them were imprisoned as “TAPOL” (political imprisoners). The 
report also said that this human tragedy committed by the army was done with the support 
of gangsters, civilian mobs, and para-military groups. Another recent report was the film The 
Act of Killing (Jagal) by Joshua Oppenheimer. It has drawn international attention to the 
1965 massacres. The film shows how proudly local gangsters in Medan, North Sumatra 
played their roles in the killings, especially focusing on the leader of the gangsters, Anwar 
Kongo. The film also shows how one of para-military groups, Pemuda Pancasila played its 
role in the tragedy. A further report was made by some NU members (especially the youth), 
with the aim of making  reparations for the violence of the past and to bring communities 
together. They tried to reconcile ex-Communist Tapols with their communities and teach 
them that both Muslims and Communists were “the same victims of the same past”.  
The 1965 tragedy was also documented in Indonesian fiction. There are some 
literary works dealing with the 1965 tragedy that were written under the power of New 
Order; Sri Sumarah dan Bawuk (Umar Kayam, 1975), Para Priyayi (Umar Kayam, 1992), 
Kubah (Ahmad Tohari, 1980), Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk (Ahmad Tohari, 1981), Nyali (Putu 
Wijaya, 1983), and Anak Tanah Air, Secercah Kisah (Ajip Rosjidi, 1985). These literary works 
written under the New Order regime were mostly written by non-Communist or affiliated-
Communist writers. After the reformation of 1998, more literary works dealing with the 
tragedy were published. It has been possible for ex-Communists to publicly tell their stories 
and for young writers to explore the meaning of 1965 event for later generations. Among 
these works of literature are: Merajut Harkat (Putu Oka Sukanta, 1999), Tapol (Ngarto 
Februana, 2000), Layang-layang Itu Tak Lagi Mengepak Tinggi-tinggi (Martin Alaeda, 2003), 
Derak-derak (Zoya Herawati, 2005), and Kemerdekaan Dimulai dari Lidah (A.D. Donggo, 
2005), Pulang (Leila Chudlori, 2012) and Amba (Laksmi Pamuntjak, 2013). 
In this context, Kubah, first published in 1980, contributes something distinctive to 
modern Indonesian literature, in that the novel sees the events of 1965 and their aftermath 
from within the culture of the pesantren. After thirty two years, the novel was republished 
in 2012, and included Gus Dur’s endorsement as an expression of reconciliation between 
Communism and its foes, particularly Islam. Perhaps a major reason for republishing the 
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novel was that it can be seen as contributing to current mood of reconciliation. This 
message can be seen from the end of the story, i.e. the reconciliation between a figure from 
pesantren (Haji Bakir) and a former Communist (Karman). On the other hand, I will argue in 
this paper that the novel as a whole does not have a reconciliatory message. Rather, I will 
show how the novel perpetuates established negative stereotypes of Communism and its 
alleged supporters. 
Ahmad Tohari’s Kubah: the representation of Communist figures 
The cover of the latest version of the novel can tell a lot about Kubah and its relation to 
Communism. There are three endorsements in the cover. The first is: “The best novel of 
1981”, from the Yayasan Buku Utama Ministry, of Education and Culture. It points to the 
fact that Kubah was one of favorites of the New Order regime under General Soeharto. 
Although it also discursively presents a critique of the military regime, it was mainly 
considered to be a strong critique of Communism as represented by the one and only 
Indonesian Communist Party—the biggest political enemy of Soeharto’s regime.  
The second is: “It has been published in Japanese language”. This shows us that the 
novel has already been recognized as an ‘international’ work. It has drawn the attention of 
other countries. The third is an endorsement by Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur), the 
then-President of Indonesian republic: “KUBAH brings a great idea of reconciliation of post 
1965 tragedy which was first  written in 1979 and then published two years later.” For Gus 
Dur, the main idea of the novel was the reconciliation of Communism and its enemy, Islam, 
as represented by the political and cultural power of pesantren through the Party of Majelis 
Sjura Muslimin Indonesia (MASYUMI) and the Party of Nahdlotul Ulama (NU).  
Characterisation as political statement 
While for Gus Dur Kubah brings the idea of reconciliation and for Tohari a kind of cultural 
response to the tragedy of 1965, I see it as a serious critique of Communism and its 
challenges to Indonesia from the perspectives of the Islamic pesantren. All the Communist 
supporters are represented as “antagonists” of the story. Above all, my analysis reveals 
some cultural representations of Communist supporters as variously victims of the party, 
schemers, immoral women or simply Chinese. On the other hand, Kubah portrays all of the 
pesantren-connected characters as positive protagonists.  
Karman’s story: plot summary 
Karman, the main character of the novel, was born in 1935 in Pegaten. His father was a 
mantri pasar109 and his mother was a housewife. In his village, the family of mantri was 
considered as part of priyayi (elite-noblemen class). As part of the elite, Karman enjoyed a 
good life as a child. Everything changed when the Japan soldiers came and stole people’s 
rice. People then just ate ubi-ubian (cassava or tuber), including the Mister Mantri’s family.  
Of priyayi, he believed that the elite should eat the best rice, not ubi-ubian. In order to have 
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 A government officer whose job was to manage a traditional market.    
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rice he finally insisted Haji Bakir to take his entire land in exchange for rice. Mister Mantri 
soon became poor. When the war independence came, he chose not to be a part of the 
Republic but to be a part of the colonizer, with a hope that one day he will become mantri 
pasar again under the power of colonizer. One day the Republic corps, which was mainly 
supported by kampung and santri youth, took him to the jungle and he never came back 
home (p. 60-61). People knew that he had died.  
As an orphan, Karman lived with his mother, bu mantri. The little Karman always 
played around with his friends, including Rifah, Haji Bakir’s daughter. Sometimes Rifah 
invited him to play with her in her house. Soon Haji Bakir’s family realized that there was an 
orphan among their neighbours and it was their duty as Muslims to take care of him. By 
giving him a job, Bakir’s family paid him some money and also gave him some zakat or infaq 
(religious alms). This helped Karman and his mother. At this time, he was also a diligent 
santri who always recited the Koran in Bakir’s little mosque at night. He always spent the 
night at the mosque. With his friends, he usually went home after Subuh (dan) prayer. He 
happily did this religious routine and worked activity for years for the Bakir family. After 
three years, they asked him to live with them in their house where he received all adequate 
food and proper daily clothing. 
In 1950, when he was fifteen years old, his uncle Hasyim came home after four years 
defending for the young Republic as a member of Laskar Hisbullah, a Muslim militia. Karman 
now left Bakir family and lived with his uncle’s family (p.80-81). He became a student at the 
junior high school (Sekolah Menengah Pertama-SMP) and finally graduated in 1953 (p.93).  
 After the 1948 coup d’état by the PKI,110 people paid less attention to the actors of the 
uprising who then escape from Madiun. Muso, as the mastermind of the action, quickly 
succeeded at spreading his political influence among various circles of Indonesian 
intellectuals (p.84). One of them was Margo, a mastermind of the Communist party in 
Pegaten. It took a long time for Margo to find a young man with great potential to become a 
distinguished political cadre but he finally found the young Karman (p.85-86). Then, a new 
chapter of Karman’s life soon began.  
 After investigating Karman’s life and family, Margo started to approach Karman with 
some ‘ammunition’. First, knowing that Karman was a graduate of SMP who was looking for 
a job, Margo and his compatriots tried to find him a job. Before talking to Karman directly, 
Triman and Margo approached his uncle Hasyim. Then, they found a job for him as a 
secretary (juru tulis) in a sub-district office. Surrounded by many Communist figures, 
immediately the young Karman became a member of the Communist party. 
 Margo also knew that Karman was recently disappointed by Bakir’s family because they 
had rejected his marriage proposal to Rifah. Haji Bakir had instead accepted Abdul Rahman’s 
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 Though in the novel Tohari just clearly names the party as Partai Komunis (the Communist Party), it’s clear 
enough to refer it to the one and only Communist party in Indonesia at that time, that is Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party). 
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marriage proposal. He was a santri (Muslim scholar) from the pesantren of Tebuireng 
Jombang and his proposal had come earlier than Karman’s. As a result, Karman was 
frustrated, angry, and ashamed. All he want is to take revenge and to hate Haji Bakir. He 
was reluctant to meet Bakir and his family, and never visited their house. He also soon 
stopped the obligatory worship in the Bakir’s mosque. He did it at home. On Fridays, he 
chose to worship in another mosque.  
 All his actions were actually forms of personal revenge. By not worshipping in Bakir’s 
mosque, he was attacking Haji Bakir. Everything became even worse. He stopped attending 
obligatory worship. The mosque and Haji Bakir as a Muslim figure were both symbols of 
Islam in Pegaten. The more he avoids the mosque, the more he felt satisfied (p.101). Margo 
and his group made things worse. They enthusiastically turned him against Haji Bakir 
(p.102).  
 Margo further taught Karman about the struggle of proletariat people against the 
bourgeois. The left-wing political views were very powerful. Margo also recited the story of 
Karman’s land. Based on his different version, it was a fact that an Islamic leader like Haji 
Bakir had greedily occupied the land of Karman’s father (p.103). It took only a year since his 
meeting with Margo’s group for Karman to become extremely cynical and always suspicious 
of anything related to Bakir. He openly left the mosque and stopped his prayers. He 
regularly quoted Margo’s words that religion is opium for the oppressed people or the 
masses (p.103).   
 The climax of his personality transformation came about near a well behind the 
house. One day he stood angrily in the backyard with a chopper in his hand. He looked, 
hesitated, but then slowly moved to a water basin made of bamboo and furiously cut it into 
pieces. The basin was full of water for wudlu (an obligatory ritual of cleansing the body 
before prayer). By doing this, he sent a message to the people that he was a real symbol of 
his transformation; he was now the Communist-atheist Karman (p.104). 
 Then the tragedy of 1965 happened. The suspected cause of the tragedy was the 
Communist party. The consequences were tragic. All Communist activists and those who 
supported the party were hunted down and arrested by soldiers. Some of them were 
murdered, while some others were imprisoned. After quite long period on the run, Karman 
was finally arrested and ‘luckily’ was not murdered by the soldiers. He was one of those who 
were imprisoned. The military government of General Soeharto sent him and many 
Communist activists to the political prison of Pulau Buru (Buru Island). Pulau Buru has 
become famous among Indonesian people and others because of its function as a jail for 
many Indonesian political prisoners who were suspected of being Communists. Including the 
most prominent Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who wrote “The Tetralogy of 
Buru Island” while imprisoned there.  
 Karman was thirty years old at that time. In 1971, his wife Marni decided to remarry 
another man. After giving up hope of marrying Bakir’s daughter, Rifah, Karman married a 
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young girl who really loved him, Marni. After Marni’s remarriage, Karman finally realized 
that his political activity as a Communist party activist had been wrong. While debating with 
his companion Sitepu in jail, Karman said “…because of the party, I’m now here in jail, far 
away from home, and my wife will remarry another man” (p.15). In jail, he had realized that 
he was just a ‘victim’ of the Communist party.   
 After twelve years Karman was finally released from Buru Island. On the first day of 
his release, he felt as if he was nothing and the most wretched person in the world (p.9). In 
1977, “I’m just an ex-political prisoner!”, he said to himself repeatedly (p.7). He did not 
realize that the people of Pegaten had forgotten the horrible tragedy of 1965. Those who 
were involved to the tragedy either imprisoned or not, had become good civilians. They 
regretted what they had done. Karman finally came home and people accepted his coming 
home. Even Haji Bakir and his family came along to his house to welcome him.  
 In front of neighbors, Karman ran to welcome Bakir then knelt down in front of him. 
He tightly embraced the old man and cried loudly like a child. Bakir could do nothing and let 
him cry (p.194). The old man and the ex-Communist activist were finally united again. For 
the people of Pegaten, the rendezvous was a symbol of reconciliation between Islam and 
Communism. Then the story ended happily; Bakir and the people agreed to give him a job 
that is making a kubah (Mosque dome) (p.209). Finally, the ex-Communist “came home” to 
his origin, Islam; and the Communist Karman had finally “died”.  
A Communist Margo: “The Mastermind”  
Margo was the mastermind behind the Communist Party in Pegaten. His devotion to the 
party is reflected in the description of his room. Although the room was not a good library, 
there was a poor cupboard which was fulfilled with books. It was not very large. Above the 
cupboard there was a portrait of Russian Communist leader; Lenin, on a red background. 
From the books which were all dirty and crumpled, we knew that the owner of the room 
loved reading lover. Besides, the books were also dirty stenciled brochures (p.111). 
 Margo escaped from Madiun and became a teacher in Pegaten. He was smart, brilliant 
and fond of reading any books or brochures related to his Communist party. He also 
subscribed to Harian Merah and was always proud of it. The name of “Harian Merah” (Red 
Daily Newspaper) actually refers to “Harian Rakjat” (People Daily Newspaper). “Harian 
Rakjat” was published for the first time in January 31, 1951. Formerly it was named as 
“Suara Rakjat” (The Voice of People)( Yuliantri & Dahlan, 2008, 77).  
 His eyebrows looked like Lenin’s. Contrary to people’s expectations, he succeeded in 
organizing some people who were sympathic to the party. The oldest one was a pensioner, 
a machinist, who was a loyal follower of Suryopranoto, a main figure of the Communist train 
workers’ movement. The other three figures were ex-followers of Serikat Islam (SI) Merah 
(Red Islamic Council). SI Merah was a political faction of Serikat Islam, which turned to the 
left because of the political influence of Alimin and Darsono (p.84). The “Red SI” was in line 
with the idea of secularism proposed by PKI. They came from some regions, but the most 
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influential was “Red SI Semarang”. Others came from Madiun, Cepu and Nganjuk (McVey, 
2010, 242-245).  
Margo deserved the praise he received. As a Communist cadre, his work could be 
measured from the results of the first general election of 1955. At that time there were only 
seven voters of his party. Surprisingly for the election of Contituante (parliamentary) 
member a year later, the voters for his party increased to 353 (p.112). This was in line with 
the result of national general election.  
In Pegaten, one of aspects of Margo’s success was Karman as his young cadre. It can 
be seen from his political teachings to Karman, including his discussion about his love affair 
with Rifah who had just become a widow (p.114). Another plan to isolate Karman from Rifah 
and Bakir family was to let him visit Semarang, the capital city of central Java province, and 
sending another woman to accompany him; Suti. 
A Communist Suti: the “wild” woman 
Suti was a stereotypical representation of a Communist woman. Suti was thirty years old. 
She was described as a woman who had a “wild” attitude, and engaged in love affairs with 
other Communist activists. When she and her companion had a discussion in her house, she 
sent her husband to the kitchen to cook. After that discussion, they had “special” event that 
in the name of the party she must serve the Communist activists like Triman with her body 
because Suti was a special woman in the party. However, her husband did nothing as if 
there was nothing between her and her companion. Although most people did not notice 
this moral disaster, her mother-in-law knew and soon died, because of frustration and stress 
caused by that sinful act (p.121). 
In Semarang, Margo and Triman left both of them. Karman was with Siti in a motel. 
They slept together. Karman was an unmarried man at that time. For the wild married Suti, 
it was a gift to have a new bachelor doll like Karman. In short, they satisfied their sexual 
passion (p.122). As stated before, it was Margo’s plan to make Suti a gift to Karman. 
However, this plan failed. For Karman, his love affair with Suti was only a mere sexual 
passion. In Pegaten, he was obsessed with his love for Rifah, who was now a widow. His 
dream of marrying Rifah rose again and he tried to make come it true. One night he went to 
Rifah’s house, spied on her and saw her in a silent and peaceful prayer. He could feel how 
peaceful the heart of a broken hearted woman who just lost her husband could be. 
Suddenly he remembered another woman who was exact opposite of Rifah. She was the 
wild Suti. He finally knew many differences between them, but could not count it one by 
one. There were too many to mention (p. 127).  
From this point, it is very clear that the author tries to discursively compare between 
Suti as a representation of Communist women and Rifah as a representation of santri 
Islamic women: Suti was a wild, sex-oriented, and sinful wife, while Rifah was religious, God-
oriented and devoted wife. From the description, it is clear that Suti was a representation of 
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most Communist women who became members of Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani), 
the PKI’s underbow [‘underground’] Indonesian Women’s Movement.  
Some Chinese Communists: Tan Oen Sok, Tan Cie Hong, Tan Liong Pek’s daughter and Oey 
Fen May 
Kubah creates the impression that all the Chinese characters were supporters of the 
Communist party. The first is Tan Oen Sok, a rich Chinese businessman who totally 
supported the political movement of Communist party. When the activists of the party 
needed a car, he let them borrow his car. When Margo and the companions went to 
Semarang, they rode his Jip. He was actually a member of Baperki—an organization of 
Chinese who supported Communism. As a rich businessman, he ran two tapioca factories in 
Kokosan. Most of the capital and trade circles in the region were in his hands. In fact, he was 
an illegal citizen because he was still a Chinese. He hadn’t changed his citizenship into 
Indonesian. By doing this, he actually broke the law that forbad foreign Chinese to live in the 
region. That was a government rule, PP 10/1985 that he broke (p.120).  
The proof of his support for Communism became very blatant. It happened several 
months before the tragedy of October 1965. He sorted out an unusual trade. He bought 
mancung (young coconuts) and a large number banana trees in from the people. Later on, 
people knew that the activity was a part of a political act. Buying most of mancung had a big 
effect to the economics of the people, since their production of coconut sugar was primarily 
hooked on mancung. But why would farmers sell the young coconuts needed for sugar 
production to him? In the 1960s, it was understandable that as poor people they always 
needed money urgently. 
Tohari described the economic-political act the Chinese had committed as “the 
politics of impoverishment”. The purpose of the act was so that the impoverished people 
would be easily agitated or provoked (p.120). The Chinese figure was described as an 
opportunist who lived in a pragmatic-economicly oriented way. After the tragedy of 1965, 
he ran away from Pegaten and moved to Bandung leaving behind his wealth and all his 
belongings. It was not a big deal. In Bandung, the opportunist could live happily again 
(p.120).    
The second Chinese character was Tan Cie Hong. He was not described as 
comprehensively as his big brother Tan Oen Sok. He was just a member of Baperki like his 
brother. Together with other official Communist activists, Margo and si Gigi Baja, with his 
companion Riwut, Cie Hong was buried by the policemen and the soldiers at the edge of 
Pegaten (p.152). Sadly he was not as lucky as his brother who ran away to Bandung and 
lived there happily. 
The third Chinese was Tan Liong Pek’s daughter, who was a ledhek dancer and the 
fourth was Oey Fen May, who was a ronggeng (a traditional dancer). Both of them were 
described as bad dancers, who danced badly but very boldly. They invited the kampong 
youth to dance with them in erotic way (p149). The novel brings a message that traditional 
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dancers were used as a tool for political acts. Although it was not mentioned clearly 
whether these two dancers were official Communist activists or not, it was well-known that 
Communist arts organizations supported the traditional dancers of the people and used 
dancers as a tool to approach the people. The Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (LEKRA) (the 
Institute of People’s Culture) was an official cultural organization of Communist party and 
organized political activity in the field of culture. It included many institutes for traditional 
cultures, such as the Lembaga Senirupa Indonesia (the Institute of Indonesian Art), the 
Lembaga Film Indonesia (LFI) (the Institute of Indonesian Film), the Lembaga Sastra 
Indonesia (Lestra) (the Institute of Indonesian Literature), the Lembaga Senidarama 
Indonesia (LSDI) (the Institute of Indonesian Drama), the Lembaga Musik Indonesia (LMI) 
(the Institute of Indonesian Music), and the Lembaga Senitari Indonesia (the Institute of 
Indonesian Dance) (Yuliantri & Dahlan, 2008, 36-38).    
Unlike the novel, the historian Onghokham has noted (2008, 2-3) that the 
heterogeneity of Chinese people in Indonesia was actually a historical and sociological fact. 
Chinese were rich, poor, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and other religion as well. It 
can be said that Chinese people are as plural as Indonesian people. Like the original people 
of Indonesia, the Chinese in Indonesia were as plural as Indonesian. In this novel all Chinese 
characters are portrayed as supporters of or linked to the Communist party in some way or 
other. My analysis proves that the novel—intentionally or not—has established two ways of 
stereotyping Indonesian Chinese; (1) that all of Chinese were Communist supporters, and (2) 
all of them were the enemy of the people.  
Conclusion 
From the findings, it can be concluded that Ahmad Tohari’s Kubah, as a type of pesantren 
literature, strongly conveys a serious cultural critique of Communism. As shown in the 
beginning of the analysis, the pesantren native Tohari through the omnipresent point of 
view in the novel narrates the representation of Communist figures as “antagonists” and 
conversely narrates all Islamic pesantren natives as “protagonists”.  
This analysis proves that, like many other literary works, pesantren literature 
naturally tended to be positional and “political” Works and that this forced them to support 
their own culture and ideology on one hand and to counter the oppositional ones on the 
other. In the context of the reconciliation of post-1965 tragedy, this novel totally contradicts 
its aim to reconcile the Muslims and the Communists as suggested by Abdurrahman Wahid 
in his endorsement of the novel and by Tohari himself in his vision to respond the 1965 
tragedy. In fact, this sort of literary work—as well as many other literary and non-literary 
works written in the era of New Order power—ideologically constructs a stereotype of all 
Communist figures as criminals; the enemies of the nation. In this paper, I have argued that 
the ideological assumptions about Communism which predominated at the time the novel 
was written are embedded in the characterizations employed. They definitely work against 
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a reading of the works as an expression of reconciliation between Islam and Communism in 
the contemporary political climate.      
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Abstract 
As population growth increases in Indonesia, as well as elsewhere, solid waste keeps 
multiplying while the capacity of Final Disposal Sites (“TPA”) becomes more limited. This 
requires a waste management system which is integrally conducted from the upstream 
sectors to the downstream one. A 3R community-based management system can be 
developed upstream, and waste handling technology employed downstream at the Final 
Disposal Site. Up until 2011, there were at least 117 independent waste management 
communities in Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY). Given the number of these communities, 
the Yogyakarta scenario can be considered as a frontline in discussion of integrated waste 
community-based management. This paper is intended to identify the level of significant 
community involvement in the role of decreasing the waste volume disposed in “TPA”-
Piyungan. The analysis was conducted using secondary data analysis methods and in-depth 
interviews with the Independent Solid Waste Management Network (termed JPSM) as well 
as other stakeholders. A case study was done on the waste management community-group 
in Yogyakarta Municipality. The analysis shows the waste management community in 
Yogyakarta in 2008 numbered 27 groups; in 2010, it increased to 93 groups, a growth of 22 
groups per year on average. The waste volume that was disposed from Yogyakarta to “TPA” 
in 2008 was 91,130 tons. This figure decrease by almost a third in two years to 65,170 tons 
in 2010. On average, each group was able to reduce their waste to TPA by 393.33 tons/year 
or 0.6% or by up to 85%. It means that only 15% of the rest of the waste materials disposed 
to “TPA’ originated from the community groups. The groups were also able to reduce the 
waste produced in the communities. Previously, the amount was up to 0.6 kg/person/day. 
This figure reduced to 0.4 kg/person/day or to around 66.67% of the previous amount. Such 
results indicate that the performance of the independent waste management community 
plays a significant role in reducing the waste volume disposed to “TPA”, so that the TPA 
becomes more sustainable. 
Keywords: Solid Waste, Community, Final Disposal Site (TPA), Piyungan, Yogyakarta 
Introduction 
The increase of solid waste volume both globally and within Indonesia is in line with the 
increase of population growth, a population that for the most part displays a strong 
consumption-orientated attitude. A significant increase in population causes a range of 
negative impacts for the environment because the availability of land used for final disposal 
sites (TPA) is narrowing and the increase of the amount of solid waste volume has almost 
become uncontrollable. In the Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY) Province in Indonesia, the 
biggest problem related to solid waste was found in the Yogyakarta Urban Area. The 
availability of “TPA Regional Piyungan”, it is predicted, only has a capacity to be utilized 
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optimally until 2014. It is difficult to widen the site or establish other locations nearby for 
solid waste disposal. The solid waste problem cannot be solved if only the downstream 
sector is focused on, an option established through provision of TPA only. The problems of 
solid waste disposal in Yogyakarta should be more optimally managed in the upper stream 
sector; in this case, it means the community from which the waste originates (Undang-
Undang RI Nomor 18 Tahun 2008). Therefore, an effort to promote an integrated waste 
management system, which is based on the community groups, has been required.  
DIY Province has facilitated the establishment of an Independent Solid Waste 
Management Network (JPSM) which consists of 117 groups spread throughout various 
regencies/city in 2011 (Widodo, et al 2012). These numbers indicate a considerable effort 
on the part of the parties involved and recommends this unique venture as a front-line in 
community-based responses in terms of integrated waste management in Indonesia, as well 
as similar contexts.  
The project must be strengthened in both its coverage and its performance. One of 
indicators of the success of the integrated commmunity-based solid waste management is 
how far it can reduce the volumes of solid waste disposed to the TPA. The research on 
which this paper reports sought to measure the significant roles of the community-based 
solid waste management groups in the reduction of solid waste volumes disposed to the 
TPA Piyungan based on the case study of Yogyakarta City. 
Methods  
The research data covers both secondary and primary data. Secondary data are statistics of 
solid waste and the profiles of the communities gathered from related institutions. Primary 
data are the working performance of the groups gathered through in-depth interviews 
conducted with the group leaders of the JPSM and the community in Yogyakarta. Data 
analysis was conducted by applying the methods of descriptive-qualitative analysis. 
Results and discussions 
The priority of the policies related to solid waste in DIY Province is the development and the 
empowerment of the solid waste management communities. One of greatest assets DIY 
Province has been in its efforts to lead to integrated community based solid waste 
management. Many solid waste management groups existence have been established over 
the last decade. The majority of these groups came from community-based initiatives. The 
trend over time has been positive which means that there are more improvements in the 
network of solid waste management communities. Through the support from the 
government of DIY Province and cooperation between existing communities, an umbrella 
organization (JPSM) was established on 6 April 2009 that had members from around 117 
groups in 2011. An advanced level of support is needed to develop the solid waste 
management groups; however, a significant challenge yet to be resolved is that there are 
still not any official regulations or laws to uphold the activity of the groups. This situation 
invites some form of regulation in the future in order to create opportunities to provide 
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better support from the local government, such as guidance, counseling and facilities 
support, among others. 
  Efforts to keep encouraging society involvement in the integrated solid waste 
management are also required. The integrated community-based solid waste management 
requires support from stakeholders who have interests of one sort or another in the success 
of the programme, for example: 
1. The main stakeholders: the community, society key persons, social institutions (for 
example RT, RW, PKK, Dasawisma and others). 
2. Supporting stakeholders: local NGOs, Society Empowerment Institution, village 
administrative (called as kelurahan and kecamatan), educational sectors, 
entrepreneurs or business firms.  
3. Policy makers: local government and related Regional Task Force (SKPD), and also 
Regional Legislatives.  
The number of community groups involved with solid waste management in Yogyakarta City 
in 2008 was 27 groups. In 2010, the number had increased to 93 groups or, on average, an 
additional 22 groups per year. These solid waste management groups try to conduct solid 
waste management by applying the concept of “3R” by self-supporting funding (Figure 1). 
The national target of the 3R Program implementation is to conduct solid waste 
management of 7% per year, so that by 2014 it was anticipated that 28% of the solid waste 
will be processed and taken out of the land fill disposal system. But, as it currently stands, 
only 3% can be processed. This standing reality more than clarifies the need for urgent 
development of the solid waste management groups’ capacity.  
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Figure 1. 3R model for Community Self-Supporting Solid Waste Management 
 
Figure 2. The correlation between the increase of community base and the reduction 
of Solid Waste Volume in Yogyakarta. (Source: Iswanto, 2012) 
Figure 2 shows that the solid waste volume from Yogyakarta City that was disposed to TPA 
Piyungan in 2008 was 91.130 tons, which decreased to 65.170 tons in 2010. Other data 
show that each group was able to reduce volume to 393,33 tons/year or 0,6% on average 
compared to the total volume existing in TPA. Each group was able to reduce the solid waste 
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volume disposed to TPA by up to 85%. This result means that only 15% of the waste 
remained to be disposed to TPA by the groups. The groups involved in the solid waste 
management programme were also able to reduce the waste, which might influence the 
environment from what it was previously (about 0,6 kg/person/day) to a significantly 
smaller figure (0,4 kg/person/day) a decrease of around 66,67%. Such results indicate that 
the performance of the JPSM plays a quite significant role in reducing the solid waste 
volume that was disposed to TPA. 
The statistics outlined above cannot be separated from the people’s/society’s active 
involvement. These groups have become the front line in the management of solid waste in 
their communities. The main key is the optimum participation. Sabrina’s research (2011, in 
Iswanto, 2012) shows that the level of the society participation reached 75% and upwards. 
For the areas which have not developed PSM, members of these communities have also 
started to show their interest in having similar groups in their area, although they still need 
more aptitude and evidence from those areas which previously have been successful in 
developing community-based groups. 
 
Several actions conducted by the community in Yogyakarta are mostly established 
from those communties’ own plans. This indicates that the local communities who 
conducted “trial and error” strategies have developed their aptitude to the ecological 
system where they live (Mitchell, 2003). This outcome is a result of the close relation among 
the people, the environment and the natural resources that surround them. New 
approaches which may be effective as priorities for development in order to solve 
environmental problems, including solid waste problems, are participatory local appraisals. 
Participatory approaches need to consider certain matters for the sake of effectiveness and 
sustainability, including: reasons, types of participation, supporting elements, participatory 
levels, available types of stakeholders, time duration, components of the program, 
mechanisms, social justice, and monitoring as well as job evaluation.  
 
One of the approaches to establish the concept of participatory local appraisal is by 
applying the concept of community-based development. A community-based development 
can be regarded as co-management, in the form of the development which is conducted by 
the society together with the local government that aims to actively involve the local people 
in the activities of planning and implementing development and management. 
 
A community development strategy is the implementation of a planned change which 
is consciously and seriously conducted through cooperation among people in order to 
improve the structure of the existing social system (Chambers, 2006). The direction of the 
change will be proper to the agreement that has been determined together previously. 
Basically, the instrument managed in the community development is empowerment. High 
participation in the development will encourage community members to become involved 
and to take responsibility towards all resources with the features of open access and 
common property existing in their environment (Read, 2005). 
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This approach needs to be applied since members of the local society are people 
who know exactly the condition of the local socio-cultural environment. Each activity in the 
development should consider the values of the surrounding socio-cultural context of the 
development (McMullin and Nielsen, 1991). Every decision of planning should reflect the 
elements of local people‘s active involvement in the development action. The earlier 
involvement of the local poeple can better guarantee the balance between the 
development program and the community‘s aspirations or ideas since it will encourage their 
sense of belonging. This conceptual approach will open the opportunities for a high 
continuity level (sustainability) over the longer-term period. The development of the local 
society should be based on the following criteria (Law and Hartig, 1993): 
 improving people’s quality of life levels that also conserve local identity and 
culture simultaneously 
 increasing incomes while also distributing wealth more evenly to local people 
 having an orientation to the development of small scale and medium scale 
business which can accommodate significant number labor force and the use of 
appropriate technology 
 encouraging the enthusiasm of competition and cooperation 
 utilizing the available potencies as optimally as possible with the smallest impacts. 
Conclusion 
This paper concludes the following points: 
1. The working performance of the solid waste management community shows significant 
roles in reducing the solid waste volume disposed to TPA. 
2. The solid waste volume from Yogyakarta City that was disposed to TPA Piyungan in 2008 
was 91.130 tons which then decreased to 65.170 tons in 2010. 
3. Each group on average is able to reduce 393,33 tons/year or similar to 0,6 % compared 
with the total volume in TPA. 
4. Each group is able to reduce the amount of solid waste disposed to TPA up to 85% which 
means there will be only 15% of solid waste that will be disposed to TPA from the group. 
5. The solid waste management groups are able to reduce the production of waste by the 
community from what previously was around 0,6 kg/person/day to 0,4 kg/person/day or 
around 66,67 % of the previous figure. 
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ESSAY 
UIN Jakarta: Islam and the West, Democracy and Education: 
Usep Abdul Matin 
Biodata: The writer is a Ph.D. student of the School of Social Sciences of the Faculty of Arts, Monash 
University in Australia on the Presidential Scholars Fund coordinated by DikTi (General Directorate of 
Higher Education), Ministry of National Education (MoNE) of the Republic of Indonesia. He obtained 
his MA degree in Islamic Studies from Leiden University in Holland (with honors) and another from 
Duke University in the United States. He is a nationally accredited lecturer by both Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MoRA) and MoNE of the Republic of Indonesia in the Faculty of Arts and 
Humanities at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Introduction 
In this essay, I mostly discuss the impact of Western democracy on leading Turkish and 
Indian Muslim scholars who lived in the 19th century. Specifically, I study the impact of the 
Western models of education on Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (Universitas 
Islam Negeri/UIN) Jakarta.   
I use the term the “West” to refer to the people, cultures, or institutions that 
introduced democracy and the education systems of these western countries to the Muslim 
world. The Western countries I draw on for this paper are England, France, Germany and 
the U.S., whereas the Muslim countries are Egypt, Turkey, India, and Indonesia  
 However, here I would like to briefly explore relevant historical themes as to the 
impact on Islamic inquiry of Western intellectual values. I suggest that the history of Islam in 
the modern times started from Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt and some Muslim countries in 
1798. This modern history of Islam reached its peak in 1840. Then, it declined until 1940 
when World War II occurred. The modern times of the history of Islam will probably be 
going on as such. This process resembles to the nature of Islamic modernity; in its 
continuous progress, modern Islam will receive its correction from the post-modernity: 
checking and balancing.111 
 The French conquest in Egypt encouraged Muslim scholars in the Muslim world, such 
as Turkey and India, to reform their government systems on the basis of a new paradigm, 
democracy: government of the people, by the people, and for the people.112 The 
banishment of Ali Suavi (1839 - 1878) and that of Namik Kemal (1840 - 1888) by the 
Ottoman sultans shows us that the problem of reform came from the caliphs’ absolutism. In 
                                                          
111
See Marilyn R. Waldman, “Islamic World,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Aug,ust 27, 2003: 
http://search.eb.com/ebarticle?eu=109498, pp. 1, 2. Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burdens of Critical 
Islam”, in Omid Safi (Edt.), Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender, and Pluralism, (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2003), p. 117. Robert L. Tignor (Int.), Napoleon in Egypt: Al-Jabartî’s Chronicle of the French 
Occupation, 1798, Trans., by Shmuel Moreh, (Princeton & New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1993), pp. 3, 
7, 9, mainly 11. Charles Kurzman (Ed.), Modernist Islam 1840-1940: A Sourcebook, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 4. Ahmad S. Moussalli, “Islamic Democracy and Pluralism”, in Omid Safi, Op. Cit., pp. 288-289.  
112
This definition of democracy is similar to that of Stephen R. Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: 
Restoring the Character Ethic, (London: Franklin Covey Co. 1999) p. 30.  
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addition, the caliphs’ judicial authority, which made the judges bow to the caliphs’ decrees, 
depicts that the governments and their elites manipulated the democratic doctrines of 
Islam, such as consultation (shura), and oath of allegiance (bay’a) for their vested 
interests.113 In concert with this evidence, the ideas of Ziya Göklap (1876 - 1924) from 
Turkey, Abu'l-Kalam Azad (1888 - 1958) from Bengal-India and the stubbornness of Chiragh 
Ali (1844 - 1895) from North-India may give us clues as to the degree to which the Muslim 
reformers could not yet develop a type of basic scheme of human rights in line with 
modernity and its concerns.114 
 As the following discussion suggests, significant and innovative elements of UIN 
Jakarta’s academic missions originated in the European university model partly due to the 
historical influences on the Muslim world, as briefly sketched out above. The mission of 
education or learning in class is originally the strong college teaching model initiated by 
Oxford and Cambridge universities. Whereas, a university’s function as an institute of 
research was initially developed in the strong research and professorship of German 
universities in the early 19th century, the Berlin model under Von Humbolt, for example. A 
university’s final function, and one that UIN also absorbed, is that of community service. In 
contrast with the previous academic missions, a university’s community service role 
originally emerged in the middle and latter part of the Nineteenth century in North America 
under the President Lincoln's administration. This innovation was known as the Land Grant 
Movement with the dissemination of the Morrill Act in 1862.115 America, then, also adopted 
these European universities’ positive models. As a result, American universities now unite 
these three into their academic missions. American universities add another function: 
international co-operation.116 As I will explain below, these academic missions have been 
extremely influential on UIN Jakarta's development. However, first, it is useful to provide a 
little historical context to the discussion of UIN Jakarta’s emergence as one of Indonesia’s 
and the region’s leading tertiary institutions. 
UIN Jakarta and academic functions  
The following brief history of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (Universitas Islam 
Negeri/UIN) Jakarta helps illustrate how this university has successfully adopted many of the 
traditions of Western academia. This description, then, explores how this university has 
become an effective agent for dialogue of interfaith and dialogue between civilizations. The 
narrative is as follows.  
 UIN Jakarta uses the name “Syarif Hidayatullah” to refer to one of the Nine Wali 
(Islamic Saints) in Java. Syarif Hidayatullah was born on the Arabian Peninsula in 1448 and 
                                                          
113
See Charles Kurzman (Ed.), Ibid., 144, 145, 146, 192, 195, 194, 196, and 329. 
114
See, Ibid., pp, 277 - 288, and 332. Compare to Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in The 
Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 90, and Bruce Lincoln, Holly Terrors: Thinking 
about Religion after September 11, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 5 - 8.  
115
 Prof. Dr. Soedijarto, MA., Op. Cit., p. 263.  
116
Ibid., p. 261.   
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legend has it that he died in Cirebon, West Java, in 1568. His mother was the daughter of 
Prabu Siliwangi from the Pajajaran (a capital city of Sunda) Kingdom, and Syarif Hidayatullah 
was a high ranking officer in the Egyptian army.117 He propagated Islam in Java wisely and 
kindly; he spoke to the people heart-to-heart and showed tolerance for their beliefs and 
traditions. In addition, he is also well-known as a man who assisted many people including 
those underprivileged in the Indonesian society of the time.118  
How Syarif Hidayatullah came to Java is a question that attracts another resource 
about his origin, one that is different from an origin located on the Arabian peninsula. This 
resource says that Syarif Hidayatullah was born in Pasai in the North of Aceh. When he was 
a child, he studied Islam from his parents in Pasai. Next, he went to study Islam in Mecca in 
Saudi Arabia when the Portuguese occupied Malacca, including Aceh, in 1511. When he 
returned from Mecca to Aceh, the Portuguese still occupied Aceh. Syarif Hidayatullah was 
disappointed with this occupation. Consequently, he left Aceh for the Islamic Kingdom in 
Demak, Central Java. Sultan Trenggono of this kingdom welcomed Syarif Hidayatullah, and 
married him with his (king's) daughter.119     
 Due to Syarif Hidayatullah’s tolerant, compassionate and helpful attitude, UIN 
Jakarta adopts his name. On 1 June 1957, when it was first founded, UIN Jakarta was a State 
Academy of Islamic Sciences (Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama/ADIA). The goal of ADIA was to 
provide state employees with an academic and semi-academic education, so that they could 
become professional Muslim educators at high schools. Three years later (24 August 1960), 
the Indonesian government established ADIA in Jakarta and the State Higher Education for 
Islamic Studies (Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri/PTAIN) became one institute: the 
State Institute for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/IAIN) to develop Islamic 
higher education. As a result, in the early 1963, UIN Jakarta was able to establish three 
faculties: Education (Tarbiya), Literature (Adab), and Theology and Philosophy (Usul al-
Din).120 Having seen this progress, the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs declared 
Decree Number 49 on February 25, 1963. On the basis of this decree, IAIN became divided 
into two: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta and IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta. This 
division led IAIN Jakarta to add two other faculties: Law (Shari`a) and Preaching (Da`wa).121  
 The growth of these five faculties of IAIN Jakarta was in tandem with the Indonesian 
government’s policy before 1965, exactly in 1962. Each of provinces in Indonesia should 
have established a public university to be able to serve as an agent of development. 
Moreover, the Indonesian Minister of Higher Education and Science of that period, Prof. Dr. 
                                                          
117
Prospectus: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, (Jakarta: UIN Jakarta Press, April 
2007), 7
th
 edition, p. 1. I am one of seven editors of this Prospectus.    
118
Prospectus: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, (Jakarta: UIN Jakarta Press, April 
2007), 7
th
 edition, p. 1. I am one of seven editors of this Prospectus.    
119
Nur Amin Fattah, Metode Da`wah Wali Songo, (Pekalongan: Penerbit & T.B. Bahagia, January 1984), pp. 32-
33.  
120
Ibid., pp. 1-5.   
121
Ibid., pp. 5-6.  
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Thoyyib Hadiwijaya, assigned each university in Indonesia the objective to accomplish three 
academic missions: “education, research, and community service.”122 Since then, the 
education law and the government's regulation act on higher education in Indonesia have 
been carrying out these missions.123 From that time on, IAIN Jakarta has also been applying 
these three missions into its academic activities. Having employed them and having 
introduced philosophy into its curricula, IAIN Jakarta, under the leadership of Prof. Dr. 
Harun Nasution (1973-1984), was well-known as the “Campus of the Reformers”, one that 
has emphasized rationality. This image helped IAIN Jakarta found its Graduate School in 
Islamic Studies in 1982; it is the first Graduate School in Islamic Studies in Indonesia.124  
 The academic progress of IAIN Jakarta encouraged its leaders to initiate the Wider 
Mandate concept of this institute: integrating general and religious sciences. Prof. Dr. 
Azyumardi Azra, MA., who became rector of IAIN/UIN Jakarta from 1998 to 2002, and from 
2002 to 2006, intensified this effort by opening new departments, such as psychology, 
mathematics teaching, economics, shari’a banking, agribusiness and information 
technology, management and accounting, and international and interdisciplinary classes. He 
also launched three new faculties: Dirasat Islamiyya, psychology, and science and 
technology.125 Consequently, IAIN Jakarta under his leadership has established nine faculties 
including its Graduate School.  
 This rapid progress of IAIN Jakarta led its leaders to transform IAIN Jakarta into the 
State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN). In response to this academic 
demand, Ministry of National Education (MONE) and Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) 
issued a joint decree, recommending that IAIN become UIN, on 21 November 2001. IAIN 
officially became UIN Jakarta on the basis of Presidential Decree Number 31, dated 20 May 
2002.126 UIN Jakarta leads the way for other IAINs in Indonesia to become UINs. Nowadays, 
we have seen five other UINs, such as UIN Yogyakarta, UIN Riau, UIN Malang, UIN Makassar, 
and UIN Bandung. 
 Based on these details, I can draw the conclusion that 1963 is a major turning point 
for UIN Jakarta because since this year the university has been able to stand independently 
from UIN Yogyakarta. This objectivity was encouraged by the policy of the Indonesian 
government in 1962. In this time, the Indonesian Ministry of Educational Affairs obliged all 
Indonesian higher schools to carry out academic missions: education, research, and 
community service. This policy enabled IAIN Jakarta to establish nine faculties as well as to 
integrate general and religious sciences into its curricula.  
 UIN Jakarta is now under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat, who 
obtained his master degree and PhD in Philosophy in 1995 from the Middle East Technical 
University in Ankara, Turkey. He has officially been appointed Rector of UIN Jakarta since 6 
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March 2006 to 2010 (2010 - 2014).127 Since then, he has been articulating the academic 
doctrines (education, research, and community service) into a motto that comprises three 
elements: knowledge, piety, and integrity. The first element, knowledge, refers to both 
religious and general sciences that are rationally and wisely taught according to the 
academic standard accredited by the Ministry of National Educational Affairs and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. The second aspect, piety, is character building; it is to say that 
these religious and general sciences should lead the students to be honest, humble, patient, 
and wise. The third factor, integrity, means that the students should apply these religious 
and general sciences for the benefit of all people.  
 On the basis of this motto, UIN Jakarta aims to develop religious and natural sciences 
that integrate faith, knowledge, and good deeds to eliminate the dichotomy between 
general and religious sciences. This integration aims to provide an ethical basis for 
developing science and technology. Moreover, this combination helps UIN Jakarta articulate 
an Islamic worldview in all walks of life; thereby reducing radicalism.128 
 Prof. Komaruddin considers the motto of UIN Jakarta to nurture leadership from 
within, a model of leadership, with the hope that his students will become model leaders in 
their work and service places. In his opinion, since its establishment in June 1957, UIN 
Jakarta has consistently kept the leadership-from-within principle. Prof. Komaruddin 
clarifies that these principles referred to surrendering to God, serving the community, and 
developing the nation. He adds that UIN Jakarta reached its golden (50th) anniversary -- 1 
June 2007— on the basis of these principles.129  
An International outlook 
On the basis of this motto, a month after the appointment (March 6, 2006) of Prof. 
Komaruddin as Rector, UIN Jakarta received international academic recognition. For 
instance, on 7 April 2006, His Excellency Prime Minister Prof. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende of 
the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands visited UIN Jakarta and made dialogue on religion and 
civilization with students. Said Fazili, Second Secretary Political of the Embassy of the 
Netherlands in Jakarta, Indonesia, and me had organised this dialogue. In this dialogue, I 
took the role of the master of the ceremony, speaking in Dutch. During lunch, as I recall 
quite vividly, Prime Minister Balkenende said to me that this dialogue was the one that he 
had been expecting to occur.130  
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Presiden Republik Indonesia, Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Salinan Keputusan Presiden Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 16/K Tahun 2006,” pp. 1-3. This is an unpublished document. 
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Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat, “The Role of Islamic Higher Education as an Agent of Nation Development,” 
unpublished paper presented in front of foreign investors on August 10, 2008, in Novotel Hotel, Bogor, p. 6.  
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Usep Abdul Matin, “UIN Jakarta’s 68
th
 Graduation Ceremony: Nurturing Leadership from within,” in UIN 
News, 17
th
 edition, September 2007/Sha`ban – Ramadhan 1428, p. 1.   
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 Said Fazili sent to me by email on 21 March 2006 the list of attendants that encompassed the delegation 
from the Netherlands and from its embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. The delegation from the Netherlands were 
Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister, Gerard van der Wulp, Director General of the Netherlands Government 
Information Service/Spokesman of the Prime Minister, Rob Swartbol, Foreign Policy Advisor of the Prime 
Minister, Pieter de Gooijer, Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Max 
International Journal of Indonesian Studies     Autumn 2015 
 
P
ag
e1
5
3
 
 Prime Minister Balkenende started his speech by saying that the students of UIN 
Jakarta represent a new generation of Indonesia; their ideas would determine Indonesia in 
this 21st century. He explained that more than a month, previous to this UIN visit, he had 
attended an international conference in Jakarta, where he listened to the speech of 
Indonesian President Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that Indonesia is developing not only 
freedom but also tolerance; thereby shattering the gap that splits the West and the Muslim 
World. Being impressed by this speech, His Excellency Balkenende signed up an 
international Memorandum of Understanding with Indonesia in countering terrorism. 
Balkenende said that tolerance and defying terrorism were the issues that impressed him to 
come to Indonesia. He clarified that tolerance was highly valuable to oppose dangerous 
radicalism. He took an example that one year and half before his visit, the film maker Theo 
van Gogh of Amsterdam was killed by a young Muslim man who said that his religion 
allowed this killing.131  
 In accordance with him being impressed by the Indonesian president’s agenda of 
tolerance and anti terrorism, Balkenende said to the audience of UIN Jakarta that he came 
to visit this university to know its students’ ideas on tolerance: “At this university, I found a 
strong focus on international affairs, and this academic mission qualifies its students with 
competency to challenge global context as well as to flourish the quality of the life of society 
[…] This is the principle [UIN Jakarta’s academic mission of international cooperation] that 
has impressed me very much,” said Balkenende.132  
 As an important turning point, this successful visit of His Excellency Balkenende to 
UIN Jakarta resulted in the Islamic Studies Program at Leiden University offering UIN 
Jakarta’s lecturers and staff Young Leaders Program scholarships to pursue doctoral studies 
at Leiden University. In consequence, a number of lecturers from UIN Jakarta pursued 
doctoral programs at Leiden University. These scholars included Mr. Kusmana and Mr. Din 
Wahid of the Faculty of Islamic Theology and Philosophy, and Mrs. Siti Nurul Azkiyah of the 
Faculty of Education and Teaching Sciences.133  
 
 Since 2006, UIN Jakarta has also welcomed a growing number of other distinguished 
international guests, such as the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt. Hon Helen Clark, on 18 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Valstar, Senior Policy Officer, South East Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Simone Bakker, Protocol 
Advisor of the Prime Minister, and three bodyguards: Marco Wesselius, Huib van Son, and Cornelis 
Burger.  The delegation from the Embassy of the Netherlands in Indonesia were Nikolaos van Dam, 
Ambassador, Peter Mollema, Head Political Section, Hans Smaling, Head Economic Section, Usha Gopie, Press 
Officer, Said Fazili, Second Secretary Political, Bert Venema, Security Manager, and Frank Knaapen, Logistics 
Manager.    
131
See “Draft yang akan diberikan sebagai pertimbangan untuk Pidato Perdana Menteri Negeri Belanda, Prof. 
Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende di Universitas Islam Negeri, Jakarta, Indonesia, 7 April 2006,” pp. 1-6, mainly 5.  I 
thank to Mrs. Nining and Mr. Said Fazili of the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta, who had sent me this unpublished 
draft a week ahead of the dialogue.  
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Ibid., pp. 1, 5. 
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Usep Abdul Matin, “The Indonesian Young Leaders Programme Offers Scholarship to UIN Jakarta,” in UIN 
News, 15
th
 edition, April 2007, p. 4.   
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July 2007. She delivered her public lecture on “Fostering the Alliance of Civilizations through 
Interfaith Dialogue” and witnessed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between UIN Jakarta and Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) in New Zealand. I was also 
a master of ceremony for this dialogue and the MoU in English. In a similar tone to 
Balkenende, Clark regarded UIN Jakarta as a distinguished university that contributes to 
Indonesia’s political, economic, and social development; she said so in her speech. She also 
stated that both New Zealand and Indonesia place great importance on peace and stability 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, her government approved funding for UIN Jakarta 
personnel to visit New Zealand on teaching fellowships during 2008.134  
 Given the fact that UIN Jakarta received international recognition of its academic 
progress, Rector Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat formed a new logo and motto for UIN Jakarta 
in 2007. According to the Rector, this logo should function in three main ways as follows: 
symbolic identity that draws the essence of UIN Jakarta, a route where by this university 
should develop by referring to this identity, and media to develop communication nationally 
and internationally.  
 The symbolic identity of UIN Jakarta refers to its open commitment of knowledge to 
amalgamate religious and general sciences, its spiritual steadfastness of piety as the quality 
of its academic life. This commitment of UIN Jakarta also identifies its cosmopolitan integrity 
as an international door to different cultures and perspectives. This symbolic identity has 
become the logo of UIN Jakarta that encompasses the orientation of Islam, science, and 
Indonesian-ness. This means that the new logo sketches a deep impression of UIN Jakarta as 
grand, modern, inclusive and international; it is to say that the new logo should indicate not 
only three characteristics (Islam, science, and Indonesian-ness) but also internationality.   
 On the basis of this cosmopolitan paradigm, the new logo of UIN Jakarta has seven 
characteristics: 1) the globe’s shadow, 2) an atom’s rotation, 3) a lotus flower, 4) a book, 5) 
white line on the phrase of UIN Jakarta, 6) blue, and 7) gold yellow colors. I insert the 
picture of this logo and the motto of UIN Jakarta as follows: 
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“PM’s Address at Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic University,” in http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/print.html, 
10/12/2008, pp. 1-5. Minister Prof. Dr. Bambang Sudibyo of National Educational Affairs (MONA) also 
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recipients of Presidential Scholars Fund (PSF): Mr. Badrus Sholeh, lecturer of the Department of International 
Relations of UIN Jakarta, and me of the Faculty of Literature and Humanities. Mr. Badrus accepted a letter of 
acceptance from Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. He dropped this nomination as he obtained 
Australian Development Scholarship to study at Deakin University, Australia. I took this PSF to pursue my 
doctoral study in the Social and Political Sciences Program, Monash University (September 2010 to the 
present). Furthermore, the successful visit of Prime Minister Rt. Hon Helen Clark resulted in university-to-
university-contract fellowship, namely between VUW and UIN Jakarta. In fact, two senior lecturers of UIN 
Jakarta, Prof. Dr. Bachtiar Effendy and Dr. Nurlena Rifai, appeared to have been successful as senior lecturers 
at VUW during April and June 2007, see Usep Abdul Matin, “Two Senior Lecturers of UIN Jakarta Visit VUW as 
Researchers,” in UIN News, 22
nd
 edition, May 2008. 
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 The globe’s shadow implies the broad-based horizon of UIN Jakarta, its mission of 
Islam and blessing the religion of the universe, and the mosque. The atom rotation entails 
knowledge that should endlessly be developed. This includes change and life dynamics that 
should be responded to as well as divine determination that should be contemplated by UIN 
Jakarta for the benefit of the universe. The lotus flower signifies sidrah. It is to say that each 
Muslim has an ideal to obtain the highest truth for the advantage of human beings. The 
kubah shows the qualification of the life and literature under the inspiration of the Qur’an 
and hadis (sayings of Prophet Muhammad and his companions) for the development of UIN 
Jakarta. The color white suggests humility in intellectual life. Blue is the color of deep 
knowledge, peace, and Nusantara archipelago, where diverse civilizations meet and 
exchange with each other. The golden yellow color means the ardor of UIN Jakarta towards 
golden years.135  
 This change in the logo connotes the keenness of UIN Jakarta in both enhancing 
academic life and responding to the needs of people nationally and internationally. In fact, 
its missions that include not only education, research, and social service but also 
international cooperation have conceived an excellent university following the positive 
models of universities in the West: Oxford, Cambridge, German universities, and especially 
those of North America. It is important to explain why UIN Jakarta has changed its logo; not 
all people understand this. For instance, a popular Islamic magazine Sabili magazine 
misunderstands totally this shift of logo.136 This change in logo signifies UIN Jakarta as a 
center of excellence in promoting better life in education, particularly its Islamic studies 
program. 
 In tandem with this promotion, on 14 and 15 August 2014, 73 experts of Islam in 
Southeast Asia from 57 universities of Indonesia and overseas went to UIN Jakarta to 
celebrate the 20th anniversary of its international journal, Studia Islamika, published by its 
Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat/PPIM). 
Some of these universities were UIN Malang, UIN Yogyakarta, Bandung Technology Institute 
(ITB), Monash University in Australia, Australian National University, Kyoto University, 
Utrecht University in the Netherlands, the University of Michigan, Boston University, 
Waseda University, Goethe University in Frankfurt, and the University of Kebangsaan, 
Malaysia. The experts of Islam in Southeast Asia of these universities presented their 
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findings that broadened their audience’s knowledge about Islam in Indonesia and in 
Southeast Asian countries.137 
Conclusion 
On the basis of these details, I draw a threefold conclusion as follows. First thought, I 
recognize that England with its Magna Carta in 1215 preceded other Western countries, 
such as the U.S (1776) and France (1789), in pioneering the most fundamental element of 
modernism: democracy.138 Nevertheless, second thought, I discovered that France seemed 
to be most influential in spreading this component in the Muslim world. This is evidenced by 
the fact that before its conquest of Egypt, France had become civilized by its revolution that 
reduced the absolutism of the king and built liberty. The impact of this conquest resulted in 
the modern concept i.e., citizenship, which spread to the Muslim countries, such as Turkey 
and India. Furthermore, the citizenship ideas of the Muslim scholars I explained above imply 
the status of freedom that accompanies political rights, including the rights to vote the 
rulers and to retain public office. In this context, the rulers should attach themselves to their 
responsibilities in public service. For this reason, I would say that citizenship is the 
characteristic of a modern cyber history. Along with this spirit, Western modern democracy 
emerges in the Muslim world in forms of consultation (shura), and allegiance (bay’a).  
In the third thought, I understand that the United States has emerged to exercise 
profound influence in the Muslim world, including Indonesia as the largest Muslim 
population in the world, especially with reference to the development of specific traditions 
now anticipated by universities in Indonesia, for example, and certainly at UIN Jakarta. This 
is evidenced by the fact that since the late 19th century, precisely 1862, American 
universities have adopted the positive models of European universities: education or in-
class learning model of Cambridge University and Oxford University in England, and the 
research and professorship models of Berlin under Von Humbolt in the 19th century. Not 
only did the U.S combine education and research, but also it added two other academic 
functions: community service and international cooperation. Since the latter 20th century, 
precisely in 1962, Indonesia has adopted these academic doctrines.  
These four academic functions are embedded in the new logo of UIN Jakarta that 
was launched on August 21, 2008 under the leadership of Rector Prof. Dr. Komaruddin 
Hidayat.  These four academic functions help UIN Jakarta promote its international status 
and build cross-cultural understanding. This promotion has seen distinguished leaders of 
other countries, such as His Excellency Prof. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende of New Zealand and 
Prime Minister Rt. Hon Helen Clark of New Zealand visit UIN Jakarta and hold dialogues on 
religions and civilizations. Furthermore, many experts in Southeast Asian Islam also shared 
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their findings in UIN Jakarta's international journal, Studia Islamika. Thereby, I believe, 
contributing to the making of a better world. 
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